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No 17, November 1989

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29 January 1990

[Translation of the Russian-language theoretical and political journal of the CPSU Central Committee published in Moscow 18 times per year.]

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Socialist Idea and Social Creativity

905B0011A Moscow *KOMMUNIST* in Russian No 17, Nov 89 (signed to press 15 Nov 89) pp 3-8

[Text] The idea of socialism is the leading idea in human history, its meaning and its live conscience. All mankind, with its past, present and foreseeable future development, is the spiritual homeland of socialist awareness. Wherever the horizons of social creativity have broadened, wherever it was not confused with a destructive thirst for violence and totally unrestrained arbitrariness or unjustified regulations, the constructive humane social idea caught fire and shed light, and the foundations of true socialist spirituality were laid.

Overt or "covert," realized or not, sometimes assuming strange illusory forms, it was present wherever the seeking mind of mankind presumed and created the principles of joint, collective coexistence based on freedom, fraternity, cohesion and moral advancement.

Naturally, as a compass of historical movement, the socialist idea did not take shape all of a sudden and all at once. It is the component and the consequence of quite conflicting trends in popular life, profound people's initiatives and serious and productive work of ideological-theoretical and practical-moral awareness which, together, prepared and guided social renovations. Therefore, the historical logic of the socialist doctrine should be distinguished from its specific history—the utopian forms of socialism from the realistic, the left-wing radical from the moderate-reformist, the democratic from the authoritarian, etc.

The socialist idea has many noted and outstanding authors. However, the creative work of the most outstanding among them—the creators of scientific socialism and the proletarian ideology of the international workers movement—is the scale against which one should check any social doctrine in testing its logical, theoretical and sociomoral purity.

The classics of Marxism-Leninism found the determining, the true substance of socialism: its material, spiritual, creative, socially useful, complex and difficult or, in short, free, labor. It is a labor which lays the foundation, the base for the appearance of new humane qualities and a new ethical quality of the working person himself. Anything which does not lead to such a humane historical objective is both actually and by definition not socialism. Regardless of the name we may give to a given social system, it will contain as much socialism as can be ensured by economic and political conditions and other

prerequisites for the humane, creative and free labor, which is the foundation of the comprehensively developed individual.

What does Stalin's dark criminally oriented way of thinking have in common with this understanding of socialism? Behind barbed-wire this man built a barracks, under the ideological cover and accompaniment of a murderous Marxian criticism of a "barracks communism," although we find intellectuals in our country who consider Marx a crypto-Stalinist. Stalin quite frequently violated the fundamental principles of human morality, yet it is being claimed that he was led into it by Marxism, with its alleged theory of universal destruction and violence, although the creators of Marxism tirelessly emphasized the senselessness, the futility of thoughtless destruction, and although Marx had in mind nothing other than the fact that universal human morality will stop being a meaningless abstraction and a pious wish only when it is supported by the real interests of large social groups and, above all, by the struggle of the proletariat for its own and for universal liberation.

This last thought, naturally, can be developed and refined in accordance with changed circumstances, acquired experience and new thinking. What is the purpose of seeking the "doctrinal origins" where essential theoretical concepts are easily sacrificed to political circumstances and to the rules of the apparatus-bureaucratic struggle for power?

The same applies to protracted efforts made in the West and now in our fatherland as well to "derive" Stalinism from bolshevism and to present Stalinism as the logical projection of Lenin's thoughts. This concept of the nature of Stalinism is nonhistorical and, to say the least, not particularly perspicacious.

Although there were certain "sins" of which one could accuse bolshevism, dictatorship excesses, and so on, caused by the exceptionally stressed Civil War (and the global imperialist war which preceded it), as well as utopian illusions, poverty, dislocation, popular indignation and impatience, they were separated from Stalinism by a period of serious democratic and economic restructuring in the 1920s, the antibureaucratic trend of Leninism, innovative steps in national building and many others. All of these trends were rudely interrupted by the Stalinist leadership and the subsequent evolution of the regime of authoritarian power, which greatly departed from the bolshevik, the Leninist line of development.

Naturally, it was not exclusively the consequence of the arbitrariness of a single individual. It had its deep historical roots in the history of the Russian Empire. It rested on the underdeveloped political awareness of the people, honest errors, and groundless dreams of the possibility of attaining universal social equality on the basis of the forced distribution of the public wealth equally among all (those who today passionately condemn this faith as being the offspring of base lumpen passions should recall that it was preceded by many

centuries of violence and oppression. This was, in all likelihood, all that could develop from the existence of a mass awareness within a maimed human universe, squeezed within the clutches of economic, political and cultural alienation). However, nor should we fail to see here the deliberate malicious deformation of the initial socialist idea.

An idea never becomes false because it was distorted, and even less so if the distortions have tragic consequences. The specific feature of the socialist ideal, based on the free and humane creative labor, was inscribed on the banners of the revolution: "Land to the peasants;" "the factories to the workers;" "peace to the peoples;" and "power to the soviets." There was no error in the socialist choice; the tragedy lied in the retreat from the chosen way.

It is this political and ethical guideline that defines our present socialist attitude toward obtaining a share of the social material and cultural wealth which the working person has the right to expect. With equal starting, or initial conditions there must be equal social reward for equal labor and greater reward for better labor.

Today a social quality of life different from that in the past is arising. Previously unknown word combinations are becoming part of the political vocabulary, reflecting the new ideology of interrelationship between the individual and society, between the citizen and the state: "social pension," or "social leave." Gradually yet sharply the state is turning around to face man, turning into a truly social rather than specific-bureaucratic formation.

For that reason the working person is the beginning and the end of the theoretical socialist idea and becomes (must become!) the guideline, the necessary prerequisite, the co-author and the active participant in political practices. He is the highest value and everything else (the condition of production forces, industry, forms of ownership, state structure, law, culture and ideology) are means to the assertion of this value; they can and must be subjected to theoretical and, above all, constructive practical historical criticism.

Although experiencing major difficulties today, we must not allow anyone's nerves to give out and for them to become tempted to start tightening up the political and ideological bolts and turn society back to the state of stagnation, concealing their inability to resolve social problems with this tried and simple method. No one should nurture any illusions whatsoever in this case. We find ourselves at a sociohistorical watershed in which we simply must go forward toward true socialism. It was precisely thus that V.I. Lenin formulated the question in 1917, in his work "The Threatening Catastrophe and How to Fight It," noting that in history one cannot stand still. One goes either forward or backward.

Under our circumstances, going backward does not mean at all going back into a thoughtless swamp-stagnant existence and a counterreformation in the spirit of the familiar inviolable "principles."

Going back would be something incomparably worse: economic chaos, political anarchy and, as their consequence, a military-police bureaucratic dictatorship. Such, in our view, is the most likely alternative to the renovation of socialism.

A time during which the entire society becomes involved in the process of economic and spiritual renovation, a time of radical reforms which set a "program" for social development for decades into the future, is rarely accompanied by political stability. It is at such a time that all the contradictions of social life become manifested particularly sharply and emphatically, particularly those which have been previously suppressed deep inside the social organism, concealed by ideological slogans and squeezed by the power pressure of the political regime.

Political instability can defeat any reformist activities. It is as though today the simple problems of economic life (the availability or lack of washing detergent, for example) assume a political dimension. The imbalance in the economic mechanism, in the course of which the old structures no longer operate at full capacity while the new are still not operational, the dislocation of the consumer market and the price-setting system, and increased inflationary trends under the condition of an awakened (unquestionably, both desired and necessary) political activeness on the part of the people all, unfortunately, also lead to the awakening of political emotions which are not always kept under control.

An excessively impatient desire to urge on the reorganization process with the help of endless meetings and strikes has developed within a certain population segment. One could easily imagine the result, which is the worsening of an already difficult situation. There have also appeared idols of a democracy through meetings, amateurs of making history with a whip and spurs, using the help of the mass information media—left-wing radical speakers, who believe that there will be more bread and democracy in the country the more high sounding are their democratic-liberal incantations. In practice such activities produce nothing other than group egoism, which is our current socioeconomic scourge.

Under such circumstances, the government is afraid (not without a reason) to make unpopular decisions and the population (not without reasons) has undertaken to criticize the authorities. This is a fact which should concern not only the party leadership but also the members of the Supreme Soviet and the people's deputies, particularly those who, adopting the populist slogans, are ready to support not only sensible but also obviously unrealistic demands formulated by their constituents.

One can only subscribe to the appeal of the miners in Makeyevka, in which they call on their colleagues—the

miners in the North, "to display prudence and thoughtfulness and a worker's responsibility for the fate of the country." "As we know," the miners write, "the USSR Supreme Soviet passed a number of socially significant laws. We must give the government time to implement them. Let us do this like workers, with dignity. Let us listen to the voice of the people and end the strike."

The situation is alarming but we should react to it calmly and soberly. The difficulties are serious and objective but not fatal. Unquestionably, they include a great deal of justified people's discontent, which took years to accumulate. However, they also include various prejudices and popular illusions as well as quasi-revolutionary aspirations to solve most social problems in one fell swoop, within the shortest possible time. Many of the objective difficulties of our development are the result of the obstruction of the past sluggish economic and political structures; however, a great deal of them are due also to subjective errors and to the underdeveloped nature of social theory.

For the time being our social science is unable to tell us where and to what extent in our country today are there greater obstructions to perestroika: in real life or in the mind? Perhaps until the scientific verdict has been passed we should agree to consider as equally important the reorganization of the economy and the "perestroika" of our own minds. Jointly, all of us together, will eventually develop a harmonious consistency between economic expediency, political realism and moral obligations. When making a political decision we should not have to choose between the bad and the worse, or between the greater or lesser evil; in our federated state the balance of centrifugal and centripetal forces should be a guarantee of progress.

In social life, unlike physics, the center is not a spatial but a political concept, in which democratic centralism is a necessary prerequisite for normal social activities. For the time being, humanity has not invented anything better, for the alternatives to it are anarchy, crowd rule, tyranny, etc. This entire set of alternatives has already been experienced by history and there is absolutely no need to repeat it.

It is a question not only of what democratic centralism means, for the question is more or less clear, but of how more completely to achieve a truly democratic centralism under our political and economic circumstances. How, for example, to implement this general democratic principle in party building?

For example, recently a CPSU Central Committee member complained in the central press saying that he did not know what he, a member of the Central Committee, should be doing in the period between plenums and, furthermore, how to implement the party line as formulated at the congress and the plenums. It was as though no one was guiding his work. Naturally, one could sympathize with such a member of the Central

Committee. The question, however is who should personally instruct such a person holding such a high party rank? Should it be the general secretary? Why should he simply implement the formulated strategy instead of actively formulating it? Who and what is preventing him from formulating constructive suggestions in any one of the commissions of the Central Committee or at home, in the obkom or raykom? Without such activeness this becomes no longer democratic but bureaucratic centralism.

Our present aggravated problems of nationalities cannot be resolved without observing the practices of democratic centralism. Today the thoroughly warped national consciousness and national feeling, deformed after years of tyranny and authoritative rule, sometimes seek to resolve their national problems by seceding, by leaving the USSR.

Naturally, this is only the semblance of a solution. The world is familiar with many seemingly sovereign but in fact totally dependent countries. The right to self-determination is only part of a democratic social system. It is a necessary but insufficient prerequisite for national independence.

V.I. Lenin noted that socialism stands above the right of nations to self-determination as well as above formal democracy. It stands above them, naturally, not in the sense that one must choose between them and socialism and give preference (as was actually interpreted by Stalin) to socialism, but in that true socialism presumes theoretically, logically and actually both the former and the latter, practicing not only formal but also true democracy. The reverse is by no means always true. Only socialism can guarantee the fullness and completion of social changes. It is the most adequate social creativity of the popular masses.

However, no creativity can exist on the basis of strict dogmatic stereotypes. Social renovation must be accompanied also by the ideology of renovation, which can be nothing other than a renovated ideology. This applies to economics, politics, power and culture. Without ideological reformation we shall be unable to accomplish reforms in other areas as well. We shall simply have nothing to reform. In the final account, we must determine what is more important to us: to preserve the basic, the socialist principle and the socialist future of development or to bury them under the wreckage of the dogmatic building of ideological cliches and political standards which cannot be subject to perestroika.

At the recently held discussion on problems of development of the economy by the party Central Committee, M.S. Gorbachev noted that at a given stage "we by no means did everything possible to provide ideological support for the policy of perestroika." While entirely agreeing with this conclusion, the editors must also accept part of the blame for it.

There has been a drop in subscriptions to the journal. Under the existing conditions, the burden of the old

thinking proved to be too heavy for the journal's authority. The journal must not be a simple ideological retranslator of higher party decisions and resolutions. It must become an organ of creative Marxist thinking, the political and theoretical journal of the party's Central Committee, and an efficient instrument in its ideological consolidation. All too frequently our praiseworthy aspiration not to pin political labels and not to administer "ideological slaps in the face" but to display restraint and control were perceived as the desire to stand "above the fray," and to preserve some kind of "academic" neutrality. The result of this was the all too infrequent publication in the journal of clashes of radical positions and dissident views, the lack of specific targets of critical remarks and, therefore, a lack of sharp problems of political life.

We erred not because we tried to avoid a tone of intolerance in debates because we "failed to notice" many "passions" which seethed around us and, with them, a sharp clash of interests and deep conflicts in political awareness. The error was not that we did not avoid discussions but that such discussions were frequently excessively speculative, little reacting to the signals of concern based on practical experience (and on the speculation itself). Our numerous roundtables frequently sounded like pleasant discussions in the company of like-minded people, for which reason they could convince only those who were already convinced of the initial rightness of the debaters.

These and other errors influenced the reduced subscriptions to the journal, from which the editors draw serious and self-critical conclusions concerning both the content and the form of presentation of the material.

The journal has no intention of avoiding any sharp socially significant sociopolitical problem. Conversely, the mission of a theoretical party publication is the full identification of the problems and the mobilization for their resolution of the intellectual potential of society. Our line, which is also the political position of the journal, should be marked extremely clearly and simply: we are in favor of anything which is considered and properly substantiated, and which is not prohibited by moral and political "laws," while the political priority will be defined exclusively by the usefulness and timeliness of the articles. Renovated socialism is the ideal law of our printed organ, actual and present.

In presenting to the attention of the public an issue which is topical and which deals with the problems of socialism, the editors have deemed it necessary to offer its pages to the broadest possible range of authors—readers and social science specialists. In its issue No 13 for 1989 the journal published the article "For a New Aspect of Socialism." Judging by the readers' mail, this article triggered a certain social reaction. As a whole, it was critically well-wishing. This means that our readers feel the urgent need to continue the debate on this topic. Today's appeals to the press not to obstruct the government should not be interpreted as a demand of

remaining idle. What hinders the work is irresponsible actions, explosions of unnecessary emotions and empty blabbering. However, no project has ever been hindered by a serious and interested discussion in which pluralism and multiplicity of voices have brought to light the most considered and weighed and, therefore, also principled party position. This is particularly important when a debate in connection with the forthcoming 28th CPSU Congress is extensively developing within the party and the society.

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READERS' VIEWS

Thinking of Socialism; Survey of Editorial Mail

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[Text] In this issue we have dedicated this section of our journal which usually includes letters and various viewpoints on a variety of current problems, to a single topic: the views of the readers concerning the fate and prospects of socialism and its past, present, and future. Such letters have accounted for a significant portion of editorial mail in recent months, which allows us to speak of a certain "social instruction," a social need for the interpretation of the positive and negative sides of historical experience, the contemporary state of socialist theory and practice and, above all, the objectives and methods of their future development.

Following are some preliminary remarks concerning the letters on such matters sent to the journal.

First, in selecting the materials for this survey, we tried to meet the conditions set by the authors of many of the letters. "I do not wish at all," writes A. Semenov, CPSU member since 1926, "for my letter, like some other, to be reviewed by some old professor or academician who will make his assessments looking down on us." This is a legitimate wish which we shall honor, observing the "authorship right" of our readers. Furthermore, it is not a question in the least of dotting all the "i" in this debate and mandatorily sum up its results. This is not a discussion which began today or will end today: there were discussions in April 1985, at the 27th CPSU Congress and the 19th All-Union Party Conference; ahead of us is the 28th Congress and the discussions which will precede it and which cannot fail to touch upon the complex problems of our social development.

Second, necessarily the letters quoted here must be abridged. We have tried, however, to preserve their basic concepts unaltered. We have to mention this, for several readers have presented the editors with something in the nature of an ultimatum: either publish the material in full (which, naturally, is difficult to achieve considering the number of letters) or else not publish them at all, for if abridged, according to P.G. from Odessa, "the item

inevitably becomes emasculated and unsubstantiated." "Therefore," he goes on to say, "in that situation I would prefer to go with the heartfelt wish of the fighter before the attack: better be killed than maimed." Well, even such a wish we must respect, although this is not always possible.

Hence the third remark: It was easy to single out in the journal's mail dozens of letters the essence of which may be reduced to the old familiar "we support" and "we approve" formulas. However, such "supports" and "approvals," unsupported by original thinking, hardly add anything to the debate or make it any more efficient. We truly encourage the manifestation of real alternate choices. Let the best options be asserted through debate. Let choices be argumentative but original, the result of one's own thinking, the interpretation of personal and social experience, even if such thoughts may not be liked by some of the participants in the discussion or be alien to his views on pluralism of opinions.

Finally, our mail indicates that perestroyka has awakened in the people a long-dormant interest in social phenomena, the wish to analyze and understand them, the aspiration to transform the people's destiny and the destiny of the society in which they live from the role of a "cog" into that of "designer." It may be that to some theoreticians the views, arguments, and conclusions may seem insufficiently convincing. However, we invite them, like all other readers, to participate in the ongoing debate in this journal.

And now...

What Was Built?

"In order to evaluate more accurately the great significance and difficulty of the past, we must soberly and openly look at the condition of our society today," opens the discussion G. Bulatov, labor veteran and candidate of technical sciences (Moscow). His view is supported by many other letter writers, who believe that without a critical view on reality we shall be unable to achieve a radical renovation, a revolutionary revival of our life.

The entire trouble is caused by the alienation caused by the statification of ownership. Such is the way we could sum up the letter by I. Koval, from Ivano-Frankovsk. It is true, he stipulates, that "statified ownership may not be such a bad thing, providing that the state is a state of the people not in words but in deeds. But what happened in practice? Ownership and, consequently, the products of consumption found themselves in the hands of the state. To the worker this was simply an alienation, whatever else we may have been telling him. In order to pacify him, they started telling him that he was the state, that he was democratically electing his representatives who, allegedly, were defending his interests. In fact, everything was being run by officials, production managers, state employees and bureaucrats, departments and even individual criminal elements and embezzlers of public funds.

The same occurred with the political superstructure. The statification of the entire ownership of means of production presumed strict regulation and planned production activities. Other areas of social and personal life were statified as well. Finally, for decades the existing political system was being adapted not to the organization of social life within the law but mainly to the implementation of arbitrary orders."

What was the result? The most complete list of social "sore spots," encompassing the views of other authors, is found in the letter by Sh. Achakeyev, a physician from the Kirghiz city of Kara-Balta. In his words, he uses the "opportunity granted by glasnost to press with materialistic mercilessness the hidden springs of our social system and 'sift' them through the time machine." The picture he presents is the following:

"The vulnerability of common ownership and the fact that it is nobody's triggered the idea of the negation of statehood based on the crisis of planning and financial affairs and excessive centralism. The working class remained a hired force and, furthermore, together with its 'junior brother,' the peasantry, was subjected to most cruel repression. After the collectivization the peasant surrendered. He left the land (an example of unparalleled degradation is the Russian Nonchernozem, although the situation is no better in other areas). A scornful and denigrating attitude toward knowledge appeared. Not a scientist but even a literate person was considered as some kind of miracle maker, a kind of hero; the physical destruction of the intelligentsia, exile and prohibitions became fact of life.... Under such circumstances, where could competence come from? It was replaced by antiprofessionalism and primitive management.

"Our unique negligence is the inevitable consequences of the rejection of economic logic and of unquestionable economic categories. Bureaucratism imbued all pores of society. Many people became contaminated with dependency: the kind lord will come, the good tsar and the good prophet will come; the lucky chairman or director will come and the desired subsidies and loans will start flowing, wages will increase, goods will be imported.... It will be a good life without any effort. To this day the people ironically mumble about 'Brezhnev' communism, according to which all that was left was to feed the people three meals daily, equalization and living beyond one's means: Is this not truly the perfect system for destroying the activeness of production forces and enterprise? Society, however, wants more and more nonmaterialized benefits. However, all of this was used up during Brezhnev's 'stagnation communism.'

"The rejection of continuity," the author goes on to say, "dealt a hard blow at the universal, the civil experience, at morality and ethics, culture, art, and religious tolerance. Direct monopoly and disciplinary rules appeared everywhere: the need to stand at attention, to listen to the command, to speak, understand and think 'accurately,' to be part of the majority and to participate in defaming the minority.... The forced isolation of our

citizens from the universal human community deprived them of the elementary possibility of even exchanging experience in ordinary life. Having lost the skill to communicate, the Soviet person shows 'in the world' as an entertaining child drawing universal attention, as though playing a farce. The person himself, however, is pursued by the persistent idea of creating fictitious images of a nonexistent enemy: everywhere and in everything we are exposing the ill-wishers, violators, enemies of the people, petit bourgeois elements, revisionists, opportunists, factionalists, nationalists, chauvinists, dissidents, and simply foreign spies."

The easiest thing would be to accuse the authors of this and other similar letters of defaming, of unnecessarily dramatizing the view on surrounding reality. This author himself notes that "such an analysis creates a depressing impression." However, he explains his view with the fact that "any lighter assessment of the condition of our society contributes to the formulation of lightened plans." Like many like-minded people, the author of this letter believes that "several decades of our development based on an imperfect and nonimprovable form of ownership, despite intensified aggressive attacks against the very idea of socialism, quite clearly confirms the amazing viability of the socialist social system. Metaphorically speaking, socialism is making its way to its future through the thorns. A curious observer cannot fail to notice that the idea of socialism cannot be weakened."

That is precisely why, we believe, the people raise ever new questions concerning the present state of society. "A great deal is being said about socialism today both at home and abroad," writes **B. Pogorelov** (Kiev), party member since 1945. The people are trying to determine what should be understood by socialism. I believe that we must abandon the customary stereotypes and the simple enumeration of its features which do not reveal the essence of socialism as a social category. Articles published on this topic sin by their not always clear and confused scientific tone. However, in order to be able to know everything and consciously judge of everything one must profoundly study the essence of phenomena."

Such demands addressed at social science teachers, notes **N. Nazarova**, docent, Department of Scientific Communism, Odessa Institute of the National Economy, are formulated by students who "are unwilling to accept half-truths which do not agree with reality." Therefore, the author of this letter believes, it is necessary "above all to determine what it is that we mean by socialism." Here are her views:

"Today a great variety of interpretations can be found in published articles. Some people understand by socialism the ideals and aspirations of people; others consider the socioeconomic system; others again think of theory. That is why we sometimes resemble the builders of the Tower of Babel, who spoke in different languages. Some believe that socialism, as a socioeconomic system, has not been built as yet; others, objecting to them, claim that the ideals of socialism were part of the Great

October Revolution and that they are alive, despite all deformations. However, these are arguments based on different sets of coordinates. There is absolutely no doubt that the impetus provided by the October Revolution has always been alive in the people. Without the ideals of socialism, which neither the years of Stalinist repression nor the corruption during the period of stagnation were able to destroy in the people, there would have been no perestroika. In order to clarify the nature of our society, from the socioeconomic viewpoint, obviously we must begin by answering the question of what is the nature of the contradictions and of perestroika."

The author of this letter (as, actually, other readers such as **Ye. Radchenko**, docent, Rostov State University) conclude that in our country socialism has not been built yet or, in any case, not in its Marxist, its Leninist understanding. The main argument is the following: Since perestroika calls for the revolutionary elimination of economic and political structures, this means that antagonistic contradictions exist within society (K. Marx believes that once "class antagonism has disappeared, social evolutions will no longer mean political revolutions." K. Marx and F. Engels. "*Soch.*" [Works], vol 4, p 185); antagonistic contradictions prove, in turn, that socialism has still not been built (according to Lenin, "antagonism and contradiction are by no means identical. The former will disappear while the latter will remain under socialism," "*Leninskiy Sbornik XI*" [Leninist Collection No 11], p 357).

"What then did we build?" **N. Nazarova** asks. She offers her answer: "It will be nothing new to say that we built a barracks-bureaucratic socialism." Also categorical is **V. Fedorov**, candidate of economic sciences, Moscow: "We must put in scientific circulation a term which would clearly indicate the fact that the social system which exists in our country is oriented toward socialism and has some of its features but does not coincide with it. In my view, the word 'quasi-socialism' would do nicely."

G. Sokol, from Petropavlovsk, offers his own conceptual alternative: "Since," he believes, "in our country the dictatorship of bureaucracy rules, it has become a state of a social-bureaucratic type. Therefore, the only solution today is to put an end to bureaucratism, which is the worst enemy of socialism, and to restore true Marxist-Leninist socialism, i.e., a state of dictatorship of the working class."

Without joining the terminological debate, **D. Yermoshin** (Kerch) writes: "It turned out, however, that a society built 'strictly according to Marx' chronically lags in its socioeconomic development behind the capitalist countries (a lag which is steadily increasing); that repeated attempts to correct matters failed; and that in the mid-1980s, under the guise of 'developed socialism' the country reached a pre-crisis situation and stopped at the brink of the precipice only thanks to April 1985. All of this makes us seriously question that which for decades was considered the absolute truth, and to acknowledge that the society we built is either not

socialist at all or else that in our country socialism was subjected to the greatest possible deformation. The purpose of perestroika in its revolutionary essence is, therefore, the formulation of a truly socialist mechanism for the functioning of society."

"It is difficult to agree with those who believe that the society in which we live is not socialist," says V. Ovchinnikov, head of the Department of Philosophy, Kalinin-grad State University, doctor of philosophical sciences, entering the debate by correspondence. "Essentially, this viewpoint calls for rejecting the 'zero option,' and takes perestroika out of the context of the historical dynamics of socialism. However, this is nondialectical. Socialism as well could have its own early and underdeveloped forms. One of them, as many historians justifiably believe, is state-administrative socialism."

Naturally, everyone has the right to have his own preference for one or another definition and we shall not, as we agreed, assume the role of umpire. However, something in which all of our correspondents are virtually unanimous is their dissatisfaction with the current condition of the society. Hence a natural turn to past experience, and the efforts to understand the nature and causes of deformation and to establish their "date of birth." Despite all the nuances found in the views expressed by the authors of such letters, they can be divided into two basic categories: those in whose view true socialist development was interrupted in the 1920s, and those who believed that all troubles started in March 1953.

In Search of the Reasons

Actually, it is a question of two viewpoints on socialism. One of them, to sum up the view of our readers, was expressed for the first time by Marx in his "*Critique of the Gotha Program*," which stipulates that the nationwide ownership of means of production, owned equally by all working people ("nothing other than individual consumption items could be the private property of individuals;" "every individual producer receives back from society, after all deductions, exactly as much as he has contributed to society"). Obviously, a nationalized economy excludes the full functioning of mechanisms such as a free market, competition, law of value, commodity-monetary relations, and so on, for which reason control over the production and distribution of goods takes place on a centralized basis, with the help of total planning, accountability, and control. Equally centralized, based on a single plan, is the management of all other areas of social life. This concept, the authors of this group of letters believe, was canonized by Stalin's "*Short Course*," and since then has dominated unchallenged in theory and practice as the only accurate one.

In recent years, however, in connection with perestroika, another view on socialism has been the subject of growing interest. It considers socialism to be an association of free producers, a "system of civilized

members of cooperatives" (Lenin). This viewpoint, supported by many readers, stipulates a collective (cooperative) ownership of means of production; the latter, like the products of labor, belong to the direct producers, the working people, not working people "in general," as in the former case, but specific people using specific means of production and producing a given commodity. Trade among individual producers takes place on a free market and the laws of value, free competition, monetary system, and so on, operate at full capacity. Since the labor product belongs to the direct producers they also own the profits from the sale of the products on the market which, (after all the necessary withholdings in favor of the social funds) can be handled by the working people as they wish.

We hear in this discussion by correspondence differing voices as well, expressing different viewpoints on socialism. Here, for example, is the view expressed by P.G. from Odessa, that same one who would "rather be killed than maimed" (his views, in a concentrated expression, reflect the views of an entire group of readers, such as B. Yelizarov (Kalinin), war and labor veteran, A. Bespyatko (Moscow), CPSU member since 1942, A. Semenov, the already mentioned resident of Gorki, the city in Belorussia, and others): "Sticking out of the 'new concept of socialism' submitted today for discussion are poorly concealed traces of the notorious Bernstein credo: the end objective is nothing and movement is everything, for the renovation of socialism on the basis of commodity-monetary and market relations could go on forever or at least until socialism has degenerated into capitalism. This concept of revisionist pluralism is based on the form of ownership. It is the same as the capitalist cooperatives and leasing. This is nothing other than allowing exploitation and social stratification. This is the same old parliamentarian state, false social democracy, and the same old reliance on the Boss (with a capital letter), and his initiative and free enterprises to which the entire bourgeois understanding of freedom is reduced. It is that same old abstract humanism (all people are brothers, love one another!). It is that same old promotion of egotistical interest.... This concept is based on the same old delights which V.I. Lenin totally destroyed in his criticism of reformism and revisionism."

"Marxism-Leninism," the author goes on to say, "as we know does not accept models. The objective truth about socialism and communism exists in a **single copy** and needs no models whatsoever.... It is difficult to believe that the authors of the 'modern concept of socialism' are unaware of this. Apparently, however, the passionate desire to separate the Stalinist times from socialism and supply theoretical crutches to the uninspired policy of perestroika were what led them to join the company of 'model makers'."

But what about V.I. Lenin's last works and the need, in his words, "for a radical change of our entire viewpoint of socialism?" Let us turn once again to the letter by

P.G.: The "model-makers," who are today fighting dogmatism more loudly than anyone else are themselves dogmatists of the worst variety. They derive V.I. Lenin's thoughts on the NEP from his overall theory of socialism, promoting them into an absolute and assuming that this is socialism in its final and true Leninist understanding. They are not concerned with the explanations given by Lenin in which he emphasized dozens of times that the NEP is merely a tactic in the struggle for socialism, the essence of which is a temporary retreat from the already gained positions with a view to regrouping forces for a new offensive on the as yet unbidden and newly developing capitalism under the NEP. The "model-makers" are unwilling to note within the strict temporal frameworks of the NEP as defined by Lenin that "we could successfully complete this stage in 1 or 2 decades" (*"Poln. Sobr. Soch."* [Complete Collected Works], vol 45, p 372).

That same Leninist statement is cited in his letter by V. Savchenko, a student from Chelyabinsk. He adds, however, that "that which actually happened is known." Yet here are two views of members of the senior generation. The already mentioned Muscovite G. Bulatov writes: "A rather long period is needed to lay the economic foundations for the new society. The NEP was such a transitional period. Lenin's premature death did not allow the implementation of the plan. Stalin, who seized the power after him, turned away from this path and began to promote a strict repressive policy." He is supported by V. Smirnov (Moscow), CPSU member since 1943: "History is familiar with many cases proving that the withdrawal from Leninism led to failures, defeats, and even catastrophes and misfortunes. The rejection of the Leninist principles of cooperation (coercion instead of voluntary participation; the kolkhoz instead of a gradual conversion from lower to higher forms and from procurement-marketing to production; plunder of the peasantry instead of financial support of the cooperative movement), which resulted in the fact that to this day agriculture is unable to supply the country with food. Such examples could be extended. They include replacing the Leninist line of merciless struggle against bureaucratism and restricting the omnipotence of the apparatus of the administrative system created by Stalin. Were these not the topics of the final works, letters, and speeches of V.I. Lenin? Therefore, did Lenin advocate, as some writers write today, the creation of an administrative system? To turn the great Lenin into a zealous supporter of the administrative system means not only to slander him but also to make an effort to deprive our party and the Soviet people of this exceptionally important, this crucial ideological legacy without which no perestroika is possible. The rejection of the Leninist doctrine and his concepts of socialism will doom us to new errors, failures, difficulties, and privations."

We believe it interesting to study also the viewpoint of retired teacher N. Radichuk from Novovolynsk (Volynsk Oblast), who expresses views on the currently actively

discussed question of the sources of Stalinism and the subjective and objective factors of its appearance. According to this author, Stalinism is the "best illustration of the result of neglecting the petit bourgeois danger. In practice this means the petit bourgeois distortion of Marxist socialist ideas. All suffer: the working class, which is virtually removed from power, the discredited ideas of socialism, and the petite bourgeoisie itself, as it implements its essentially reactionary ideas. It would be naive to claim that the ill-will of one individual, even supported by dozens of other 'fellow workers' sufficed to promote this entire collectivization. This 'ill-will' did exist but it implemented its objectives by involving powerful social forces. A major role was played in this unparalleled battle by the declassed, the lumpen elements. The 'depeasantization' was carried out not by the will, the power or the interest of the industrial working class which, according to the Marxist-Leninist idea, should play the leading role in the state of proletarian dictatorship. It was promoted by that same peasant, even frequently by fellow villagers, guided not by Marxist but by petit bourgeois ideology—petty jealousy, settling old accounts, and primitive concepts of equality. It is that same mentality which, as it happens, is still operating today and is manifested in equalization and even in facts of open terrorism and sabotage aimed against those who try to work and earn as much as they can.

Why was it that the gains of the October Revolution and the Soviet system did not perish totally? Because Stalinism, like a petit bourgeois deviation within Marxism, was just that, a deviation, and did not break entirely with Marxism.

The leftist distortion of Marxism-Leninism and the victory of leftism as a deviation are the starting point for all of our latter distortions and difficulties. Stalin and his personal qualities played a role only to the extent to which a person with such a mentality could systematically implement clearly unviable ideas.

In the view of the author of this letter, substantial corrections must be made also in our understanding of what was wrong in Stalinism. It is usually believed that it was a question of distorted concepts of socialism and that we must formulate a different model of socialism, a different concept. In reality, the main errors should be sought not in any particular vision of socialism, although it did exist quite distortedly in Stalinism, but in the ways of progress toward socialism, and in the means of building it.

This viewpoint seems to have a built-in refusal: the means of building is determined by the objective; one cannot build without a clear idea of what precisely should be built.

This is accurate if applied to, let us say, a building; however, here we are dealing with social development in the understanding of which mechanicism is inadmissible. To presume that the laws governing the development of society are as familiar as the laws of mechanics

and they both operate in the same way means to display unforgivable superficiality which turns into social catastrophes. A dam or a canal is simpler than a social system; today, however, it is no longer necessary to prove that the correlation between desirable and unpredictably negative circumstances in their building are by no means always in our favor. Even worse results are obtained in an arbitrary invasion in social developments.

Stalinism proceeded from a given system, a given model, formulated quite tangibly away from reality but considered as an ideal, as the absolute achievement of science. Stalinism introduced socialism from above. Socialism, however, cannot be introduced, it grows, it takes shape as a result of the natural development of society. Socialism is not a theoretical given once and for all, which must be strictly followed; concepts of socialism develop and are concretized in the course of the very process of building it. The main error of Stalinism was not only that its initial concept of socialism sinned with its great many petit bourgeois prejudices (an absolute model of a future society is in principle impossible) but that this concept was raised to the rank of absolute truth and the successes in building socialism were measured not in terms of customary traditional indicators of social progress but of newly invented indicators of the consistency of social life with the formulated scheme. Thus, in the "great change" successes in building socialism were measured not in terms of productive labor or the well-being and standards of the people but the level of collectivization.

Here is another excerpt from the letter of D. Yermoshin, whom we already mentioned:

"Today the total domination of socialism based on the 'Short Course,' in both theory and practice is coming to an end. Increasingly, in the course of perestroika, we turned to the Leninist model of the new society, considering it the foundation for today's reforms. The attitude toward this process is quite varied, ranging from its categorical rejection and negation (undermining foundations! discrediting sacred principles!) to unconditional approval, considering the 'new NEP' the only solution to the situation.

"Meanwhile, the success of perestroika depends precisely on the extent to which we can clearly and efficiently determine for ourselves the typical, the essential features of the socialist social system and derive from them the specific content of economic and social reforms. We cannot build real socialism by acting intuitively and blindly. That is why it is so important today to do that which Lenin was unable to accomplish in his time, i.e., using the dialectical-materialistic method of analysis and based on the experience gained over the decades since the October Revolution, theoretically to substantiate and elaborate a concept for real socialism, consistent both with the strategic and tactical tasks involved in building socialism."

Looking at the Future

In suggesting and substantiating various features of the collective portrait of socialist society in which they would like to live, the readers do not consider their views as the "final truth." They appeal for theoretical considerations which should lead to the formulation of conceptual approaches and resolutions; they appeal to the CPSU and its leading agencies, addressing to them their own suggestions via the journal. The authors emphasize the need for a new, a more productive mechanism for information gathering and processing and, on this basis, a truly creative development of Marxist-Leninist doctrine, which would take into consideration and sum up the results of free social discussions. The readers would like for their current thoughts to be taken into consideration, to be analyzed and compared by society and science, for the 28th Party Congress is not too far into the future; the mail reveals that particular hope is being linked to the congress in terms of the theoretical interpretation of the topical problems of socialism and the formulation, as notes A. Shustov, doctor of historical sciences (Kostroma) of an "overall vision of socialism by 'coupling' economic, political, social, and spiritual areas in our society." The authors, therefore, are trying to make their contribution to the pre-congress debate.

"The model of a society, whatever its system, depends on its economic system and dominant relations in the process of the social division of labor," begins his letter V. Khudyakov, a locomotive engineer from Tynda (Amur Oblast). "The foundations of the entire public building are production relations, the most important element of which is the form of ownership. This elementary feature of Marxist political economy has been asserted in our country, in my view, only theoretically, scholastically. Practical economics exists as though specifically for the purpose of refuting all the conclusions reached by the founders of scientific communism.

"It may seem that the simple Marxist truth is the following: Whatever the system in a society, the political power is wielded exclusively by those who own the basic means of production. In theoretical political economy no one would risk to refute this Marxist historical summation. It is axiomatic. But what do we see in the practices of our country? Our soviets, as we know, have had no ownership of basic means of public production and trade in the course of their 70-year old history. Nonetheless, according to the Constitution (Article 2) somehow, miraculously, they are the agencies of popular rule. If such an article is part of the Fundamental Law, and if it is important and significant, it should be supported in practice, materialistically, in a Marxist fashion, for Marxism-Leninism cannot be tricked by phraseology. We know that whenever a forgery has been accepted in the past, failures have followed.

"Honest and true Marxism replaces private ownership with collective ownership by the associations of free producers. Such associations, in my view, are the labor collectives rallied by the soviets. The soviets will lease

from the state (society) all industrial and agricultural enterprises and organize production and trade. That, in particular, is what 'Soviet socialism' is.

"In my view, unlike 'state', 'Soviet socialism' eliminates the notorious mechanism of hindering a radical economic reform. It cannot exist outside of competition, commodity rivalry, and extensive offer of commodities and services to the population. All soviets on different levels should produce, trade, form corporations, form companies, and develop new production facilities or, in short, do everything necessitated by the economic circumstances, domestic and foreign.

"The idea of the tax in kind is the foundation of the economic system of 'Soviet socialism.' The soviets implement contractual conditions for production and marketing and the entire above plan output in kind or cash remains to meet regional needs. Conversely, the economic system of today's socialism, of 'state' socialism, is based on the ideology of the requisitioning of output. One-half of the enterprises work at the expense of the second half. The economy works for itself and little is left for the soviets and the working people. Under conditions of irresponsibility, this has become a habit and reached a point absurdity.

"This situation would immediately come to an end with 'Soviet socialism.' Everything will convert to cost accounting. Wholesale and retail prices would drop. The quality of goods and services would improve. The arbitrary outlay influence on the economy will become unnecessary. Contradictions between production forces and production relations, between the political and economic systems, between ideology and socialist practices, and between a just socialist base and superstructure will be eliminated. All of this will objectively change the model of socialism, making it dynamic, granting broad economic and social rights to the working people, and strengthen the emblem of quality and preference for our socioeconomic system abroad."

This letter deals with one of the basic topics raised by the readers: economic change, forms of ownership, and problem of alienation. D. Durlankov, docent at the Udmurt University (Izhevsk) has entitled his notes "From the Viewpoint of 'Economic Determinism'." Noting the well familiar imperfections in the mechanism of supercentralized management of economic activities (outlays, swelling of the administrative apparatus, corruption, shortages, low production quality, inevitable social discrimination, a black market economy, etc.), the author emphasize that in fighting such phenomena "one to one," as separate entities, is impossible. A decisive elimination of the old mechanism is needed. However, this would inevitably result in decisive changes in the superstructures. In his view, this will affect above all the party structure. "In the period of the blossoming of the centralized economic system," he writes, "a developed power system was established: all decisions stemmed from the party authorities while responsibility for such decisions had to be assumed by the soviets. We must

most frankly admit that in its former quality and with its former functions the party loses its efficiency. Today it must provide political support to the development of cooperatives (in order to avoid the endless policy swings; for it is precisely the lack of a long-term and stable political support that has led to the appearance of grubbing 'one-hour cooperatives,' which operate on the principle of grab what you can before they close you down); the spreading of leasing and other forms of ownership in the countryside (endless 'resolutions on the rural problem' which means abandoning command positions for the sake of opening 'combat headquarters' in the sowing and crop harvesting campaigns, thus preventing support of political and economic changes in the countryside); the movement for a healthy ecology; the conversion of enterprises to cost accounting and self-financing (frequently governmental resolutions are still based on temporary difficulties, as a result of which a final conversion is still considered distant); finally, changes in the areas of science, art, education, etc."

The author also thinks as follows: "The total dismantling of the hierarchic party apparat is needed." But then here is another opinion expressed by someone we already mentioned, N. Nazarova, from Odessa. Having formulated her claims concerning the apparat and having emphasized that it is precisely the apparat that controls ownership, "standing with a knife by the national pie and slicing it," at the same time she does not believe in the least that "the entire party apparat is a hindrance on the way to perestroika and, therefore, to the conversion to full popular rule. Furthermore, perestroika itself was initiated by the party and is headed by it. In general, it is not a question of party position but of personality, as was convincingly confirmed by the elections of people's deputies."

F. Minyushev, doctor of philosophical sciences (Moscow State University) discusses the topic of alienation in the area of the fundamental tie linking social development with human nature: "What should be the principle governing the structure of society in order to be consistent with human nature—individualistic or collectivistic? For the time being, the individualistically structured society (although real grounds for individualism are increasingly shrinking: in the United States as much as 80 percent of the population perform hired labor), in terms of its objective indicators it outstrips a collectivistically structured one, i.e., socialism. On the basis of such data one could simply answer: in terms of its principles capitalism is more consistent with human nature than socialism. Such views are voiced in articles and in university lecture halls. However, the study of such a problem is not easy.

"The essence of the self-alienation of man on the economic level is reduced to the fact that in the labor area, at the contemporary level of development, a man functions and develops by pitting himself against the labor product and by subordinating to it his own labor behavior and life style. This process develops its own

mechanism as a dual nature of the commodity (consumer and exchange value) and labor (concrete and abstract labor). Socialism tried to reject this mechanism entirely (based on the concept of the noncommodity nature of socialism, i.e., the fast elimination of the alienation of man). Time proved, however, that the attempt to develop in the country a mechanism of direct commodity exchange (abandonment of the market and commodity production), as the national economy became more complex, led to certain deformations in the labor and distribution area and even to the development of society as a whole, following an unnatural way in the areas of economics and politics.

"Alienation in the economic area can be seen in the following: 1. The labor product is granted the status of commodity and becomes anonymous; 2. The money (wages, profit) as the ideal aspect of the commodity, by subordinating the worker to itself stimulates his labor. What is positive in this fact is that labor and wages reciprocally develop and enhance each other.

"By introducing planning socialism practically eliminates the aspect of the undetermined fate of the labor product, strengthening the social protection of the working people. However, history proved that any 'unceremonious' interference in the activities of the mechanisms of economic life and the 'ultraprotection' of the worker turn into the elimination of the incentives for progress, combined with the long-encouraged drunkenness (instead of 'irritating' the people with ever new types of goods), marking time in defining the correlation between the consumption and accumulation funds, and disharmony in economic development, we found ourselves in a kind of historical impasse and began to accuse socialism as such for our own troubles. We were unable accurately to understand not only Marx but also Lenin. Hence a semi-spontaneous development, a 'development as needed,' for which, retroactively, theoretical excuses were found.

"In this connection we would like seriously to question the accuracy of the formulation of the basic economic law of socialism, according to which our production is oriented toward the satisfaction of the increasing needs of the people. This is inaccurate. Even if the general orientation is lofty and consistent with the meaning of socialism, the mechanism of economic life should be structured on the basis of orienting the production process toward profitability. The point is that a production process directly oriented toward the satisfaction of the needs of the people is deprived, strange though it might seem, of an internal source of development, for the needs of the people themselves develop under the influence of the production process which, in turn, should seek a motivation for activities outside this circle, developing at the expense of the aspiration for profit (the added product). Otherwise the result is a vicious circle of gradual stagnation."

Let us note that most authors seek the mechanism for combining economic with social efficiency, considering

the former its component and the latter the objective of the socialist organization of society and its national economy.

"A transitional step to converting labor into a prime vital necessity of man (the definitive elimination of economic alienation)," F. Minyushev goes on to say, "must be the acknowledgment of collective ownership within which the noneconomic as well as economic coercing of man to work, coming from the outside (which is extensively practiced in our country) turns into an economic self-coercion (the feeling and status of 'master'). The extent of coordinating cooperative, leasing, family, and other forms of ownership with state ownership is a question of practical experience, with trials and errors, which dictates the need for engaging in respective socioeconomic experimentation. In this connection, the state should pay attention to the suggestion of Academician N.M. Amosov on 'unleashing the initiative of individualists' who account, according to his estimates, for 5 to 10 percent of the population.

"Alienation in the political area (self-alienation) is well illustrated in the movie by M. Zakharov, based on Ye. Shvarts's play "Slay the Dragon:" before slaying the living dragon, one must kill the dragon within oneself. The arbitrary behavior of the authorities is possible only at the lower stages of development of the individual, and the democratization of society can take place only as combined with the molding of the individual. Naturally, this does not mean that one must wait for everyone to be so highly developed as to take the next step on the path to democratization. The valuable feature of democracy is that it can be achieved only in the course of the practical process.

"Economics, the ownership area, is the foundation of democratization. Economic independence is the foundation of human freedom. Obviously, based on this understanding of freedom we shall have to revise the formula that 'freedom means recognized necessity,' which was established in science and in the mass consciousness. Freedom achieved through cognitive means (are you free because you know?), is merely the first step leading to real freedom (which, indeed, is a very serious one). Real freedom is based on human actions in favor of achieving freedom both for society and the individual.

"To sum up the question of the correlation between the nature of man and socialism, we can say that under socialism the personality is more individualistic than collectivistic. Consequently, all social forms of utilization of labor and stimulations of human actions must take this feature into consideration. Practical ways must be found to combine private with public, with collective interests. This is the most important task the solution of which will lead to an economic revival and the adoption of a different attitude of the people toward labor and, in the final account, an abundance of goods. At that point harmony will be established, i.e., a condition of mutual support between human interests and ideals."

This discussion by correspondents is entered by B. Vinogradov, candidate of technical sciences (Moscow), whose views are shared by A. Makarov (Barnaul), B. Yelizarov (Kalinin), and others. "Socialism," he writes, "is not the fruit of the imagination but the result of historical development. If we, having tried it while it is still not ripe, turn away from it, the only thing this proves is that we are still too much involved with the present to be able to think of the future." He goes on to say that "could it be said that in restructuring ourselves we are advancing toward an efficient socialist organization of society? In my view, we are not. The reason for holding such a view is that the only possible way of healing the economy, in our view, is the use of the Western management method for public production, not on the microlevel, where it is indeed no sin to learn, but on the macrolevel, which is related to a radical revision of relations of ownership with all the consequences stemming from this fact.

"More than anything else I am amazed at the innocence with which it is claimed that if we, as the true supporters of socialism, spread the rights to collective ownership, this will make it nationwide ownership. Obviously, this will be no more than group ownership, the purpose of which can be nothing other than its self-reproduction. All of us, the 'external environment,' will be merely a means to this aim. All of this will be done under the familiar slogan of 'man is the center of the economy!' In the past we used to say: 'I know this man!' Today we are still in the stage of studying him. I do not understand what is preventing us, with such an approach to ownership, to proclaim it as national in any capitalist country: the nature of production there is quite public. It is only the nature of appropriation that is private! Or could it be that this is a secondary fine point?

"In depriving the plan of its specific content, converting it into a control-observation point and reducing state orders to a minimum, we are virtually depriving ourselves of the possibility of managing the economy as a single organism. Hopes of market regulation under the conditions of a comprehensive scarcity are ephemeral. The instruments of state regulation of the market with the help of prices and taxes, given our inexperience, will yield (and are already yielding) zero efficiency. The experience in the 1920s does not help: the economy is much more complex and we no longer wish to tolerate cities with unemployment. It is being said that the market is the natural condition of human relations. For the time being this may be true. However, abandoning the possibilities of the plan in large-scale production is unnatural.

"Disgust of the strict diktat in planning is so great that we do not wish to see that which has already been achieved with a planned economy. This applies both to our country and abroad. We worship the Chinese experience, and that of Hungary and Yugoslavia. However, we simply refuse to notice the achievement of our best kolkhozes and sovkhoses and best industrial sectors.

"We are applying self-financing in everything, pretending that we do not know that following the cycle of updating the means of production, such means, which are new, will no longer be national property but will belong to specific labor collectives which, in order to ensure the best possible use of their property for their own purposes, will mandatorily demand full freedom of action. It is thus that 'on the sly,' without naming things by their proper names, under the guise of democratization and improvements of socialism, with the use of an ordinary, albeit radical, economic reform we are sliding into a society of group ownership of the means of production. Therefore, while we are involved in reading the truly terrible pages of our past, the future is being determined without our participation. It is true that our leadership is still hesitating, and market thrusts are interwoven with drastic administrative interference; however, we cannot sit on two chairs at the same time....

"Originally identifying the form of ownership with that of management, many people think that democratization means a return to the 1920s and that we shall repeat everything all over again, but better. However, this is not the way to treat history. What happened happened. Whatever the case, we built that which exists now. We can correct the old sins only in such a way that tomorrow be a day which is better and more just than is today."

D. Yermoshin, whom we quoted, has a different view on the subject of the correlation between the plan and the market: "The view is quite widespread that these two mechanisms for economic control are absolutely mutually incompatible, for which reason we must inevitably choose: either plan or market. This approach to the problem is ant dialectical and radically wrong. The plan and the market could perfectly well coexist within the framework of a single economic system, each one performing its own role, interacting and enriching each other. Furthermore, at the present stage of development of production forces neither the plan nor the market would be simply able to improve the economy by itself. The so-called shortcomings of the plan or the market, which are cited in the discussions, appear precisely from the fact that efforts are made to ascribe to each one of these economic mechanisms an absolute, a comprehensive significance although anything can be good only when put in its proper place. Naturally, it is unlikely that anyone would be able clearly to demarcate between the economic 'spheres of influence' of the plan and the market, for clear boundaries are something alien to dialectics. However, their approximate determination is possible. For example, a free market, together with its unavoidable satellites (competition, law of value, and monetary system) can obviously perfectly cope with tasks such as controlling prices, efficiently reacting to changes in supply and demand, and the distribution of material goods according to labor, i.e., it can work precisely in the area in which, as we have already seen, the diktat of centralized planning can only cause harm. Meanwhile, in a modern economy, particularly in a society which is scientifically managed by people, we

cannot do in the least without long-term programs, strategic development concepts, and, naturally, social insurance. It is obvious that the market is essentially unable to solve such problems, for which reason in this area priority in planning is unquestionable.

"As to the development of relations between the plan and the market as we advance toward communism, let us note that with the development of production forces and the increased level of socialization of the means of production the market will gradually wither away. This, however, does not mean that its functions will be taken over by planning. The withering away of the market will be strictly the consequence of another process, i.e., the gradual disappearance of the need for the daily tactical control of the economy and the mechanism for the distribution of material goods. As society comes closer to such a status, as material abundance and the prosperity of the population grow, and as the masses develop a communist attitude toward labor, economic 'control' over the consistency between the measure of labor and measure of consumption will be gradually eased, i.e., the market and others with it (competition, the law of value, and the monetary system) will gradually wither away. Naturally, current economic affairs will hardly ever be totally left unattended and naturally society will retain a certain control over them which, however, will have nothing in common with the strict diktat of centralized planning. Even under communist conditions, the latter will be in charge of the area of strategic and conceptual assignments."

Let us note that this conversation by correspondents is no longer limited to our immediate future, to the improvement of socialism (however lengthy we may consider this period to be), and to its own "paradigm," but is aimed also at a more distant future—communism. Idealism? A rather harsh alienation from reality? A return to the times of "arbitrary limelighting?" But let us not refuse anyone the right to look that far into the future as dictated by convictions, values, and aspirations, and concern not only for those who live today but also for the future generations. "The more distant the objective the straighter seems to us the way leading to it," said a poetess living in Shchelkovo (Moscow Oblast) N. Kuzina, who described her notes as "Let Us Whisper a Word About Communism." However, she discusses matters which are entirely prosaic. "It is naive to expect of socialism more than what it has already given. Socialism is an intermediate condition of society on its way from capitalism to communism. Under the conditions of perestroika to rely on its qualitative renovation means to lose." Why? The author provides an unexpected answer: "What we built was proper. Now we must move on to new heights, the heights of people's self-management. This is what full communism is. Its foundations will be laid only by the type of workers who will manage by themselves public property and will hold in their hands the full power in the country, not entrusting it to bureaucrats, whether at the center or regional.

"What is self-management by the people? It means flexible management structures (soviets) on all levels of social activity: sector-shop-enterprise-rayon-region-center. The soviets invite specialists or set up task forces of specialists, whose tasks are to provide them with information and organizational services. However, the main difficulty is not to paint a picture of already existing flexible power structures compactly surrounded by specialists. The difficult question is the following: how to convert from a bureaucratic apparatus to a flexible structure of the soviet, how to accomplish the transfer of power from the bureaucracy to the people, making this complex process as easy and as painless as possible?

"Above all, we must abandon the traditional pitting of rigid structures against a free market. Such pitting has fully exhausted its usefulness. The time has come to open the gates of people's power and to invite the free market to cross their high arches. The people's system will take a step in the direction of the market and convert to flexible structures. The free market will take a step toward the people's system by abandoning wasteful anarchy.

"This is a symbiosis which looks strange on the surface: a market operating on the basis of flexible management structures, and flexible structures functioning within the framework of exchange and distribution relations. However, it is precisely thanks to such a symbiosis that the market will become a mechanism for planned relations, although the principles of implementation of such relations will be found no longer in funds and ceilings set from above on a centralized basis, but in the equivalent exchange of commodity masses."

In conclusion, let us cite an excerpt from the letter by the already mentioned V. Ovchinnikova. In our view, she logically winds up the discussion by the readers: "History always provides a choice, for it is created by people and for that very fact it cannot be without any alternatives and offer only a single variant. A view of socialism based on variants is one of the essential features of the new theoretical thinking. From the very start perestroika assumed the nature of making alternate choices. It presumes a change in the viewpoint on socialism and the creation of a new concept of socialism. Correspondingly, within the theory of the new concept socialism must be restructured using the method of alternate approaches, i.e., the method of comparing and interpreting actual opposites and finding within them the parameters of alternate variants which provide new constructive potential and development opportunities.

"Let us try to single out some alternate such variants.

"First. Formative and general civilization characteristics: shifting the emphasis to the development of the quality of civilization, which would emphasize the dominant role of universal human values in social activities.

"Second. Governmental and civic principles: shifting the emphasis toward the development of civil principles.

Historically it developed that the state covered our virtually entire society and the virtually entire 'space' of social activities. This contradiction can be resolved with the democratization of social life and the revival of that which past philosophers themselves were already defining as a 'civil society.'

"Third. Administrative and economic methods: shifting the emphasis toward economic methods, expressed in the system of commodity-monetary relations, cost accounting, leasing, and cooperatives. Under the command-administrative methods constructive activities could be manifested either as support or public enthusiasm (the first 5-year periods) within the framework of prescribed conditions. This type of activity, as reality indicated, has its limits, after which its decline and deformation in terms of labor begins.

"Fourth. One-dimensional and static condition versus multidimensional status and pluralism: shifting toward the assertion of the dominant role of multidimensionality and pluralism on all levels of social activities. At least three aspects should be singled out in the understanding of pluralism: pluralism of opinions; pluralism of interests; pluralism of ownership and social movements and political life. Within this context pluralism acts as a mechanism for conversion from uniformity of thoughts to multiplicity of thoughts, and from one-dimensionality to multidimensionality, from a static to a dynamic condition.

"Fifth. Average and talent: shifting toward the domination of talent in the structure of the constructive potential of society. This is the supertask of perestroika, without which the solution of which it could find itself in a situation of creative exhaustion, in an impasse.

"This view on the development of socialism under the conditions of our country, based on variants, also presumes 'negating the negation:' a return to the unused possibilities provided by the Leninist variant in the building of socialism, to the Leninist concept of socialism. In this connection, let us note the following: had there been no alternatives to Stalinism and the command-administrative methods, the current perestroika would not have existed. The Leninist variant of the building of socialism, although rejected in favor of another choice, nonetheless remained as an idea, as an unused opportunity. According to Hegel, history also has the 'trick' that, after indicating the dramatic and harmful nature of a chosen way, it can correct its movement and return to the unrealized potentials and opportunities. In a certain sense, our perestroika is such a 'historical correction,' which emphasizes its objective accuracy.

"Finally, we should not expect miracles from the new variant of socialism. However, we can and must expect of it that it will be a normal society (there should be nothing extreme or extraordinary) in its development. For a long time our people have yearned precisely for a type of development without appeals, storming and rushing. If we are seeking for the most generalized

criterion of post-perestroika socialism, in my view such a criterion involves the concept of a normal social development. This is the main thing from which stems all the rest."

Let us sum up the variety of readers' opinions by singling out the main thing. The people do not wish simply to be the observers of life around them. Regardless of the polarity of approaches and the differences in the expressed views, they profoundly support the idea of socialism and seek ways for its implementation, consistent with its humane content. They are also unanimous in the belief that no solution or concept could be viable without taking into consideration the broad public opinion and the frank discussion of such decisions and concepts. Therefore, let us repeat: The discussion goes on....

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'I Am in Favor of a Critical Attitude'

905B0011C Moscow KOMMUNIST in Russian No 17, Nov 89 (signed to press 15 Nov 89) pp 20-24

[Article by Vladimir Grigoryevich Petropavlovskiy, people's judge, Pitelino Settlement, Ryazan Oblast]

[Text] I was motivated to take pen in hand by the numerous articles published of late on relations among nationalities, including the situation of the Russian people, the condition of our Russian lands, suggestions to replace the RSFSR with a "truly Russian" republic, etc. Some "daring" authors are essentially proposing that the map of the USSR be redrawn and that there be yet one more resettlement of the peoples.

Let us consider the first method, that of attaching to the RSFSR territories where the relative majority of the population is Russian. In that case it would include Northern Kazakhstan, the Crimea, some districts in Alma-Ata and Tashkent, etc. In turn, some of the Maritime Province and the virgin lands would have to be given to the Ukraine. Additionally, some part of the Crimea should be given to the Estonians, for there are Estonians who live there; as to a number of settlements in the Southern part of the country, they should have to be separated altogether from the USSR and given to Bulgaria or Greece. What is entirely puzzling is what to do with the cities? What type of people live in Odessa or Yakutsk? What to do with the gypsies and the Jews? The second method is forced resettlement. Tens of millions of people would be removed from their places on the basis of someone else's will, for the sake of the purity of the national structure. Shall we supply them with apartments with elevators, or give them per diem pay; shall we ask for their permission, and shall we ship after them the graves of their fathers and grandfathers or shall we not?...

Does the reader recall that something similar already happened in our country?

Finally, where shall we find the money for renaming oblasts and cities and doing the paper work, which would require substantial funds? Would we be able, in that case, to increase pensions and meet the demands of strikers?

Let us do all of this. Let us erect brick walls between nations, large and small, let us put guards and let our grandchildren and great-grandchildren, plunging into the chaos of the early middle-ages, continue to settle their territorial disputes with weapons, cursing those who started them.

We are living in an abnormal situation. Whereas the main principle governing international relations and a prerequisite for peace and security is the rejection of force and acceptance of existing boundaries, our country looks like a buzzing beehive. Territorial disputes are taking place, and age-old insults are recalled, and then homes are burned down and people perish.... For how many generations will such insults be remembered? Should we recall the Polish-Lithuanian intervention or the Tatar-Mongol yoke? Should we ask Sweden and Mongolia for compensations?

History is familiar with a number of examples of reciprocal cultural influence and with the joint struggle waged by our peoples against conquerors. An ancient Latvian song, for example, says:

"I go to the Russians, I go to the Lithuanians, everywhere I am welcomed like a brother."

These, perhaps, were not bad times.

Now, when there is sufficient flammable material in relations among nationalities, we need examples not of hostility but of cooperation.

Events in recent years make it necessary to think of the role of the intelligentsia in the restructuring of national relations. Does it include people who can call for tolerance, reciprocal understanding and a feeling of justice and become, like Tolstoy and Korolenko, acting as the conscience of the nation? Unquestionably, such people exist.

However, people are also debating the right of the intelligentsia to emigrate. Let all of us go. This is the best time. The borders are open and we have in our country shortages and rationing, and perestroika is in difficulty. Let us abandon this restless and dangerous ship, let us go somewhere in Samoa, away from the difficulties of the fatherland and there, under the whispering of palm trees and the surf, let us finally start creating....

Memory, however, brings to mind other examples. When Pasternak was asked to leave he said that it would be better to stop writing. Aleksey Tolstoy, Kuprin and Tsvetayeva came back. Was it easy for Akhmatova, Platonov or Bulgakov? Perhaps we should consider how to help in the assertion of a creative personality. Perhaps

we would thus nurture another Pushkin? In Japan, for example, gifted people are considered the property of the nation....

How much do we suffer as a result of all kinds of extremes and excesses! That is perhaps why things are going on poorly. The excesses of collectivization, the endless cults, the erasure of boundaries between town and country, or else the campaign-style attitude in the struggle against drunkenness or its total abandonment; either excessive centralization or a voluntary paralysis of the authorities....

There is a truth according to which the proper way to discredit an idea is to take it to its extreme. We occasionally read about efforts on the part of some personalities and think: What is this? This person is not stupid: he is simply a conscientious performer of unrealistic plans. The simplest example in this case is that of corn. It is an excellent crop which is exigent when it comes to heat and moisture and, naturally, no one would think of sowing it in the Polar Circle. The extremes in planting corn were so great that today it has been virtually abandoned. This was unnecessary. Wherever corn is grown the people know how irreplaceable it is for animal husbandry.

In the 1960s, in connection with the "expanded building of communism," the principal means of struggle against crime was selective re-education. Many of the functions of the militia were shifted to the public. This triggered a wave of hooliganism which took more than 20 years to uproot. The present idea of humanizing criminal punishment does not trigger any objections in principle. Do we take into consideration in this case that the revival of commodity-monetary relations and, in particular, the social stratification of society are objectively contributing to increases in crime?

Shall we ever learn from our errors?

Since the 1930s exaggerations and extremes have assumed hyperbolic features. We initially praised the "father of the nations" or the "tireless fighter for peace" and then... if we praise someone less in life we would abuse him less in death! The reason for this phenomenon is the administrative system, the undemocratic political structures which are beginning to change only of late. However, "enthusiasm" also plays a major role in the development of excesses and cults.

The people who are now taking our history to the dump indiscriminately and who once again make us rootless are the same as those who previously attacked the church and demanded the death penalty for Zinoviyev and Bukharin. They are always "on the crest of the wave," they are always ahead; ahead of what is not important. This would not have been so sad had they not rendered poor service to those who followed them; it is no accident that they are being suspected of insincerity.

There are other people who find it more difficult to change their views. They have something to change. In

that sense they are conservative and they risk being out of step with life. "Unusual nimbleness of thoughts" is not for them. "Well," the reader would say, "what does the author himself profess? He likes neither the left nor the right."...

I favor critical thinking. Not words but thoughts! Not speculative schemes (we have already been burned by that) and not a search for the best possible prescriptions but the study of reality should be the basis for changes. Even the best initiatives, alienated from reality, could cause harm. Later, when such initiatives start bursting like soap bubbles, comes the time of triumphant conservatism. It is within such a magic circle that we have been marking time for more than 30 years. One left is not like another. Some people realize the depth of the problem and try to solve it radically. Others are simply "adapters," the flotsam, as Lenin said, which invariably accompanies any revolutionary movement.

Today we also have extremes in society. No movement appears accidentally, and each movement claims to have the truth on its side. At best, however, it holds only a particle of the truth. Truth has been broken up: it is as yet to be reassembled, to become an entity in the course of a stormy political life, assuming that we are able to accomplish this.

What will perestroika become: turning in circles or a spiral development? It is as though an evil fate is hovering over some of its initiatives. What is the reason for this? A variety of opinions exist on this account. As I see it, the reasons are still the old ones: haste, inconsistency, lack of specificity, and promulgation of favored principles into absolutes, lack of analysis of and control over new developments.

We started and abandoned the struggle against drunkenness. Meanwhile, we uprooted the most valuable vineyards. The cooperative movement, allowed to develop by itself, naturally took the easiest and most profitable line. Conversion, by this token, implies turning tanks into shaving blades, and so on...

In national relations, however, errors are inadmissible and the field for their experimentation is necessarily small.

The Soviet Union is a truly unique governmental formation. All republics are multinational. In some republics, most of them autonomous, the native nationality does not account for even one-half of the total inhabitants. Other ethnic groups have lived in them for quite some time, but because of their small numbers and scattered nature, neither have nor could have their own statehood.

Possibly, in this connection we should consider an extraterritorial autonomy toward which a traditionally negative attitude has developed but which, added to territorial autonomy, would enable us to solve some national problems, particularly in Union and in small

republics, the further division of which would be impossible. I also believe that the peoples in our country should accept as inviolable the existing boundaries.

Let us be objective. The Soviet system allowed for the first time a number of nations to develop their own statehood. To this day in such countries people are fighting, in the literal sense of the word, for no more than autonomy.

Let us be historical. By sacrificing their all, the senior generation built brick-by-brick, the bright building of the future, accepting that life will be difficult for them but better for their children. It turned out that the building of a new society is not like building a house but is a process of constant renovation. One may be saddened by it but also one could realistically consider that this is the only way for any development to take place. It seems as though socialism has merely crossed its early stage of "official" socialization of production and is now facing the task of applying the laws of the market and value (here as well there is an analogy with the use of the laws of nature) in the interests of the entire society.

Is it possible to combine something seemingly impossible to combine? Our hope is based on at least two circumstances. First, history pressed socialism, as though against a wall, with the need to solve this problem. Second, the contemporary world, including that of capitalism, and that is perhaps the main accomplishment of the October Revolution, is already inconceivable without socialist traditions and practices.

Perhaps the problem is not the fact that we are running in circles but are developing in accordance with the laws of dialectics, in a spiral. It is only the conservative part of the social superstructure that could turn the spiral into a circle and only for a while, at the cost of a loss in the pace of progress. It is literally impossible for us to go back to capitalism.

All of this applies to national relations as well. Let us try to understand the concern of the Baltic peoples and their dislike of irresponsibility (they should have the opportunity to work as they wish and can). We must adopt cost accounting and organize market relations.

The restructuring of national relations, like cost accounting, should go beyond the relationship between "center and republics." The protection of national minorities, which have no state formations of their own, is on the agenda. This question is banging on the doors with the fists of strikers. The situation of minorities in the republics is totally unregulated by the Constitution which was not written with the existing situation in mind. Obviously, we need an all-Union law on the status of ethnic groups without statehood, living in the various republics. Reality has proved that national feelings influence democratic thinking. It is difficult to be a nonpatriot of one's nation. It is difficult to escape the temptation of granting one's nation benefits, particularly if that nation is small and if measures for its preservation are truly needed.... Perhaps in the case of an argument as to

whether a given measure would harm the interests of the majority or minority of the population, this should better be discussed by the USSR Council of Nationalities, which includes representatives of many other ethnic groups which are not directly involved in the dispute and which, by its very nature, is called upon to deal with such affairs and, in such cases, act as a justice of the peace. Furthermore, we also share the common principles of equality and democracy.

As to language disputes, let us quote one apparently forgotten opinion. "Switzerland has three state languages. However, draft laws dealing with referendums are printed in five languages, i.e., in addition to the three state languages, two "Romanch" dialects. These dialects are spoken by... slightly over 1 percent of the population." Here is another: "Small Switzerland does not lose but benefits from the fact that it does not have one state language but three: German, French and Italian.... If all privileges are eliminated, and if we stop imposing one of the languages, all Slavic people will easily and quickly learn how to understand one another and will not fear the "horrible" thought that in a single parliament speeches will be heard in different languages. The needs of economic turnover will themselves determine the language of a given country, the knowledge of which would be to the advantage of the majority in terms of trade. What will make this determination even stronger is that it will be accepted voluntarily by the population of different nations, the faster and the more extensively and consistently democracy is developed...."

These were Lenin's "Critical Remarks on the National Problem."

The impression is occasionally created that unlike other countries we seem to want to do without a governmental language for communication among nationalities. In any case, there is no law about it. By virtue of its functions, such a language would be the second language of the republics and would be equal to the state language. It would help a Bulgarian in Moldavia, a German in the Caucasus and a Lithuanian in Kazakhstan if necessary (this is a constant need) understand one another on neutral grounds.

As a member of the Russian nation I would like to say that it is my deep conviction that the Russian nation did not seek and does not enjoy any legal and material advantages over other nations.

In addition to everything else we are experiencing a crisis in ideology and, perhaps, this is the main crisis. To a certain extent, however, it is artificial. In his time, Lenin opposed nihilism toward the preceding culture. To repeat our errors is our punishment. Once again we have wrecked our own—this time socialist—past to such an extent as to create the impression that since 1917 our entire path has been one of errors. We tend to forget Marxism with striking rapidity. In the West, it has assumed the status of scientific discipline. In our country, we have popularized home-grown theories,

unscientific views on history, rejection of the objective nature of its development, an exaggerated concept of the role of the individual in history, narrow pragmatism and mysticism, discord and confusion, as was the case after the 1905 Revolution.

Meanwhile, our extremely rich theoretical baggage remains unclaimed. Soon the "Communist Party Manifesto" will be 150 years old. What in Marxism has remained true, what should be corrected and what has become a dogma? We have the respective departments, institutes and doctors of sciences but we have no contemporary theory of socialism.

How to combine the concept of a society with satisfied needs with the Marxist formula that consumption is the booster of progress? If we have in mind a democratic society which ensures economic progress, social guarantees, freedom and initiative (including economic) for the individual, without exploitation and dictatorship, could it be that this is the next, the higher stage of socialism?

The national crisis is based on reasons which are not purely national. This is self-evident. How much energy is being wasted today on clarifying relations and analyzing even pogroms. This energy should be turned to perestroika, and to the benefit of socialism and internationalism.

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RENOVATION OF THE PARTY

Search for New Approaches

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[Continued publication of discussion materials (KOMMUNIST Nos 12-16, 1989)]

[Text] How to enhance the role of the communist party in the process of the socialist renovation of our society? What are the ways leading to the democratization of internal party life? What should be done to upgrade the activeness and role of the primary organizations and the individual party members under contemporary conditions? These and other questions are being extensively debated in the course of the partywide discussion. Numerous constructive proposals have been submitted, reflecting a variety of views on the ways and means of renovation of the party and truly ensuring its vanguard role in the life of society.

Following is an abridged report of the first session of the Politika Club, which was recently founded at the Moscow Higher Party School.

V N. Shostakovskiy, rector, Moscow Higher Party School:

The party needs a profound self-analysis. That is something which we failed to do for many years. Yet it is only

after thoroughly determining what is alien to its nature, what cells within its organism should be discarded in the interest of healing and renovation, that the party will be able to work on itself and to become truly a vanguard.

Let us note above all that a specific type of internal party relations has developed in our country, characterized by the power of a minority, the power of elective authorities or, more specifically, their apparatus. It is precisely on this basis that the so-called (fictitious) "monolithic unity" was formed and so did that same iron party discipline which essentially meant merely blind obedience. All of this was intensively cultivated within the party for many years. It is precisely for this reason that today we fail to see any whatsoever noticeable manifestations of political creativity and autonomy on the part of the primary party structures. I believe that this is one of the basic problems of the contemporary condition of the party. For we cannot act with confidence and efficiently as a political vanguard without the political creativity of the lower strata, of the party mass.

In my view, no decree, constitutional article or any other legal document can codify the vanguard role of the party and guarantee it within the society. This would be essentially wrong. Clearly, it is the soviets of people's deputies that should be the nucleus of the political system. We heard at the first congress that the party should deal with politics and that the power should go to the soviets. To me this pitting seems improper: the soviets will participate in political life and, one should hope, actively so; meanwhile, their interaction with the party should be structured on an entirely different basis.

As to the party status, obviously clear stipulations about it should be included in the Constitution, above all concerning the party's constitutional responsibility. The main thing is that the party must earn its status as a political leader through the convincing nature of its policy and daily activities, while a mandate of confidence could be earned through a referendum or any other democratic mechanism. As the political vanguard, the party's main task is to seek a consensus of interests and to study and coordinate its policies with the interests of the various social strata.

I can hear people objecting that this is exceptionally difficult and that already now we are noticing an entirely clear differentiation of positions within the party itself and a rather considerable difference of opinions. I am confident that this consensus is attainable above all in terms of certain priorities (strategic as well as tactical). And although currently there may be differences, for example, among the interests of some cooperatives and labor collectives of state enterprises, nonetheless the economic reform should, in my view, lead to a situation in which such interests could be coordinated.

We shall have to develop an exceptionally flexible system for determining, taking into consideration, and

implementing the interests and social priorities. The ability of our party for such a flexibility has still not been restored.

I believe that the party should be one of the bridges, one of the conduits for interaction between the state and the politically awakening civil society. In this area we have many problems which are new and unfamiliar to us. However, if we turn to world practical experience, we would see that in frequent cases it is precisely such a role that is played by the parties, harmonizing relations between the civil society and the state. Let us recall a comparison, albeit incorrect, with the fact that the "founding fathers" in the United States set up a specific model for the functioning of the state and quite soon realized that without parties this interaction between the state mechanism and civil society could not be achieved. It was at that point that the two-party model, borrowed from the British experience, was established, which provides a balance of interests among the different wings of the ruling class and effectively ensures the stability of the system. But, I repeat, to us we find in this area an exceptionally large number of new problems. Furthermore, taking into consideration the novelty and difficulty of the tasks related to shaping a civil society, it is precisely for this reason that I assume that our party should acquire flexible organizational and ideological structures. Let me particularly emphasize the need for flexible structures.

Under contemporary conditions we are aspiring toward a profound democratic renovation of the party, the end objective of which is to assert within it a broad democracy, i.e., the power of the party masses. How to proceed? Perhaps it would be necessary, above all, to set up within the party platforms, in the sense understood by V.I. Lenin and as practiced during his lifetime. In the opposite case, in my view, there can be no flexible model of the party as a political vanguard. In other words, its interaction with the various areas of civil society under the conditions of a one-party system cannot be ensured through a monolithic and rigid structure, which is the current party structure. Furthermore, we must acknowledge the reality: it is a well-known fact that there has never been monolithic unity within the party. There were in the past and there now exist a number of trends and groups which frequently assume totally opposite views not only on tactical problems or ways of action but also on some strategic matters. It is important for such approaches to be manifested in the course of debates so that agreement can be reached in all strategic problems. It is on this basis that a unity of action could be developed along with party discipline, political creativity, and responsibility. This would be important also in shaping the horizontal structures within the party. I believe that without their establishment it would be very difficult for the party to interact with the different social strata and sociopolitical autonomous formations.

Another trend in the renovation of the party is the revival of debate as an important work method, as the basic mechanism of its internal life. Today we hear all

too frequently that the party is not a debate club. In the Leninist context this assumes an entirely different meaning. Lenin was in favor of debates but against the party remaining exclusively a debate club. In any case, that is precisely the way I understand his view. Under contemporary conditions the party can act only on the basis of discussions, a democratic model of which would make it possible to present a variety of viewpoints expressing anything that is of concern to the citizens of our society. I may be wrong but it seems to me that the party does not take into consideration the interests of the intelligentsia or of any other groups and strata. This is an extremely worrisome thing.

In democratizing the party, it is extremely important to shape statutorily minority rights. In the past the party statutes guaranteed, protected such rights through specific organizational mechanisms. As early as the 14th Congress, however, in 1925, following the speech by N.K. Krupskaya, who pointed out the rights of minorities, "sa"lies against this standard were mounted. In general, any consideration of minority interests was attacked. It is of essential importance to restore this standard and practice.

Next. We need an essentially new system for establishing the elective authorities and the delegate corps on all levels, including the CPSU Congress and the party's Central Committee. Elections of delegates should be held starting with the primary party organizations and party districts. In a word, it is important to develop the type of system which would make it possible for the rank-and-file party member truly to influence the formation of essential political decisions and the membership of all elective authorities, including the Central Committee. I also believe that the corps of delegates on all levels should function throughout the entire term of the elected authority and control it.

In short, a truly democratic model of the party is the only true way to assert within it political work methods. Without democratization, without a profound renovation of the party we shall be engaging only in making declarations on political work methods for they will have no base on which to develop and establish themselves.

S.V. Kuleshov, professor at the Moscow Higher Party School, doctor of historical sciences:

We have become accustomed to believe that a political party is a superior form of class organization. This is indeed so in societies with conflicting class interests. Unquestionably, in Russia the RSDWP was a labor, a proletarian party. As a result of the changed structure of Soviet society, it was proclaimed at the 22nd Party Congress that "our Marxist-Leninist party appeared as the party of the working class and became the party of the whole people." This was reflected in the program and statutes adopted at the 22nd Congress. At the 27th Party Congress a new draft of the third CPSU program was adopted and amendments were made in the statutes, in which the two understandings of the party as being a

class party and a party of the whole nation, were synthesized. Now the CPSU statutes include the following formulation: "The CPSU which, while remaining in terms of its class nature and ideology the party of the working class, became the party of the whole people." We therefore have an antinomy, a contradiction: "class—all-national."

Could there be an all-national party? This question was raised in Russia as early as the turn of the century when on the eve of the 1905-1907 revolution there was an intensive process of establishing political parties in the country. The Constitutional Democrats (Cadets), who also described themselves as the "party of people's freedom," classified in their polemics with their political opponents the Russian parties as being class-oriented, all-national, and national.

Let me clarify the latter: neither the Polish, nor the Latvian or the Finnish Social Democrats were national parties. They were as much class-oriented parties as the RSDWP. The way the Cadet ideologues thought was as follows: The Social Democrats represent the interests of the workers; the S.R., of the peasants; and the Octobrists, of the bourgeoisie, whereas the Cadets were a non-class and non-stratum party. The creation of such a party was explained by Milyukov, one of its leaders, in terms of the historical destinies of the Russian liberation movement, in which the main opposition force to autocracy was the non-class intelligentsia. Naturally, the claims of the Cadets to speak for all progressive social forces in Russian society at the turn of the century was no more than that, a claim. In itself, however, the possibility of the existence of a "nationwide" party does exist. This should be a question of a general national, a general people's party of perestroika, the criterion of membership in which should be the active civic stance, the desire to serve the cause of social and political renovation through word and action. Could any given class assume the monopoly right to such qualities? I do not believe so. It is clear that the ideology of such a party should be based on universal human values.

What are the ways leading to the democratization of the party? Under the conditions of true political pluralism the existence of factions may be no better. Under present circumstances, however, it seems to me that a party with factions may be, for the time being, the only alternative to a multiparty system. Let me point out that V.I. Lenin provided a theoretical substantiation to the legitimacy of the existence of factions within the party under certain circumstances. He wrote: "A faction... is not a party. The party could encompass an entire range of shades, the extreme of which could even sharply clash with each other.... Within the party the faction is a group of like-minded people, whose purpose is, above all, to influence the party in a specific direction...." (*Poln. Sobr. Soch.*) [Complete Collected Works], vol 19, pp 6-7).

I.M. Klyamkin, doctor of philosophical sciences:

The idea of factions, of a factional system within the party, of having different platforms, has been suggested. I am not certain that this would be a suitable model for a party such as the CPSU. In any case, to substantiate this idea we should study the experience of the existence of factions and platforms in the 1920s, before they were abolished. They were eliminated not only by Stalin but also by people such as Bukharin who is now occasionally depicted exclusively as a positive character.

The model of a party without any factions whatsoever, the party of "monolithic unity" organically stemmed from the entire logic of the internal party struggle in the 1920s. Now, however, it is assumed that it is possible to have a party which would encompass the entire wealth of today's ideological and political shades and yet will remain a single party. I doubt that such an organization is possible. The point is that the function of a "monolithically united" party, and perhaps even its main function, was its strictly defined Stalinist role in the means of production. Today we say that it is the main link in the administrative-command system but do not always realize what this means. What this means is that the party was efficient and functional under Stalin and that it was precisely under Stalin that its golden age took place. At that time even the primary organizations were functional. Subsequently, when the system began to break down, all that were left were resolutions on upgrading the role of the primary organizations. This role, I believe, would hardly be enhanced in the foreseeable future or even in the most distant one. It is frequently said today that we must pull the party out of the production process. However, the party was shaped on the basis of playing a specific economic role—to provide ideological and organizational services to the administrative-command economy. Could the party be withdrawn from the production process? If so, it would then become a different party.

On this basis, I do not exclude in the least that it may be expedient, in the interests of the CPSU itself, to follow the path not of factions and platforms, for this, in my view, would erode it from within, but the path of the slow nurturing of its opponents, for as a ruling party, under the conditions of a crisis, it is facing the problem of delegating responsibilities, as took place in some socialist countries. As long as the party holds the monopoly on power it also assumes full responsibility. In other words, I believe that one of the main problems which now faces the CPSU is to create conditions for a pluralistic multiparty system.

O.G. Obichkin, professor at the CPSU Central Committee Academy of Social Sciences, doctor of historical sciences:

I fear the "new model" party which has been suggested to us now; I fear the freedom of factions and groups. What matters most is not a model but results. I believe that, based on the experience of our party, those comrades who believe that factions would "explode" the party from within may be right. The point is that a faction is an

organization for action. Could it be that there are those among us who would like to split the party? This looks likely. If we start pulling in different directions we do not have to divide ourselves into orange, green, pink or any other "color" parties. Everyone would follow his flag in a different direction and we shall have no party.

Nonetheless, I believe that new approaches are unquestionably necessary. What is their essence? Above all, concern for the structure of the party. How many among the millions of members are true communists? For many decades we pursued quantitative figures while constantly losing in terms of quality. Therefore, one should not fear if the party is reduced numerically, for it can only benefit from this.

What type of organization do we need now? It is sometimes being said that we do not need democratic centralism. I believe that that which we have had so far could be described as "democratic centralism" by stretching the point. The main feature of democracy is structuring the organization from below, on the basis of electivity. In our country the organization is largely structured from above. The real influence of the party members on party affairs is manifested above all in participating not only in decision making but also in establishing the type of leadership which will implement the decisions. For the time being we do not have such a thing. To a certain extent, elections are of a ritualistic nature.

Now as to the apparat. "The elected authority may be good and the apparat bad," is what is frequently being said and written today. I believe that this problem could be treated entirely differently. Obviously, we do not need an elected authority with a paid work apparatus. We must choose the type of party members as members of the party committee who would be working there. The majority of committee members would be released from their other duties. Other comrades would remain in their previous places as candidate party committee members, participating in the work of plenums to the best of their ability.

K.I. Timofeyeva, Moscow Higher Party School, floor manager:

I have nothing to do with science: I am nothing but a technical worker. However, I have extensive party experience. I would like to express a few thoughts from the practical viewpoint. I now hear talk as to what the party should be. There is talk of factions and platforms. All of this may be right. Today I can hear all over the place that the party has lost its authority. I joined the party in 1942 and I find such talk very painful. Occasionally I argued that in the final account it is not the party to be blamed but specific individuals.

What type of party should we have? I believe, above all, that greater attention should be paid to the individual party member, to his moral purity. In my view, a party member could lead the masses of party and nonparty people only if he himself is a crystally pure person. It is

in that case, it seems to me, that it would be easier to create the type of party which could truly lead the people. Someone said here that the party's responsibility has been lost. One cannot say that the party consisted of totally irresponsible comrades. No. If a party leader is honest and decent, he should care for his obligations.

V.V. Shinkarenko, Moscow Higher Party School, doctor of historical sciences:

A party member who is retired can no longer set the example in labor as is required by the CPSU statutes. It is true that many pensioners find the possibility, for a while, to remain active in social and ideological-educational work. As time goes by, however, they lose their strength. Inevitably, a time comes when the pensioner is only listed as a member of the party organization. Such formal members are in the hundreds of thousands, if not millions. Their presence in the party creates the appearance of strength where, actually, such strength has long been lost. However, this contributes to the preservation of formalism, to the gap between words and actions, and to complacency. The solution of this problem requires a certain delicate approach. One must not insult the party veterans who have dedicated to the party their best years. The problem must be solved in such a way that anyone who is no longer able practically to participate in the work of the party organizations should know that the party is grateful to him and that his past merits have been properly rated. Now, I believe, in the interest of the common cause, such people should drop out of the party organization.

It is difficult to say how to do this better. It may be necessary, along with the title of candidate or party member to introduce the title of honorary CPSU member. Other solution may also be possible. This too is a difficult problem. However, the people must be given the option of a dignified resignation from the party organization, not being expelled from the party but by assuming a new quality, in which a person who remains a communist by conviction is forced, by virtue of his physical possibilities, to terminate his direct participation in party work.

I believe that the struggle for the pure moral aspect of the party member should be expanded with steps which would provide an absolutely clear idea of the material status of the party members. Today we recognize that we are still poorly aware of the society in which we live. However, our knowledge of the party is poor as well. What could the party members say about their comrades in the party organization concerning their material situation, income, and expenditures? This too is an extremely important problem. Who has how much money, what type of apartment, and what type of material interests? It is no accident that some honest party members spend half their lives in an effort to acquire a private apartment while others, thieves and scroungers, are concerned with how better to conceal what they have stolen.

In my view, it would be expedient to intensify the work of the higher party authorities. When the party became ruling, while V.I. Lenin was alive, party congresses as well as, incidentally, party conferences were convened on an annual basis. Subsequently, for familiar reasons this practice was abandoned. But what is preventing us from reviving it today? The need for this does exist. Why is it that so far our party congresses are timed to the 5-year plans? Is this not an obvious duplication of the functions of the USSR Supreme Soviet? But then the Supreme Soviet as well, as we can see, is quickly restructuring its own work and intensifying it. Furthermore, obviously the time has come to change the way in which party congresses and conferences are held. The delegates must make more active efforts so that such events involve active work rather than the formal ratification of predrafted resolutions. Actually, that is what will happen if congresses and conferences are convened annually for purposes of practical discussion and formulation of party policy.

B.N. Kocherga, doctoral candidate, Moscow State University:

The problem of the party apparat is being raised ever more urgently on the highest political levels. In its first draft, this problem appeared as follows: we cannot do without an apparat. Today it is formulated somewhat differently: we need a new apparat. But where can we find it? Is it a question of replacing Ivanov and Petrov, who have discredited themselves, with the "good" Sidorov and Nikolayev? It seems to us that the problem of the party apparat cannot be reduced to the question of whether the party apparat as it was in the past is necessary or not and whether it should be replaced with a new one? The main thing is where to find these "good" Sidorov and Nikolayev. Will they appear in front of the party masses as extraterrestrials, as a result of a so-called cadre selection and placement? Or else will political leaders, democratically elected by the rank-and-file party members in the course of competitions of views, programs, and personalities and on the basis of previous activities, assume their legitimate and natural place? Therefore, the topic of the party apparat is a matter of party perestroyka and democratization.

Speaking of the re-creation of the party as a political organization, yet another important prerequisite should be taken into consideration. The party should be an alliance of like-minded people, serving a common political objective and convinced of the rightness of the main idea. Today the slogan that "people and party are one!" is perceived quite sharply. It entails responsibility. But then that is precisely the way things should be if the party claims the role of political organization representing the interests of the people. In order for this to be the case in fact, the party must be relieved from economic and management functions, retaining only a role which is natural in the case of a political organization: exert political influence on the masses. It is this role that makes the party a truly voluntary association.

Under the present circumstances, the interests of the working people can be represented only by a single party and such a party officially exists: the CPSU. Its "informal" existence as a political organization of all working people and by all working people is possible, in our view, only if there is an organizationally established political pluralism within the party. Actually, this internal political pluralism within the party could be achieved, we believe, only when the policy formulated by the party will encompass the various concepts related to defending the interests of the working people. Naturally, in order to implement the political program of the entire party, a specific variant based on consensus will have to be applied. Naturally, this question can be resolved by the majority of the party membership and this decision will be mandatory for all party members. However, this does not mean that other alternate views and opinions must be suppressed. Is this possible within the framework of an organized structural party unity without the establishment of permanent factions and groups? I believe that it is. In that case what will guarantee the opinion and views of the minority? This becomes realistic under the conditions of the existing of various constitutional sociopolitical organizations, associations, societies, alliances, clubs, and so on, which do not have the status of political parties. It is precisely within them, after an all-party resolution has been adopted, that the minority will be given the opportunity to discuss and develop its own views, concepts, and platforms in order to make them known not only to the entire party (such a possibility should exist within the party) but also to all working people. If social practices would reveal the groundlessness of an official party concept, in the course of elections for people's authorities, by expressing their wills working people will be able actively to influence changes or replacement of concepts with others which have enjoyed greater support among the people. This feedback mechanism would become, I believe, the most reliable sociopolitical guarantee for the irreversibility of perestroika and ensure the real rather than merely proclaimed unity between people and party and the party's leading role in society.

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What is the Color of the Party Card?

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[Article by Aleksey Valentinovich Ulyukayev, KOMMUNIST special correspondent]

[Text] We traveled to Sosnovyy Bor on a clearly defined editorial assignment: to hold a conference with the journal's readers on the topic of "Party and Society." The conference proved to be quite interesting. The point is, however, that virtually all that we found out about the party members in the city, its political life, concerns, difficulties, successes and unpleasant aspects, all of our

meetings and conversations essentially became part of a major dialogue on society and the party.

The editors hold regularly meetings with the readers. The analysis of the way in which gradually the content and nature of the questions and statements is changing is quite interesting and useful. Their common vector is a shift from complaints to suggestions and from specifics to generalities. At the meetings in Sosnovyy Bor another aspect was noteworthy: instead of traditional charges that the party had no clear concept of perestroika (let the social scientists provide us with the necessary economic, political and ideological postulates and we shall transform the society), there was a willingness and readiness to assume personal responsibility.

This is important. Eliminating reason from power makes power totalitarian in its worse variant, i.e., totalitarian-incompetent. The suppression of reason by power makes reason destructive, acting according to the principle, the worse it is, the better. The years of perestroika are helping us to achieve an understanding of this fact, for otherwise are choices are either a return to totalitarianism or skidding toward a meaningless and equally total negation, anarchy.

We are beginning to realize that power must be sensible and that reason and nothing else should dominate our decisions and actions. In societies such as the one which has developed in Sosnovyy Bor, a kind of technopolis, in which the level of education and creative activeness (professional as well as in social activities) is high and where party and soviet leaders are those same "physicists and lyricists, as their "subordinates," this is beginning to become reality.

Reciprocal trust or, conversely, mistrust on the part of the public and the power institutions in an age of reform and revolution is extremely significant. How to build a bridge of trust? Here is a simple example borrowed from the life of the Sosnovyy Bor Party Organization. Here, after a change of leadership (approximately 1 year ago all three gorkom secretaries were re-elected) the following order was instituted: the gorkom secretary is a member of one of the city primary organizations which he addresses regularly, reports, participates in party meetings, etc. This eliminates artificial barriers, above all that of information, between the rank-and-file party members and the apparat. It is precisely these barriers that are the main source of misunderstanding and lack of understanding or even conflicts, which was clearly apparent in many parts of the country in the course of the elections. It is precisely these barriers that act as catalysts for highly emotional campaigns concerning the "privileges" of the apparat. Literally in the past few days a new round of reciprocal misunderstanding has been started, related to raising the salaries of the party personnel. In such cases rational arguments such as, for example, the correlation between the average wages of party workers in other categories, and the need to attract for work in the apparat truly capable, educated and creatively thinking and initiative-minded people, are, as a rule, discounted.

Passions are seething and tension rises. The situation in the "Sosnovy Bor variant" is entirely different. When N. Tabolin, the gorkom's second secretary, became a member of one of the shops of the Leningrad Nuclear Power Plant (LAES) it became clear that with his 290 rubles per month his salary was the lowest. Understandably, seeing with their own eyes the way he works and how much he earns, the shop workers received the news of his salary increases with complete understanding.

Today the party members are quite excited by the question of the party budget and its use. Starting with the 19th Party Conference, this problem has been repeatedly raised and discussed. However, to this day no intelligible answer has been obtained. Meanwhile, this information vacuum must be filled. This leads to the spreading of rumors, one more stupid than the other. The only way to combat rumor is truthful information. This makes understandable, therefore, the importance of the publication in MAYAK PROGRESSA, the city newspaper, data on the budget of the city party organization. The party members in Sosnovy Bor believe that total glasnost concerning the party-wide budget is necessary. Otherwise a further heightening of passions is possible. As it were, they have already reached the boiling point. The party organization at the instruments-making plant, for example, suggested that pressure be applied on the superior party committees by refusing to transfer membership dues. The suggestion was discussed at a plenary meeting of the gorkom and was rejected, considered and effort at applying force and replacing a principled discussion of sharp problems with diktat. However, if no social compromise is sought and if no consensus can be reached on the basis of openness and trust, emotional breakdowns and explosions of this nature will be inevitable.

A social consensus can be achieved through reciprocal concessions and readiness to share responsibility. Typical in this connection are relations between the CPSU Gorkom and the city soviet executive committee and the local newspaper MAYAK PROGRESSA, and with the informal organizations in the city. For example, the newspaper may publish data which are by no means pleasing to the official authorities. However, they do not interfere in newspaper affairs aware, on the one hand, that the viewpoint of the gorkom is always accurately reflected by the newspaper and, on the other, realizing that if they do not allow the opposite viewpoint to be published, that viewpoint will be inaccurately yet noisily and emotionally reflected in discussions, rumors and social excesses. Thus, some informal groups raised the question of changing the nature of the Social Organizations House which is under construction (the city soviet, the party and Komsomol gorkoms, the trade unions, DOSAAF and others) turning it into a lyceum. The newspaper sponsored a discussion of this problem. All interested sides expressed their views. All arguments were heard and discussed. The eventual decision is difficult to predict. I am confident, however, that it will

be based not on emotions or "wetting the whistle" or bureaucratic power secrecy, but on a joint sensible agreement.

The city has an active social initiative group entitled "Ecological Glasnost." Its bulletins are printed in MAYAK PROGRESSA. The newspaper regularly publishes materials written by activists from the city voters' association, and members of the Popular Movement for Perestroyka. Equally regularly, however, it publishes articles by gorkom personnel and their answers to readers' questions.

Also important is the fact that not the least active among the promoters of the ecological movement are the members of the gorkom. Therefore, they are trusted and considered as part of the group.

Today we say that perestroyka in the party is trailing perestroyka in society. However, not everyone realizes what this involves: political methods of managing, and the party's conversion from the role of ideological dictator to the role of ideological vanguard. However, this new knowledge cannot be acquired immediately and fully, like Minerva coming out of Jupiter's head. It will be constantly crystallized out of numerous little bits in which theoretical knowledge blends with practical political experience and the live creativity of the party masses. In Sosnovy Bor these bits are created in the course of the activities of political clubs set up by the main primary party organizations and the city party organization.

Strictly speaking, the conference of KOMMUNIST readers was, to a certain extent, a conference of these political clubs. The discussion was frank and strict. Above all, what we learned from it is that we frequently have a very poor idea of the level of the so-called ordinary awareness (particularly if this awareness involves social strata which are socially, intellectually and politically active), and the ideological standards of nonprofessional ideologues. Such people are by no means a clean blackboard on which visiting theoreticians could draw even the most beautiful hieroglyphs; they are not a virgin field for the planting of concepts. Discussions with such people and a consideration of their ideas are always discussions among equals. I believe that it would be quite pertinent to quote without any comment examples of such thinking, as were heard at the conference (understandably, we cannot publish all the speeches. We have chosen the most typical, which reflect the overall tone of the discussions).

N. Vilkov, senior scientific associate, Scientific Research Technological Institute (NITI).

The pace of domestic political life has become so fast and the situation is developing so rapidly that no theory can catch up with events and answer all questions which come to the mind of the "ordinary" citizen in our country. Although today we are speaking of a loss of authority by the CPSU, nonetheless the Soviet people continue to turn above all to the party members in the

search for answers to such complex problems. The fact that the tone in which the questions are asked is becoming increasingly exigent is a different matter. The ability to answer such questions and to suggest ways of solving problems and practically implementing what has been planned for the good of the people constitute the "authority of the communists" at the present stage.

Naturally, it would be naive to expect immediate answers on the part of theoretical science, represented here by our guests, not to mention forecasts which would cover all cases in life. Real social life is quite complex and its manifestations are infinite. Therefore, indeed "any attempt at a priori structuring of detailed 'models' of the future social system would be sterile." The natural scientists also understand this idea, which was voiced in an editorial entitled "Toward a New Face of Socialism" in issue No 13 of *KOMMUNIST*, 1989, for they well know that "models with numerous parameters are unstable when it comes to providing accurate solutions."

However, now it is a question of the fact that increasingly in daily practices the communists must face both the questions of "well-wishers" and attacks of open opponents against the most basic problems of Marxist-Leninist sociology. Today not theory but life itself such as, for example, in the course of discussing the draft action program of the Leningrad Party Organization in intensifying perestroika under contemporary conditions, demands of the party members to solve the question of the class nature of the CPSU and the class affiliation of its ideology and the link between this ideology and the basic interests of the entire Soviet people.

I dare say that we have lost the meaning of the word "worker" to such an extent that now even theoreticians find it difficult to formulate it. In my view, in general they have fallen greatly behind in terms of analyzing the social structure of our society. For quite some time in our country the State Committee for Labor alone has ruled who is a "worker" and who is not. According to its classification a typist is unquestionably a "worker," but a foreman at a plant (and sometimes a brigade leader) does not have any connection with the working class. Naturally, we have fallen way behind the global scientific and technical revolution. However, the status of a person with a diploma for higher education is no less pressing from the viewpoint of his alienation from ownership. From time to time the argument as to what does the term "worker" mean breaks out with new strength. Frequently, however, it is of a scholastic nature. Most frequently here we use the features of the nature of the work (mental or physical), although this should obviously be considered secondary.

It is not a matter of indifference to the masses what the present affiliation of the communists may be. For an ideological consensus within the framework of the idea of the "state of the whole people" is not possible without harming the status of the CPSU in society.

Incidentally, in order for the consensus to be more fruitful and take the domestic political situation into consideration, I deem it necessary that a Law on Parties be promulgated. I do not believe that opponents of the CPSU have any real mass base in our society. However, the passing of such a law would create conditions for the objective assessment of the real situation. This is because once again we are burying our heads in the sand, like ostriches, this time plunging into incantations concerning the lack of a social base for a multiparty system. Let everything be identified in terms of actual political support. This will indicate the color of the party card of many party members who are joining a variety of "fronts." In my view, meanwhile the party members are disarming themselves in the face of the people, lulling themselves with the concept that there are no "objective prerequisites for the requirement of promoting the political development of Soviet society through a multiple party system" (the draft program of action of the Leningrad Party Organization). If there are "no prerequisites," there is no reason to worry about this matter. However, our opponents believe otherwise and, let us admit it, they have already been able to achieve something.

I also think that a Law on the Press would help to present an objective image of condition in society. It would make it possible (with certain restrictions in the area of public morality) for any organization or individual with enough funds to this effect to publish its printed organ. At that point we would once and for all be rid of the equivocal situation which, by virtue of its monopoly status, a party press organ, considering the promulgated pluralism of opinion, is publishing the views of its political opponents in millions of copies, thus creating a distorted impression of the real size and real influence of such political organizations. In turn, the CPSU would gain the possibility of participating in the real political struggle and to criticize the other political organizations.

I. Ladygin, senior scientific associate, branch of the State Optical Institute imeni S.I. Vavilov (GOI).

The party must make up its mind as to what it wants: to remain a ruling party at all cost or to have its own political face. If this face is a program of the struggle for a classless communist society, let us let other parties lead the people should the people want it, toward a social-reformist "paradise."

The program must stipulate that the long-term objective—building a society without ownership relations—can be achieved through the maximally efficient use of ownership and commodity-monetary relations. All we need is the public, including the state, regulation of the negative consequences of the market, stemming from the twin nature of commodity-monetary relations. The success of this program is not guaranteed. Generally speaking, what guarantees can be provided for any system if it lacks the wisdom to change?

Unity in itself is not self-seeking. There is unity when everything is joint and identical. There also is a unity in

which one feels an interdependence, when the people are rallied by the commonality of a social system, culture, laws and interests. Freed from the "statehood" complex, the party could become the spiritual bulwark of society.

A. Vlasov, operator at the Leningrad Nuclear Power Plant.

Many of our problems are related to the fact that present-day ideology does not have a specific address. It is aimed at the old illiterate party member. Worse, today's apparat is itself catastrophically illiterate! In principle it cannot give us that which it lacks itself! Today this is the greatest danger threatening the communist ideals in our country, the more so since political adventurers on all levels are successfully gaining "publicity" by digging into the past!

Who will accomplish all this: ensure the true power of the soviets, universal suffrage, a new constitution without any general statements but, on the basis of the history of mankind, ranging from the Greek cities to the Bill of Rights? The answer is only one: it is our party who must do this. There is such a concept as historical perspective: it is found only in this type of decision. However, this is not enough. Let us remember what Rousseau said: it is only an educated people that can build a truly democratic state. Under our circumstances it is only an educated people that can build a democratic socialist state. In its time, the party created the newspaper as a mechanism for education. Today it faces the same task.

The renovated structure of the party, free from indifferent people, and assuming the great role of educator of itself and the entire people, could provide stability and development of the state. An educated nation will question a great many things. However, in the course of discussions and struggle the party can only become stronger.

Why is ideology not working today? Because it is not respecting its own people. We have outgrown our breeches. We no longer need someone else's summaries of prime sources. We need the prime sources themselves.

Such statements and meetings with the labor collectives in the city clearly confirm that not by bread alone (although bread too is needed) does the contemporary person live. He is short of many vital items but the most vital is the question of the accuracy of the course chosen in social development. Let us not make one more mistake. We can no longer make mistakes. Hence the readiness to set our shoulder to the common task, be it theoretical or practical, it makes no difference.

The best thing which, under such a situation, the party organization and its leadership could do is not to ignore this, not to reject the sincere, the live thoughts, words and actions, even if those who bring them are unshaved and uncombed. All too long everyone was forced to have the same haircut. No more. Therefore, the party and

party ideology become the natural center of attraction of creative people and of nonstandard ideas and approaches.

Extreme radicalism and "radical conservatism," whether on the left, the right, "superior," "inferior" and other extremisms are not inherent in the nature of the intelligentsia. They are the result of the instability of the situation, the youthful condition of democracy and, above all, in our present circumstances, the lack of a consolidating, tolerant political and ideological center, attuned to a dialogue and compromise. This specifically applies to the local areas, to each city, rayon and oblast. In politics a center does not mean spinelessness or lack of position but a position of reason.

Surrendering one's given ideological primogeniture is no simple matter. However, in exchange one could receive something greater—true cooperation, joint labor and joint creativity.

This is what is being promoted in Sosnovyy Bor, perhaps not always consistently and properly thought out. Perhaps. However, words are being spoken and actions are being taken. That is why it is so difficult here for the opponents of our renovating party, the opponents of the new face of socialism, on either side—the Leningrad People's Front and the United Front of Working People. They have neither a social nor an intellectual base. That is why the "green" here are so close to the "red." Where would an activist in the ecological movement, a political club, an informal ideological seminar, an association of voters, a historical-cultural association or local civic self-administration go? In Sosnovyy Bor, he would go to the party committee. That is what matters.

In addition to local problems, public discussions focus on two main points: preparations for elections to republic and local soviets and preparations for the 28th Party Congress, and a discussion of the program for action of the Leningrad Party Organization under contemporary conditions. It is interesting in this connection to note that the party members in Sosnovyy Bor and, in particular, the members of the largest party organization in the city, at the NITI, do not agree with the published draft program to which they intend to submit amendments.

They intend to supplement the stipulation on the current lack of objective prerequisites for a multiparty system with the statement that in the future a multiparty system would be possible, thus leading to the development of healthy competition.

They believe that the party member has the right publicly to defend his viewpoint even if it is not shared by the majority. They deem necessary to provide full information to party members and all working people on the course of discussions and the making of decisions. In their view, it would be expedient to hold direct elections for party committee secretaries and conference and congress delegates. They believe that a communist may

drop out of the party on the basis of a personal declaration which must be discussed by the party organization.

One may agree or disagree with such suggestions. One may argue and refute. All that one must not do is pretend that they do not exist. Wherever the leadership "pretends," it turns out that it is putting a brave face on a sorry business. However, today no one has the right to pursue a bad policy.

Such is precisely the situation with the elections. The civil society which is developing is creating its own structures. Numerous organizations of citizens are being formed, some of which have clear-cut sociopolitical views. Wherever the party organizations (as in Sosnovyy Bor) engages in a dialogue and cooperates with them in solving the complex problems of today, foundations are laid for a new real electoral bloc between communists and not simply nonparty people but members of citizens' associations, i.e., people who have their own views on existing problems and their own vision of ways to solve them. This in itself is a major intellectual wealth and a prerequisite for the formulation of truly necessary, universally acceptable and efficient decisions. On the other hand, the deputies belonging to this bloc (whether established or not) become a force field which combines in its practical activities the authorities with society.

Under those circumstances the citizens become real citizens and not simply people in pursuit of bread and entertainment but people who aggressively demand both.

In a conflicting transitional age nothing can be worse than dividing people into "we" and "they": we, the people, will demand and apply pressure; they, the chiefs, must provide. Step-by-step an understanding develops that in fact all of us are "we," and that everyone of us has the right and obligation to formulate ideas, criticize them, take them to the point of specific steps and carry them out. To this effect the authorities must surrender some of their monopoly in assessing ideas and making decisions while society and the intelligentsia must surrender some of their monopoly on criticism and claims. This may be unusual but is vitally necessary.

Socialism, the new face of which we are tempestuously discussing today and painfully want to see more clearly and come close to, is not monochromatic or black and white. It is a socialism encompassing the entire spectrum of the rainbow, all human values and aspirations. Obviously, the color red will not be the least noticeable among them and, furthermore, it will cast its own hue on the "green," the "blue" and the other.

Furthermore, the politics and ideology of real life demand equally active politicians and ideologues. We very much liked the statement by K. Kolenchikov, party committee secretary of the branch of the State Optical Institute: One must not fear unevenness and even errors; one must fear indifference. Let there be emotions and passions, for they are the materials from which ideas, which capture human minds, are molded.

Socialism is, in fact, "human, all too human."

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THEORY AND POLITICS

Plurality of Ownership and Models of Socialism

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[Text] Awareness of the profound revolutionary crisis in the old system and the urgent need for a global renovation of socialism as prerequisites for its historical survival have put on the agenda the question of the historical fate of state ownership.

The idea of its inviolability, which prevailed for decades, was the granite foundation of the old political economy or, more accurately, a firm fence around it, the crossing of which was possible at the risk of having one's name deleted from the list of supporters of socialism and even participants in socioscientific life in general. In this sense the open discussion of the question of the future of state ownership marks a significant step toward the emancipation of public awareness. However, the elimination of the superficial limits is only half an accomplishment, if not less than half, for the previous psychological stereotypes of the mind and methodological stereotypes in science remain. What remains is the aspiration to put on the economic throne a kind of new (or conveniently forgotten old) form of ownership and granting the other forms the right to be a retinue (and only temporarily, at that, until "better times" arrive).

This approach dooms the new concepts of political economy to carry the old burden of ideological servicing of the system, excluding any alternate vision of the future and nurturing the unacceptability of conflicts among ideas. The fact that we shall have 10 militant concepts of political economy instead of "a single and true" one would hardly lead to a substantial increase in the constructive effect of economic theory: the multiplicity of viewpoints presumes a different mechanism of interaction, based on acknowledging the fact of an optional historical development and the possibility of different combinations of components.

The existence at the very foundation of the new political and economic concepts of the idea of options, of alternate future developments presumes a different, a more consistent understanding of the variety of socialist forms of ownership. The main object of this article is to consider the alternate forms of socialist ownership on production factors in the various models of socialism. The formulation of this task is based not only on its significance but also the fact that this problem was not

discussed in the article "Toward a New Face of Socialism" (KOMMUNIST No 13, 1989), although a great deal of the ideas expressed in that article agrees with it.

The spreading of the idea of the multiplicity of models of socialism is not only a reflection and support of the general political concept of socialist pluralism but also a significant sociomoral gain achieved recently. This idea accepts the freedom of the historical choice by the people of their way of development. It excludes giving a scientific blessing to the aspiration of making people forcefully fit the forms of socioeconomic existence which, in someone's view, are the exclusively socialist ones. The significance of this moral change to a society with a totalitarian past would be difficult to overestimate. Scientific concepts—resulting from self-development and not from instructions of "consistency"—become compatible with the norms of humanism, placing man above ideological stipulations and the nation above the specific social forms of the existing (or anticipated) system.

The trouble, however, is that the new "model" garb of thinking frequently hides the old view of what is "the only true" way. I mean by this the popular "twin model" structure in which we distinguish between two models of socialism: "good" and "bad," "right" and "wrong," and "our" and "not our."

Such a black and white ideological cliché is inherent in the religious-dogmatic awareness, on the basis of which any different interpretation of socialism is considered an apostasy or heresy. The root of such a formulation of the question is found in the awareness of the general socialist criteria (their origin, substantiation, etc.) within which we find a range of socialist views and variants of historical development. Such criteria reflect the unity of aspiration of mankind toward a better society with the actual results of many centuries of socialist searches and experimentation. They have expanded the initial idea of common ownership as a means against exploitation by acknowledging the significance of the humanizing of relations and, subsequently, with the understanding of the pluralism of social forms as a means of reaching the freedom of human choice and dynamic development.

The vision of the world from the position of such gains in socialist thinking unquestionably helps to lay the path into the future. However, the use of this standard in the analysis of the past and even of the present could lead to the conclusion that socialism has never existed anywhere, does not exist and no one knows whether it could exist at all.... As a result, in history, including very recent history, vast "blank spots" develop which conceal experiments in searching and errors, zig-zags and impasses, and the appearance of entire social structures spreading over many countries and lasting several decades, which we find difficult to identify. Obviously, our views on such structures should be based on the historical nature of development of socialist searching and on the criteria of socialism themselves.

From the viewpoint of the contemporary standard of socialism, no single model of the societies which existed in our country after the October Revolution ("war communism," NEP, Stalinist socialism and its stagnation variety) could be considered as being systematically socialist. However, if we start from the more primitive features of "socialization," which were considered at that time as adequate, we could speak of some early models of real socialism. This provides an approach to the interpretation of the paradoxical duality of the age which would combine, for example, Stalinist totalitarian-repressive regime with mass social support of the system.

The simplest socioeconomic guarantees and hopes for a leap into a better future were given to the people "in exchange" of guaranteed personal freedom and economic independence. Total statification of the economy, including the statification of manpower, means the development of a special mechanism for combining production factors with all the stemming consequences—production targets, mechanisms and principles of distribution, etc. It is hardly possible to separate within such a structure "pure" socialism from its "deformations;" it is a question of an integral model, of a specific variety of early socialism with its own reproduction laws, evolution and tremendous inertial power. Its obvious characteristics are state totalitarianism, and the economically based monopoly of state ownership and economic management.

State socialism, naturally, needs a closer study (including from the viewpoint of historically available model options). What is unquestionable is that today this system is in a state of deep crisis. The need for an extensive "destatification" of socioeconomic and political life and demonopolization of ownership relations has been felt by our entire tragic system and is already becoming reality through perestroika.

Variety is becoming the natural result of development which detected contradictions and the internal boundaries of the process of socialization and, in this sense, is a stable historical feature. Actually, to consider the variety of forms of the acquired "new harmony" of socialism, "corrected and supplemented," would be erroneous: complex and contradictory interaction processes are taking place within this tangle of phenomena among different development possibilities; the development of general socialist criteria raises the question of the models of socialism on a new level, as a question of the correlation among the different ownership systems, which define model differences within socialism.

On the surface, the expected interaction among different forms of socialist ownership looks like a self-regulating system, in which the ownership structure changes by itself, on the basis of the competitiveness among the various forms of ownership, adapting itself to the specific tasks of economic development. In practice, however, the principle of equality could be implemented

differently, depending on the type of form of ownership which is accepted as a yardstick for comparison purposes.

Therefore, the interaction among forms of socialist ownership becomes a target in the theoretical, ideological and political struggle, in which each one of the sides uses the slogan of equality while essentially defending different models of development and even different models of a socialist society. It is a question of their possibilities, for the reality remains that of a single model: the model of state socialism which is experiencing an acute and profound crisis. Alternate variants are highlighted only in the architectural design of the future economy. Within the visible chaos and accumulation of problems of functioning and reorganization of society there already are developing concealed processes in the structuring of alternate systems. The task of any further study is to look at these genetic strata and see the different possibilities of a socialist future (some of which will remain mere "possibilities" while others will become reality).

The visibly growing variety of forms of ownership not only makes the economy more flexible but also increases the set of possible variants in its evolution. Any individual form of ownership carries within itself, in a compressed, general and conventional manner, a "genetic information" on an extensive array of means of economic management. On the basis of this logic one could try to "decode" the outlines of possible models of socialism, contained in some existing or merely developing forms of ownership (the structure of a range of forms of ownership, means of control, social consequences, etc.), the formation of which clashes and becomes interwoven today in the basic tangles of socioeconomic contradictions.

As we leave behind the system of state socialism, naturally, the main problem becomes that of the future of state ownership, this absolute ruler of the former model of socialism in the USSR. The inevitable loss of the open monopoly rule of state ownership does not mean as yet, however, the elimination of its dominant position. We must not forget the fact that the specific shortcomings of this form are today obvious to everyone and are organically related to the by no means as yet obvious historically possible merits: the ability to promote the extensive harnessing of resource and their purposeful redistribution. This could be achieved in the new system in which the manifestation of such advantages will be steadily enhanced by the existence of other forms of ownership.

State ownership itself will be diversified (Union, republic, and municipal). This will display yet another feature of state ownership: its organic connection to the political system, the democratization of which today leads to the decentralization of ownership. However, it has its obvious limits, for a profound decentralization could lead to the loss of "mobilization," and "cumulative capabilities." For that reason, this system presumes the existence of "small-scale" forms of socialist ownership (cooperative, individual-labor, etc.), which will

become widespread in areas inaccessible to efficient state economic management.

The division of the functional areas among the different forms of socialist ownership remains in this case the prerogative of state control, which will deliberately establish an optimal structure of ownership for each stage of economic development. This could lead to the development of a secret monopoly on the part of the state sector, which would hinder the development of the other sectors and, indirectly, the economy as a whole. The social consequences of this model are equally conflicting: the possibility of retaining control over the economic and social situation (by legislatively limiting prices, engaging in an extensive program for compensation and progressive taxation of high income, etc.) becomes interwoven with the weakened incentives for economic and technical development, the abandonment of the radical forms of socioeconomic changes, etc.

Such social results are attractive not only in the case of the socially inert population strata, corrupted by equalization, but also the relatively numerous social elements, limited in terms of possibilities of engaging in independent economic activities by virtue of their position within the economic structure (defense industry, raw material producing enterprises, basic science and education). Support of such "neostatified" model is not the same as the conservative rejection of change although we find a certain continuity between it and the model of state socialism, particularly when we compare the more radical variants of such changes.

Many people see cooperative ownership as the real historical alternative to the state ownership system. Awareness of the "model" nature of such contradictions did not develop immediately. Today, however, the alternative of cooperative socialism is being most seriously considered.

Both the strength and weakness of cooperative ownership lie in the cooperative nature of the individual shares owned by the participants in the public enterprise. This creates efficient mechanisms for incentive in activities and leads to the drastic curtailment of administrative expenditures. Nonetheless, it strictly limits the scale of economic management, triggering sharp problems of harnessing means and resources needed for expanding economic activities.

The cooperative model presumes a particular range of forms of ownership. Thus, individual labor ownership is a means of destroying the old structures and acts as a steady base for the development of the cooperative. Share holding, which is a separate type of ownership, is a mature form of the mechanism for harnessing public funds. State ownership is preserved in areas which are inaccessible to the cooperatives because of the need for extensive capital intensiveness, slow turnover and substantial social costs.

The social forces which currently support the cooperative model are distinguished by their tremendous

variety. They are united only by their negative attitude toward the official structure of the economics of state socialism in which they "could not fit" for a variety of reasons. Meanwhile, the mass joining of cooperatives by initiative-minded and skilled workers could substantially influence their social aspect and status.

The complex combinations of social forces related to the various options in the economic evolution are developing also in the case of the kolkhoz system. The following paradox is noteworthy: the forces which actively oppose the new cooperatives fiercely defend the kolkhoz system (i.e., the officially cooperative system) in the agrarian sector. Actually, the kolkhoz system could not be considered a cooperative sector in the least. The cooperative principle of combining private commercial and social interest is implemented in it in an upside-down fashion: by the strict separation of the private-commercial (or private-physical) personal auxiliary farm and the "public field." Considerations on the distortion of the Leninist cooperative principles are, in my view, sterile; the kolkhoz system is not a distorted reflection of cooperative ownership in the trick mirror of Stalinist kolkhoz policy but a transformation of communal ownership.

Communal ownership, in its basic historical aspect, is a nominal (based on making a specific contribution) joint ownership of the indivisible fund, along with the even more nominal (obligations to the state and the community) private-family land ownership. This form easily adapts to a great variety of systems of production relations, including totalitarian-state socialism. State ownership monopoly in this case was not bothered by any kind of "pluralism." Furthermore, by tying the members to the kolkhoz, statified manpower directly served the fiscal and military-political interests of the state. We must also acknowledge the staggering viability of the communal form which, under the yoke of a totalitarian state, was able to preserve elements of internal communal democracy in economic management and ensured the survival of the country even during the most difficult times.

Now, under the conditions of the "destatified" economy, the communal organization is gradually rejecting the suppressing governmental structures and could become the bearer of its own variant of development: communal socialism. This model is, to a substantial extent, an alternative to the cooperative system. Unlike the cooperative, in this case it is not the individual who promotes the joint organization by contributing his share but, conversely, the communal organization which advances to the individual part of the ownership, providing that he will assume labor, production or monetary obligations. The market regulation of economic activities assumes second place (or even a lesser one, yielding its position to the "willful" regulation on the part of the community or its management.

The kolkhozes are not against the elimination of the bureaucratic state management organizations; they do not oppose the development of individual or small-group

farms side-by-side with their own lands. However, they would like to be the subjects of subleasing, not only economically but administratively, having control over allowing such subleasing or not. Therefore, the pluralism of ownership does not mean a rejection of the kolkhoz system. It is not structured on competitive-market principles but obeys the specific communal-legal regulation and cannot clash with the interests of the employment of the majority of "municipal subjects."

The social forces oriented toward the "noncommunal" model of socialism with its cultural and moral traditions are by no means reduced to individuals who continue to live and work within the kolkhoz system, promoting "strong" chairmen. "Leaving" the kolkhoz countryside lead to the creation in the cities as well of substantial strata (including people with technical training) who did not accept the "factory system" in terms of its attitude toward nature, the human community, and so on. The latest trends in the crisis of "industrialism" (particularly emphatic in "large-scale chemistry") influenced the patriarchal roots of the population in the various worker settlements and cities.

The idea of autonomy is countered by suggestions on making use of the Western experience in socialization. Obviously, we should agree with the claim that "the socially most developed capitalist countries are, in terms of a number of parameters, closer to a conversion to a 'mature model of socialism' than some socialist societies" (KOMMUNIST No 13, 1989, p 7). In considering the movement toward socialism as a universal process, we inevitably come to the question of applying already developed socialist forms elsewhere in the world to our own transformation practices. This task could be hardly resolved simply, the more so since this experience itself cannot be reduced to a single model. It is embodied, first of all, in the Scandinavian or the social democratic model; second, it is found in the separate trends related to the development of collectivistic enterprises of working people, which are the elements of this model but which could develop outside of it as well.

The Scandinavian model is not an abstract possibility but a historical reality, an attitude toward which we are currently trying to formulate. This circumstance makes it necessary to apply a different kind of research: go from social results to the specific origins of this model and then solve the question of the distance which separates it from our society and the possibility of crossing this distance.

The social advantages of the Scandinavian model are unquestionable. The combination of a high material standard with developed mechanisms of social protection and political democracy with stable rule by labor parties are what makes it attractive. What are the specifics of the various forms of ownership in this case? Which one of them is dominant?

This system is characterized by the stable preservation of the sector of large-scale capitalist economic management, which plays a special functional role by maintaining a high level of economic efficiency and providing the products for the specialized redistribution mechanisms. The highly developed capitalist production is surrounded by sectors of public ownership and a super-structurally socialized distribution. However, it is precisely this element that is the foundation not only of the unquestionable merits of the Scandinavian model but of its problems as well (exploitation of hired labor and the related antagonism).

A movement toward such a social system was entirely likely in the postrevolutionary period—the consistent and long-term implementation of the Leninist NEP could have provided such a result which, unquestionably, would have been more desirable than the Stalinist variant of state socialism. However, from the viewpoint of the contemporary situation, this virtually unquestionable truth turns into a historical paradox: in a number of parameters the Scandinavian model is superior to our current social system; however, the conversion to it would require of us to take steps back in the sense of the restoration of socioclass inequality.

Nonetheless, something else is possible: the development of mixed economic associations which would combine state, cooperative and joint enterprises with foreign capital, in which the active entrepreneurial activities of managers would be combined with hired labor free from noneconomic coercion and a "strong" social policy by the state and the labor unions. However, in this case we must take into consideration the starting conditions, which include a lowered cost of labor and manpower surpluses in many sectors, which would be similar to the situation in Latin America and Scandinavia. In this case the present "hidden unemployment" would become open and would depress the already extremely low cost of labor, eliminating within the inexpensive manpower incentives for technical progress. A higher cost of labor will affect only a few members of the highly intellectualized professions. The efforts to raise the cost of labor of the broad masses through strikes could also undermine the commodity backing of their wages.

We believe, therefore, that the social forces which are truly interested in the "social democratic" model of socialist development in our country are very few. They include above all modern management cadres and the most competitive representatives of the highly intellectual professions. The significantly broader strata—above all collectives of technically well-equipped enterprises in progressive sectors—could become the social base of the other variant in the utilization of Western experience, oriented toward forms of collective enterprise by the working people, surpassing the level of hired labor.

The problem of hired labor and the development of a historically consistent alternative to it affects both the neostatified and, partially, the cooperative model. In interpreting the concept of the worker's ownership of his

own manpower, which is an economic manifestation of the demand for his individual freedom, a crack has opened between the supporters of democratic economic reforms, which threatens to develop into a precipice.

The steps taken to ensure the personal freedom of the owner of the manpower—the right to strike, eliminating restrictions on mobility and so on—are an extensive part of the alternate formulation of the problem, which is highlighted in the practice of strikes and in its interpretation ("owners do not strike"). It is difficult to believe that socialism is essentially incompatible with hired labor, for history provides examples of the interweaving of socialism even with coercive labor. However, the economic situation of the worker cannot be based on hired labor.

The idea of reaching such a situation by the working people in the economy, which is meeting with increased social support, conceals the serious theoretical and practical problem of socialist enterprise, i.e., managing enterprises by the owners-workers, using their own and public funds. Its formulation is entirely justified from the historical viewpoint, for it is precisely the lack of entrepreneurial forms for the implementation of socialist ownership that was one of the main reasons for the crisis of state socialism, which alienates the workers from ownership and its management. The "coupon clipping" type of implementation of ownership, which is contrary to enterprise, is characterized by separating economic management from the owner in exchange for guaranteed income from the ownership; in the state socialist system it was manifested by increased negligence and bureaucratism. The long-term development of these trends led not only to a lowered overall efficiency of economic management but also to a breakdown of the socialist forms.

The search of ways of restoring unity between ownership, labor and management as one of the basic features of socialism and its embodiment in the development of economic and entrepreneurial functions by the working people themselves, is taking place in a variety of areas. A characteristic feature is the revival of the idea of the general participation of working people in management. The democratic potential of this idea is limited, however, by the actual possibility of its implementation, i.e., management is a type of work which requires not only time but also professionalism. Therefore, the desire of the working people to assume such obligations and the ability to carry them out are by no means attained automatically. The widespread slogan of universal participation in management is frequently reduced to the more modest tasks of worker control and the development of protective functions by organizations of the working people, for the more active embodiment of economic functions does not have an adequate economic foundation within the ownership structure itself.

Supporting management by the working people with real ownership and "fructifying" common ownership

through individual ownerships, outside of which individual activeness is either suppressed or localized, and securing channels for the access by collectives to public sources of funds, without which any collectivistic entrepreneurial activity cannot compete with large-scale capitalist undertakings are, clearly, the basic conditions for progress toward a new model of ownership.

The large enterprises could become real objects of ownership by the working people themselves, by combining within the enterprise different types of ownership, such as individual (stock owned by the labor collective), collective (property of the lessee developed with his own funds), public (stocks and bonds owned by other enterprises and associations of working people), municipal, republic, national (through leasing, share participation of state authorities), etc. The "formula for alloying" different types of ownership could substantially vary according to the type and size of enterprise. The method itself, however, of combining private with public funds would turn out to be most of all typical not only of large enterprises but of medium-sized (combination of cooperative ownership with leasing, loans, shares held by consumers, etc.) and small enterprises (individual enterprises, credited by consumers or the municipal authorities). This type of **associated ownership** could become the foundation for the development of a particular pluralistic system of ownership and model of socialist society.

Today the old Marxist principle of "association of individuals" is gaining new supporters thanks to the fact that from an inscription on a banner addressed to the future, it is turning into a real means of combining production factors and providing an alternative to hired labor. Associated ownership should be consistent with the new organizational principles and institutions leading to unification, which are replacing the customary cadre selection, and the impersonal hiring of workers by administrations. The starting point in an association is the self-staffing of microcollectives which have the right to practice leasing and to create larger associations supported by combinations of various types of ownership.

The establishment of this type of economic associations is a much more complex and lengthy project compared to that of renaming an association and eliminating its departmental supervision. "Day labor" has become a profound part of the economic structure and, to an even greater extent, of the mentality of the people. That is why one can understand collectives which refuse to accept as share holders colleagues who work without initiative, to conclude with them hiring agreements or else act slowly in converting to leasing, fearing the dependency of the numerous "day laborers" on the conveyor belt mentality. The chances of success of the "associated" way largely depend on the social maturity of the collectives and their ability to apply contemporary financial mechanisms (stocks, bonds, etc.).

The ways of social control of associated types of the socialist economic system as well could be quite unusual, leading from a "state economy" to a "public economy,

an economy of citizens..." (KOMMUNIST No 13, 1989, p 11). A special role is assigned in such control to public unions and social associations, which are alternate varieties of the trade unions, consumer associations, associations of lessees, members of cooperatives, farmers, etc. It is quite likely that the creation of parity systems of sociostate control—employment (with the trade unions), quality and prices (with consumer societies), and so on, is entirely likely. Unquestionably, we must develop an initiative-minded multiple-channel financing of large-scale social and production projects by floating securities for autonomous projects. The projects thus created and regulated cannot be considered group projects in the least, for essentially here one can speak of people's enterprises and popular (and not only individual and collective) socialist enterprise.

Could people's ownership exist in addition to state ownership and live and develop outside the strangling narrow state uniform? Will the survival of socialism be related only to the restoration of the "small-scale" forms of socialist ownership or will the hopes of Marxism for ownership by the people obtain a more efficient historical confirmation? The future will show.

The "multiple model" interpretation of socialism is what follows, in my view, from the suggested "spectral analysis" of ways and systems of socialist ownership in connection with the possible trends of development of socialism. Naturally, the author has his own viewpoint concerning the most preferable model; however, this is not what matters. What difference would it make if the 1,001 variant of the "only accurate line" or a conciliatory "third way" be suggested? True development is richer than that and the awareness of this fact should influence the interrelationship among different views.

The current polarization of the variety of viewpoints becomes an additional factor in the aggravation of the real contradictions and could contribute to a blow-up and even collapse of the revolutionary process as a whole. Accelerated radicalism was a natural feature during the period of awakening of public opinion; today the militant reciprocal exclusion of a variety of socialist versions and their elimination from socialism are hindering its survival. The real foundation for efficient work is the development of a certain compatibility among the different lines of socialist development in the pluralistic models of socialism.

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Weight of Acceleration

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[Article by Otto Rudolfovich Latsis, doctor of economic sciences]

[Text] According to the USSR State Committee for Statistics, the 1970 national income of the Soviet Union

was at 65 percent of the U.S. indicator. In subsequent years our country outstripped the United States or else increased its superiority in the volumes of output of the most important basic sectors and complexes of industrial sectors. Thus, the extraction of basic types of fuel and the production of electric power by hydroelectric and nuclear power plants (computed in terms of nominal fuel) reached 61 percent of the U.S. level by 1970, and 110 percent by 1987. The respective indicators were 103 and 261 percent for cast iron, 95 and 197 for steel, 216 and 527 for iron ore, 88 and 182 percent for chemical fertilizers, 106 and 164 percent for metal-cutting machine tools, 145 and 484 percent for tractors (excluding low-power truck-gardening tractors, based on the total power of their engines) (the last figure was for 1986), and 141 and 181 percent for cement.

In some sectors the absolute growth of output in our country was lower than these relative figures indicate, for the United States reduced the volume of output in metallurgy, the production of metal cutting machine tools, and tractors. In other areas the real increase was higher: for example, although the overall production of fuel and energy carriers in the United States increased, in our country it increased even further. The same applied to the production of chemical fertilizers and cement.

We know the cost to the country of this impressive increase in output and the burden it put on the environment in the country and on the pocketbooks of the citizens. What did it give us? Judging by this comparison with the United States (which, understandably, is not the sole criterion), the answer is simple: nothing. Whereas in 1970 our national income over 65 percent of the American, it had dropped to 64 percent in 1987. Let us incidentally note that the figures themselves, according to that same State Committee for Statistics, during each one of the 5-year periods of that time, of the average annual growth rates of the national income in our country exceeded those of the United States. If the pace was higher, how could the final volume be relatively lower? The methodology used in computing such indicators may explain a few things: pace and volume are computed through different methods and, therefore, differences may develop in the results of such comparisons. However, this should not reach such an extent and deviations should not always go strictly in one direction!

Let the statisticians explain this puzzle. In this case it does not weaken our conclusions but, conversely, it even strengthens them. It is impossible to assume that the leaders of the Central Statistical Administration of that time deliberately lowered our figures when comparing them to the United States. If anything, they even padded them. This conclusion becomes even more believable by admitting a worsening in the correlation of volumes while claiming superiority in terms of rates. If the most substantial physical indicators of public production in our country increased, compared to the American, while the final comparisons in terms of the national income worsened in our case, this means that on an average each unit of our own national income, compared to the

American, had become substantially more "sluggish." This is confirmed by comparing the work in transportation. Freight turnover for all types of transport facilities (excluding gas pipelines) for the USSR amounted to 98 percent of the American by 1970 and 136 percent by 1987. We are generating less national income while hauling more freight.

In turn, each unit of output in physical terms had become substantially more expensive during that period. In order to extract petroleum, natural gas, coal and metals, we must go increasingly farther away from the basic consumption areas, drill and dig ever deeper, and exploit ever more difficult or leaner deposits in terms of the basic substance. The result is that each percentage of growth of public production demands an increased amount of capital investments.

Partially, these processes reflected a worldwide trend. In the past decade, in their forecast of the global economy for the year 2000, drafted by a group of United Nations experts, headed by Vasilii Leontyev, it was reported that for the last 30 years of the 20th century mankind will spend more raw materials and fuel by a factor of 3-4 compared to its entire previous history. Actually, this forecast, which depicted an extension of the established trends, proved that mankind could not allow such an extension, for this could not be withstood either by nature on the planet or the economy. The energy crisis which broke out in 1974 tightened up the restructuring of the growth, above all in the economically most developed countries.

Prestige "gas guzzlers" disappeared from the American highways. The passenger car became compact and lightweight and an engine with a gasoline consumption such as, for example, our "Volga," lost any whatsoever chances in the competitive struggle in the West as early as the 1970s. Petroleum consumption declined both in terms of extraction and imports. The extent of refining, however, increased. Efforts are made to avoid burning fuel oil which, after refining, yields light petroleum products.

Yes, during that period the pace of economic growth declined in those countries. However, even during years when the overall increase in the GNP equaled zero, this did not mark a period of stagnation. The static nature of the average figures concealed a headlong mobility of sectorial indicators: traditional energy-intensive sectors reduced their output while science-intensive ones gained the upper hand.

The main factor, however, was not changes in intersectorial proportions, which were visible on the surface. Within a decade the entire technological foundation of industry changed. Electronics transformed metallurgy, chemistry, machine building and agrarian production. It changed the household economy and the daily way of life. Within each sector and technology production and technical characteristics are being subjected to profound quality changes. For example, metal smelting is related

not only to substituting plastics for metal. The tons of goods produced by American, Japanese and Western European metallurgy include a substantial amount of different metals smelted in different ways, rolled and processed differently compared to a couple of decades ago. As a result, the present output of this metallurgy, with a lower tonnage compared to the past, has a significantly higher consumer value.

Capitalism carried out this structural reorganization without abandoning its typical methods. In many countries, even the richest, the time of the energy crisis is recalled with a shudder, for it was a time of increased unemployment, accelerated inflation, and numerous bankruptcies. Structural changes were urgently demanded because enterprises which became unprofitable were closed down.

Our theoretical concepts stipulated that in principle, the socialist planned economy can carry out such a reorganization of the production structure without such major social costs. In this case, however, we have no practical data with which to prove this: so far we have not made any radical changes in the structure. Does this mean that socialist planning in general is incapable of such work? I believe that it would be more accurate to assume something else: the planned control instruments proved to be in weak hands in the 1970s.

It would be useful for historians and political experts to determine the reasons for this. Within the limits of our own topic, something else should be emphasized: today this problem is not only ripe but overripe in our country. We have come to a limit beyond which with the old structure we would be unable to continue any expanded or even simple reproduction. We shall have no resources for solving social problems and our national economy would increasingly find itself in the position of self-destructive production for the sake of production. This means that today we must not simply engage in a structural reorganization but complete it quickly and dependably.

Am I depicting the situation in excessively somber hues when I speak of the immediate threats related to the old structure? Let us consider a single element of preplanning computations for the next 13th 5-year period: the long-term development of petroleum extraction.

We know that the first half a billion tons of petroleum were extracted by our petroleum industry in 77 years of its existence, from 1860 through 1936. Today such a quantity is extracted each 10 months. Today our country is extracting more petroleum than was extracted by the entire world in 1950. In order to ensure such an increase the petroleum workers had to go first beyond the Volga and, later, beyond the Urals. However, the time came when even the biggest deposits discovered in West Siberia had passed the peak of their productivity. The easy part was done. There is still a great deal of petroleum in the ground but now this petroleum is located in small deposits and in deep layers. Increasingly deeper

drilling is needed for each ton of extracted petroleum as well as increasing capital investments.

A responsible approach to this matter would have made us acknowledge a long time ago that the further increase in extraction has become unbearable for the economy. This was not acknowledged. The necessary investment resources were "found" by "saving" on the production and social infrastructure, environmental protection, and areas where well gas was being collected and processed. Discussions on the shift method concealed the harsh truth that the new cities were being built as shift work settlements, while the base cities for them (a basic city should be reachable by helicopter) were the cities in the European part of the country: brigades were assigned to work thousands of kilometers away.

Even that violation of nature and people stopped yielding results. In 1960 we extracted 148 million tons of petroleum, including (here and subsequently) gas condensate; extraction totaled 353 million in 1970 and 603 million in 1980. This was a definite growth averaging a doubling of output with each decade. Subsequently, however, the petroleum industry halted and, for the first time in a long period of time, no longer expanded or even met its target. A total of 595 million tons were extracted in 1985. This was followed by feverish efforts which were hardly useful from the viewpoint of an optimal system for extracting the petroleum from the deposits: 615 million in 1986; 1987 became a record year: 624 million. The plan for 1988 stipulated a certain reduction but it was slightly overfulfilled and the record was duplicated. No efforts whatsoever helped in 1989, the plan is not being fulfilled and extraction is lower compared to last year; a fuel shortage was felt everywhere. The expected extraction for 1990, according to the specialists, is estimated at 618 million tons.

What can we expect for the next 5-year period? The difficulties can be felt as of now, while the plan is still in the drafting stage. Let us consider the following figures: the initial plan of the various Gosplan departments in charge of the fuel and energy complex was to extract 620 million tons of petroleum in 1995 for which, according to them, we would need a total of 88.8 billion rubles of capital investments for the 5-year period, which includes 18.2 billion for construction work. The ministries in the fuel-energy complex promise to extract no more than 610 million tons but demand capital investments of 116.2 billion and 26.6 billion rubles for construction work.

The conclusion of the commission of experts was that the country could get by with 610 million tons and that the ministries could ensure such an extraction with 86.5 billion rubles in capital investments and 21.2 billion rubles in construction work. The trouble, however is that the consolidation department for capital investments of the USSR Gosplan does not promise to guarantee neither of those three variants: it will allocate the sector 68 billion rubles for capital investments and 11.3 billion for

construction work. According to the experts, with such figures by 1995 no more than 540 million tons will be extracted.

This would suffice for domestic consumption but would deal an irreparable blow to petroleum exports. In 1995 the export of fuel and energy resources will decline by 10-15 percent compared to the 1990 level, essentially by reducing exports of petroleum and petroleum products even if 610 million tons are extracted. With 540 million it would decline by a factor of 1.6. Earnings in freely convertible currency will drop substantially in the first variant; in the second we shall be unable to meet our long-term obligations and will have no money to pay for purchases from the fraternal countries. The current heated debates among Soviet economists on the structure of imports (should we purchase grain, industrial goods or equipment for foreign currency) will become academic: our possibilities of purchasing any one of these items will decline sharply. It is true that for quite some time economists have sensibly been saying that export earnings by an industrial country such as ours should not be based on crude oil but on highly processed goods. The trouble, however, is that earnings from petroleum would decline much faster than such income would increase from the sale of machines and equipment, for instance.

Operational drilling is the most costly part of capital investments in the petroleum industry. Its volume in the forthcoming 5-year period should increase by 28 percent if we adopt the 610 million ton variant for 1995. More drilling with lesser extraction is the usual fate of older petroleum areas. We have entered the period in which our main petroleum areas are old. Increased depth may not require greater outlays if the equipment were to be improved at the necessary pace. However, our deep drills are mostly modifications of models which were developed 40 years ago. The changes made do not lead to any revolutionary leap in productivity. Therefore, more meters of drilling means more drills (each drill or, rather, system, accounts for 1000 tons of metal shipped across roadless swampy tayga and tundra) and more drilling workers.

American industry is intensively engaged in automating drilling. This requires less service personnel and the productivity of each drill is higher, so that increased depth does not require a larger number of drills. Soviet designers developed an automated deep drill 25 years ago, roughly at the same time that the first American blueprints appeared. It fared better than many of our other inventions. It was recognized by our Committee for Inventions and Discoveries and was granted American and Western European patents. An experimental model was manufactured and its tests confirmed its efficiency. The most difficult part remained although, in principle, it should have been the simplest: completing the design and ensuring reliability and, subsequently, organizing mass production. Instead, after a halt of several years, the production of another prototype was undertaken, followed by new tests. Every year something

could be added to the reports on the fulfillment of the plan for experimental design work but mass production was always postponed for the future. A.M. Kotlyarov, the creator of this automatic drill, who objected, was pensioned off and the design bureau no longer needed its founder nor the facilities for completing the project for which it was created. The time of the patent expired before the country was able to earn even a single dollar from it. Today Kotlyarov's idea may be used by anyone who so wishes. The millions of rubles spent in experimental design did not yield the expected savings which could have amounted to billions.

Is this an atypical case? Following is a quotation from the speech by Siberian petroleum worker V.V. Gustov, USSR People's Deputy, delivered at the First USSR Congress of People's Deputies: "The program for the technical retooling of the petroleum sector in Western Siberia, earmarked in Surgut in September 1985, with the participation of the heads of the leading machine building ministries, was actually suppressed. Out of 64 types of new equipment of essential importance to the petroleum and gas complex we obtained only one: a single control-measuring device."

Taking this into consideration, one can easily imagine the basic reasons for more general national economic problems. There are no reasons to assume that our scientific and technical organizations and machine building enterprises have a special dislike for the petroleum industry. A similar situation prevails in the technologically updated sectors which not only produce but also consume, and in the case of fuel and energy carriers. If technical stagnation struck only at the petroleum sector, bypassing everything else, the threatened reduction in petroleum extraction down to 540 million tons by 1995 would not have caused any difficulties and would even have been desirable. Considering the technical standard accessible today to the industrial countries, our national economy would have been able to lower the consumption of energy per unit of finished product not by a few percentage points but by a substantial one-third.

Let us once again make a comparison with the United States. The overall output of fuel and energy carriers in that country was 2,072,000,000 tons of conventional fuel by 1970; 2,141,000,000 in 1980, 2,154,000,000 in 1985 and 2,143,000,000 in 1987. In other words, since the start of the 1970s, there was a slight increase; at the beginning of the 1980s the volume remained virtually stable and starting with the mid-1980s, there was even a certain drop. Petroleum and gas extraction in the United States has substantially declined since 1970 and so have petroleum imports, whereas the end economic result and the national income as a whole increased substantially.

None of this is something new and we realized quite some time ago the significance of progress in this area and we are slowly formulating similar assignments in our 5-year plans. A certain reduction in energy and material intensiveness per unit of national income is taking place. However, we have not even tried at any point to include

in our plans a pace of progress in this area so that the entire economic growth can be fully attained without increasing the production of fuel and energy carriers. Even the modest assignments in terms of savings which we set ourselves are by no means always met. Usually we are more successful in increasing extraction than reducing outlays. We cannot avoid wondering about what it is that is not working in our planned, economic and, finally, social mechanism, which has repeatedly proved its significant possibilities in completing other historical projects.

The answer to this question can no longer be postponed, for the further development of our economy without a profound structural reorganization is not simply ineffective but, in this case, impossible. The dilemma of the current financial crisis has given us a particularly painful reminder of this, for under circumstances in which all national economic complexes are trying to increase investments, state budget appropriations for industrial construction as a whole must be reduced. That same fuel and energy complex should take into consideration the reduced investments as early as 1990, before the start of the 13th 5-Year Plan, the difficult problems of which we already discussed. As was reported, the share of resources for expanded reproduction in the consumed national income should decline from 16.3 percent in 1989 to 14 percent in 1990. This would be a 2.3 percent drop in a single year, whereas during the four preceding years of the 5-year plan that share was reduced altogether by 2.1 percent.

This decisive step is tied to the hope for financial improvements, which we need so greatly. However, this hope could turn into a prelude to difficulties, should we try to solve the problem by simply mechanically curtailing industrial capital investments. Such a "decision" could lead to an aggravated scarcity of energy and, in the final account, undermine the production of consumer goods, for the sake of the strengthening of which this financial maneuver is being undertaken. Such a turn of events could also compromise and drastically worsen perestroika. Major investments in the production of fuel, energy and metal could be eliminated only by really reducing the need for all such resources. Is this possible?

A study has indicated that it is not only possible but also very desirable and useful in a number of respects. However, the existing possibilities will become reality only if we stop viewing a radical structural reorganization as a purely technological task. It is a task which profoundly affects economic, social and political relations, the social mentality and the way of life of the people, as well as mental stereotypes.

Yes, in this case the quality of technical and economic decisions lies on the surface of phenomena. It is precisely this quality that must be changed. However, it is not changing.

Here are some facts which have been discussed of late at meetings of the USSR People's Control Committee.

The average use of the energy potential of our 300 horsepower "Kirovets" giant tractor is used in the kolkhozes and sovkhozes at no more than 40 percent. Simply said, this huge power machinery which drags on the soil a mountain of iron, which wrecks the soil, is useless to the farmers. Conversely, there is a great need for small tractors with a traction not higher than 1 ton. Engines are in particularly short supply. This problem has been discussed for many years, under the conditions of the initiated economic reform, we must admit that industry is not in a hurry to restructure, forcing the consumer to pay for more expensive and less needed equipment. It is true that it has accepted to manufacture the new tractor by creating a huge production facility in Yelabuga, having requested for this purpose 3.8 billion rubles in capital investments despite the fact that we are already producing six times more tractors than in the United States. However, the machine builders are in no hurry to carry out this assignment with fewer outlays, by restructuring operating plants.

It has been frequently pointed out that the United States is producing less grain harvesting combines than the USSR by a factor of 12, while harvesting significantly more grain. Furthermore, American agriculture has a sufficient number of harvesters to ensure the gathering of the entire crop within optimal terms—up to 10 days—while our agriculture is constantly short of machinery. The main reason is known: our combines are worse than the American in terms of output, reliability and quality; they are less well-serviced and less well supplied with spare parts. However, even the best which domestic industry could produce—the "Don" combine—is, according to the specialists, a technically advanced machine but technologically and structurally not ready for production. Low technical standard and quality are compensated by quantity, by an avalanche of essentially unnecessary metal which is powered by rivers of fuel.

Let us consider another sector. The hauling of 1 million tons of freight in containers (and not in bulk freight cars) would save the national economy about 3,000 tons of metal and 200,000 cubic meters of timber and would yield a profit of 20 million rubles. Above all, this would quadruple labor productivity in loading and unloading. Need we explain what this means today, when the life of enterprises, sectors and, in some cases, entire areas, literally hangs on the acceleration of freight car turnover and reduced idling. Furthermore, the freight itself is better protected in containers. However, containerization plans remain unimplemented from one 5-year plan to the next. Investigations have led to the conclusion that the railroads can fulfill the assignments related to containerization but that the Ministry of Railways sets plans for containerized transportation below these assignments and the requests of shippers. Whereas the fleet of containers increased by 14 percent in the first 3 years of the 5-year period the haulage of containerized freight increased by 2 percent only. For months on end thousands of railroad containers remain idling in ports; 20 percent of the containers are inoperative at any given

moment, and no one is in a hurry to repair them. Sometimes a faulty container is... shipped to another railroad, while we avert our eyes. The Lvov Railroad alone has spent in 3 years more than 150,000 rubles to haul faulty containers. Naturally, with this kind of use there is a shortage of containers. An increasing number is being produced and a great deal of metal is expended for the purpose. Furthermore, since the start of the 5-year period about 30 million rubles worth of foreign exchange have been spent to purchase containers from India. In 1988 alone the Ministry of Maritime Fleet spent more than 8 million rubles in foreign currency on leasing containers from foreign companies.

It would be pointless to go on with this depressing list, and even this is sufficient to realize that the problem which faces us is less technical than socioeconomic. As long as we do not solve it it would be senseless to even formulate the question of how much petroleum, steel, electric power or tractors we need. If a kolkhoz can freely buy a highly efficient and reliable tractor with all the technical features it needs, if spare parts for it are plentiful and if it maintains and uses the tractor carefully, without letting it rust in the snow, it could be that a single tractor would suffice where today even 10 are not enough. Unless the current attitude toward the production and utilization of material values changes, it will always be in short supply in our country however much we may increase output. Why is it that we are still unable to surmount this barbaric attitude toward natural resources and the results of our labor?

The most common reason is the by no means as yet eliminated weakness in cost accounting relations. The "total cost accounting," which was introduced with the Law on the State Enterprise, should more accurately be described as "fuller cost accounting." Unreliable prices, which by no means always let the enterprise know the true cost of the goods they purchase, continue to be used. A set of levers continues to function, protecting the enterprises from the consequences of negligence, idling or faulty moves: subsidies, easy credit, and free state financing.

This entire system of shock absorbers which lower the cost of irresponsibility, determines to a tremendous extent the behavior of the enterprises. Here is a clear example, described in a newspaper report from Tula Oblast. Last spring, a farm in Zaokskiy Rayon invited an American specialist in truck gardening, Professor D. Mittlaider, to train our farmers. It is said that he started crying when finding out that chemical fertilizers in our country are hauled in dump trucks and dumped in piles at the edge of the field. He himself measures chemical fertilizers by the gram. His yields proved to be higher than in the farms of Zaokskiy Rayon, and the nitrate test of the vegetables he raised indicated that the produce was clean. Let us note that although in the USSR a substantially greater amount of chemical fertilizers is being produced compared to the United States, they nonetheless remain in short supply.

Let us point out yet another serious ill which undermines the healthy effect of the market even if the enterprises efficiently apply cost accounting: monopoly. It is precisely the monopoly status of producers that allows them to impose on the consumers not the types of machines they need: since no other machines are available, these are the ones the consumer will buy.

Monopoly is a serious phenomenon in the modern economy. A tremendous amount of publications have been written about it. In a number of countries special antimonopoly legislation has been passed. I believe that for the time being we are still treating this phenomenon too light-heartedly. It is true that we curse it roundly but do not as yet think through quite thoroughly about ways of struggling against it and about its very nature. Obviously, it is only one part of the problem that rests on the surface: departmental monopoly. This monopoly can be seen with the naked eye. The suggestion of closing down the sectorial industrial ministries and allowing voluntary enterprise associations to assume the functions of centralized management is meeting with increasing social support.

Although this idea is very useful, its implementation could probably eliminate sectorial monopoly only partially. Yes, an association under democratic control by the enterprises would be unable to create the type of trend is inherent in the bureaucratic apparatus of developing its own exclusive interests pitted against those of society and the state (which is inherent in the ministries as such). However, there also is the monopoly of enterprises which, within the framework of an association, could become even stronger. Enterprise monopoly is most frequently related to the fact that a given commodity is produced by no more than one or two enterprises which have no competition. Actually, these are isolated cases. Dozens and hundreds of similar enterprises working for the same market could also have a monopoly. This is related most frequently to commodity shortages: if the demand for a commodity exceeds supply and the commodity is unavailable on the market, all manufacturing enterprises benefit from the advantages of a monopoly status in their relations with the customer. There is no choice although there may be thousands of suppliers, for if the commodity is in short supply it is taken from wherever it could be procured and under the conditions set by the seller. Such a dispersed monopoly is particularly durable.

One could have a monopoly not only on one's own output and conditions of sales. In our country monopoly power is provided above all by the possibility of handling the sources of material procurements. That is why, for example, frequently enterprises do not dare to break their affiliation with an association or ministry although they have been granted this right by the law.

Departments organized on the basis of monopoly and their traditions and personnel are the main bearers of a specific economic standard of the time of industrialization, which has long become obsolete and is seriously

hindering the structural changes which must be made today. This standard developed during the period of initial industrialization and initial replacement of manual labor with machines, when economic progress was justifiably identified with the increased output of metal, coal, cement and electric power. A wartime situation or a situation influenced by the threat of war, as in the 1930s and 1940s, strengthened this mental stereotype. The real vital foundations for such an approach to industrial development were exhausted the moment it was able to ensure victory in the war. However, in his electoral speeches of 1946 Stalin reproduced the ideological concepts of the time of the First 5-Year Plan, spelling out all development targets for three to four 5-year periods in advance in terms of metal, coal and petroleum, and nothing else.

This peculiar standard of initial industrial expansion was reflected not only in the mental stereotypes but also in the training of cadres and the material foundations of industry and construction. It is much easier to find a contractor for building a new enterprise than an organization which would be willing and capable of reconstructing and updating or even simply repairing an existing enterprise. This is largely explained by the fact that building something new is more profitable to the builder than repairing and reconstructing. In the 1930s this was no problem. In terms of their share in fixed industrial capital, the new enterprises exceeded the old to such an extent that in itself this ensured the good condition of the production system, regardless of the efforts to reconstruct and repair existing enterprises. However, this situation was fitting only in the case of a young industry. In a mature industry, conversely, adding capacities consisting of recently completed enterprises is insubstantial. Much more important is the skill to maintain functioning enterprises in working conditions and to update them. It was precisely because of neglecting this task that we have such a large amount of excessively worn-out equipment and installations and, as a consequence, such numerous accidents. However, this is not the only problem. Reconstruction and modernization are a relatively inexpensive way of changing the production structure while building new enterprises is the most expensive method. Dislike of reconstruction is a major reason for inertia in the production structure.

Today our economic and general political publications claim virtually on a daily basis that the old stereotypes are being surmounted. Actually, however, this is by no means the case as yet. The very acceleration of economic development, proclaimed in 1985, which is so necessary to our society, has been frequently interpreted by the planning authorities in a traditional spirit: increasing the growth rates of the basic volume indicators and, above all, of the gross national income. Yet the politicizing of this concept is inconsistent with the contemporary objectives and understanding of social development, for today the acceleration of economic development means, above all, ensuring the vitally necessary acceleration of progressive structural changes. The type of growth rates of

volume indicators in this case should, in principle, be a matter of indifference. In this situation the politicizing of the "growth rates" which is traditional of our propaganda becomes particularly harmful.

Even greater harm is caused by recurrences of concepts of centralized investments as being the main instrument of structural changes and for the acceleration of the entire economic growth. In the past year a great deal has already been written on how our economy and the position of perestroika have been undermined and out state finances have been disrupted as a result of the investment boom of the current 5-year period. It may seem as though society has reached an agreement on the fact that a maximum reduction of state budgetary expenditures for industrial construction is the only thing which could help us surmount the collapse of the market. However, here is one of the most outstanding documents of perestroika: the appeal of 417 agrarian deputies to the First USSR Congress of People's Deputies. Not to issue commands to the peasantry, not to impose forms of economic management, put an end to incompetent interference in production, let the labor collectives handle the products it has created, establish economically substantiated prices for agricultural and industrial commodities, and provide agriculture with the necessary material resources: these are all accurate and experienced relevant demands. We should not plunder the peasant or tie his hands, but let him do his work. This is the only accurate approach in a socialist system (and, incidentally, not only in the case of agricultural production). In that same appeal, however, we also read that "under our conditions the government finds nothing better than reducing capital investments for the development of agriculture. Such a revision of national economic proportions, considering the shortage of food is a mistake."

However, as has been pointed out, it was during the period of stagnation that efforts were made to solve the rural problems by increasing state capital investments. Such capital investments fed the developers of reclamation systems who, ignoring the very meaning of the term "reclamation," did not improve but wasted the land. Such capital investments were used to create reinforced concrete "meat factories," relying on the fact that fodder will be purchased from overseas, for funds to develop feed production were no longer available. Actually, it is not a question of the technical use of such capital investments. The point is what determines the nature of any kind of social relation: Who is the master of such funds, who makes decisions concerning their use? Is it the peasant or the official on the outside? By the nature of the social attitude they express, state budget capital investments are clearly inferior to capital investments by the farms themselves, for which reason they are also less economically effective. We paid for understanding this truth with a 20-year stagnation in the development of agrarian production despite a flurry of investment activities: hundreds of billions of rubles were sunk in the land without improving it in the least. Unquestionably, the

products of the farmers' labor must be paid for adequately. The countryside must have at its disposal, at accessible prices, good equipment, materials and fuel. The participation of the state in financing the social area is necessary. However, we do not need any fictitious gifts consisting of centralized free financing of industrial capital investments which are ruining the country without enriching the countryside in the least. It was precisely they that were of tremendous assistance over the past 20 years in the preservation of the material-intensive structure of our entire national income.

Naturally, all of this does not apply to our agriculture alone. In industry as well enterprise investments and the use of their own funds created by the labor collectives are, as a rule, more efficient than "nobody's" money supplied by the various departments. This does not mean that the role of economic centralization (unification of resources) or planned centralism should be reduced in the share of the structural reorganization. Both are necessary perhaps even more than in the past. However, under the conditions of full enterprise cost accounting, both should be implemented through different methods. Thus, instruments for combining resources for investments, exceeding the possibilities of a single enterprise, could include stock companies, consortiums, associations based on shares, voluntary associations and voluntary mergers. The instruments used in influencing the sovereign rights of enterprises through the state plan include advantageous prices, interest rates and foreign exchange rates. The initial steps of the economic reform have convinced us that the "plan or market" dilemma does not exist in the structural reorganization or in current production management. We need both a strong plan and a strong market.

Naturally, there is an area of long-term major decisions related to essentially new trends of technical progress in which we need the decisions of the state plan and government budget outlays. However, it is precisely in making such decisions that our planning authorities frequently lag behind the governments of capitalist countries. Could the reason be that they are overburdened with extraneous functions?

The entire methodology of management planning and organization relies on continuing the existing development and the fact that tomorrow each sector will grow approximately in the same way that it did yesterday. Under circumstances in which dynamic structural shifts are more necessary than anything else it would be difficult to find a less suitable system of management than that of sectorial ministries and a less suitable model of planning than the tradition of adding something to the "fact" in all areas.

We have never solved nor did we ever try to solve a problem familiar to the rest of the world, such as closing down existing sectors and production facilities. The constant change of sectors on their way up or their way down is precisely what ensures dynamism in the contemporary world. For example, if Japan had continued to

rely on the sectors which ensured its "economic miracle," the miracle would have ended in the 1960s. Yet it gained a second breath thanks to the fact that it abolished its "heavy" sectors in the 1970s and tempestuously promoted progress in "high technologies."

It is not only the ways of planning and management that have fallen behind the demands of reality. All forms of ensuring social guarantees, firmly linked in the mass consciousness and political traditions to socialism, are based on structural immobility. Such guarantees are related to the concept that everything that exists should always exist. The tempestuous mobility of structures in a contemporary economy should be backed by an adequate strengthening of systems of social guarantees. We need human forms of organization of sectorial and territorial mobility and new ways of compensation in the transfer of personnel and a new system for cadre retraining. On the other hand, restrictions imposed by the existing level of cadre mobility should be attentively taken into consideration in the planning of restructuring.

The problem of structural changes in the economy has always also been a political problem, for it affects the vital interests of millions of people. This has always been one of the main problems of political struggle in the economy. The conflict between private and common interests, which has so extensively been discussed in our social sciences and by our journalists is manifested precisely here particularly sharply. The effort to satisfy equally all group interests is unpromising and extremely harmful to society as a whole. A democratic mechanism for identifying and taking into consideration the variety of interests is developing today precisely in the USSR Congress of People's Deputies, the Supreme Soviet and its agencies. We also need a new type of political awareness, an understanding of the fact that not each group interest could and should be satisfied.

Structural reorganization is a strategic long-term problem. Today we live surrounded by concerns which demand answers in a few months or even days. However, the very gravity of the situation is largely explained by delays in solving long-term strategic problems related to shaping an efficient public production structure. Our acceleration is extremely unwieldy for which reason it is not successful. The excess weight should be discarded.

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Formulation of Social Objectives

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[Conversation between S. Yarmolyuk and Vladimir Georgiyevich Kostakov, doctor of economic sciences, professor, director of USSR Gosplan Scientific Research Economics Institute]

[Text] Yarmolyuk. Until recently the question "why?" was the focal point of public attention. All of us were

trying to understand the reasons for the negative phenomena. Subsequently, a great deal became clear. Today social thinking is concentrated on the question "how?" on solving the crisis situation. Quite indicative in this respect is the search for constructive decisions by the country's Supreme Soviet. This is a question I would like to ask you, Vladimir Georgiyevich, as director of the economics institute, as a person interested in the study of social processes, and also as a member of our highest planning authority.

Kostakov. To begin with, I would not ask "why?" It seems to me that we have still not clarified to our own satisfaction the situation as well as, I would say, the full extent of crisis phenomena, for some processes, above all those related to man, have still not been properly assessed. Yet we are setting ourselves the task of turning the economy to face man, which is the main objective of perestroika.

There are some end, some objective indicators of economic and social development. In my view, these are the lifespan and the population's health. Do you not agree that, in the final account, this is the main thing? If we look at data for the past 25 years, let us say, we would realize that the lifespan in our country has not increased but has even somewhat decreased, although the national income has more than tripled and real per capita income has more than doubled. Naturally, the following question arises: What kind of development has this been if it has not been generally reflected in the most important factor?

A situation which is the direct opposite of global trends has developed. In the developed capitalist countries the expected lifespan has been extended by several years and infant mortality today is lower by a factor of 2.5-5 compared to our country. The conclusion is obvious that in terms of the main factor—the service to man—the quality of the growth of our economy should be considered unsatisfactory. Unquestionably, it must be studied: Why is it that the dynamics of general economic indicators, although in itself adequate, does not guarantee man a better life?

In the past as well we said that man is the main thing. However, the mechanism of having the economy meet the demands of man has never been considered as state policy. Conversely, we were always pleased by the pace of development. Let us recall the second half of the 1960s, when it was quite high. Yet it was precisely then that the lifespan began to decline noticeably. We could have noticed it had our economic affairs been related to the individual.

Yarmolyuk. Today, as we know, there is a particular emphasis on strengthening the social trend in planning....

Kostakov. Nonetheless, it is the idea of the pace, the highest possible pace that prevails in the formulation of the plans. As in the past, the pace is the main criterion in rating a plan and its acceptability. I believe that the

emphasis should be shifted to the way plans meet the needs of the people and lower or prevent social tension.

Actually, in a certain sense, there has always been social planning in our country: plans contemplated the growth of real population income, living standards, development of health care, education, and so on. The same attention was not paid to the social trend of planning which we are adopting now. Unfortunately, we are only undertaking it now, and to a large extent it remains traditional and simplistic.

The current economic crisis has clearly proved that facing man should not be considered—as is the widespread belief in our country—through the lens of material and value paces and proportions. It is assumed that it would suffice to increase the share of consumption in the national income and accelerate the expansion of industrial sectors in group "B," by redistributing respectively some investments among the various national economic areas to ensure that same desired social trend in planning. Naturally, implied here are high growth rates of the economy and, correspondingly, a high increase in well-being. However, the humanizing of the economy and its true subordination to the interests of man change the habitual concepts as to what we should aspire to attain. From the positions of the interests of man, in terms of which the economy is merely a means of improving his life, pace and quantitative growth are also merely means. In themselves their scale, regardless of the way the needs of the people are satisfied, does not prove anything.

Let us imagine the following situation: Let us say that there has been no increase whatsoever in indicators, that the national income has been stabilized and so has the volume of output. But then let us say that instead of 25 to 30 percent losses we have only 5 percent losses in agriculture. The resulting benefits are clear and, furthermore, this will also improve the quality of the goods. There will be changes in industry as well. Let us assume that the volume of output in the shoe-making sector does not increase but the structure is changed for the better. It is true that today we cannot see in the stores even the type of shoes which we have always criticized. But let us assume that the policy of income, and price setting is finally such (coordinated with the volume of output) that the people can go to a store and see that shoes are always available. Although the person cannot immediately acquire what he needs he would not be irritated by the empty shelves. He would think: Well, I will save on this and such, I will restrict my purchases of something else but, 6 months from now, I shall be able to afford the shoes. If it is a question of a higher cost, the person would think as follows: I will not take time off but will try to work harder.... This provides the person with incentive.

I think that we could even conceive of a situation in which the volumes of output, real income, and living standards would decline but also that there would be a balance, there would be a dynamism in the sense of

structural changes in the economy and quality improvements which, after a while, will have a certain impact and ensure an upsurge. Let me say that social development could improve even if growth indicators are unfavorable from the customary viewpoint. Our trouble—which is the origin of many of our difficulties—is that we are still trying to promote **growth**. Yet we should be promoting **development**. Development means, above all, progressive structural changes in all areas of the national economy, improved quality of labor, goods, and services, use of all reserves, and balance in all components of the economy, including the area of solvent population demand. In this sense, a favorable development from the positions of the people could be secured, based on the characteristics of the stage of socioeconomic development, whether the pace is high or low and even if it remains static for a while.

This is a topical problem, for perestroika will inevitably (in any given period) affect the pace, which will also influence the dynamics of the real income of the working people.

Yarmolyuk. For the time being, the draft plan for next year reads as follows: "... The main indicators of the plan, reflecting in a general aspect the steps planned to enhance the living standards of the people, will increase faster than during the current year. In the final account, this is the criterion of the social reorientation of the economy."

Kostakov. A recent theoretical article published in the central press stated that the first thing we need is to develop social standards; if we develop a system of such standards and apply them in planning, we would drastically intensify its social trend. This type of approach, the very fact of formulating standards and making the needs of the population fit them means preserving the old system in a new way. Once again we consider the population as average population, and once again we shall be equalizing everyone. If we truly speak of humanizing the economy, this presumes a firm rejection of the concept of the average resident, worker or consumer. It should be a question of determining, of studying the needs of the elderly, the young, children, and women, and, as we choose the ways to satisfy their needs in the best possible manner, we would be able most efficiently to use our available funds and cadres....

Yarmolyuk. But what about the individual? What role is assigned to him in this case?

Kostakov. This is part of the aspect of formulating the objectives of social development. We have now proclaimed that by the year 2000 every single family will have its own apartment or house. Furthermore, the set housing area per person is quite high. Yet if we were to ask the people (for the sake of speeding up the project), they may be satisfied with a smaller apartment, but an apartment that would be their own, private. Possibly, they may favor housing as well to be included as part of the market. What would be the view of all the people: Do

they have their own long-term guidelines? Our formal approach meant that, essentially, we have ignored their interests. Yet they account for 20 percent of the population, or about 50 million people.

Let us recall the situation in Novokuznetsk, which led to the outbreak of the extremely big strike. One of the members of the strikers' committee said the following: For many years we were told, give us coal and we shall feed and clothe you, you will have a roof over your heads, you will rest well; now we are once again being told, give us coal but as to the rest, look for it by yourselves....

This idea of letting the people procure by themselves everything has been raised on very high levels. It is proclaimed at the same time (true, on different occasions) that everyone should handle his own affairs. In this case we forget when it comes to "one's own affairs" that to call for self-procurements or, virtually, for a barter economy means to contribute to production inefficiency and to waste funds which could be used more sensibly. This involves another problem as well. From the beginning a situation is created in which social injustice is intensified: Some people will have the opportunity to secure for themselves better food and housing by working in big plants which sometimes employ several tens of thousands of people; others may work in small enterprises, let us say in the clothing industry. Therefore, we cannot resolve the problem. We would have to "correct" the situation with the help of extreme measures which, frequently, are haphazard.

Yarmolyuk. Judging by the mail, many people today feel that we are extracting things from a common system, bit by bit. The following question arises: Is there such a system? Do we have a uniform, an efficient, a well thought out concept and strategy for action?

Kostakov. If we mean by a concept a sum total of policies—technical, living standard, distribution relations, investments, location of production forces, employment, or demographic policy (naturally, not their simple addition but their organic unity and interconnection), in my view, we still do not have any real concept. The farther along we go, the more realistic we become and the better we imagine what must be done, for our intention is to make perestroika fit the interests of man. But how? In our aspiration to achieve changes faster and to obtain tangible results in the immediate future, we have undertaken to do everything, to develop all areas of the national economy, and are making an effort to reform all areas. Obviously, however, it is impossible to do everything at once. It is as though we took a stick and approached a big anthill, disturbed it, and are now trying to gather back the ants which have scattered all over the place.

I believe that we can speak of a single concept after we have clearly formulated the objectives of social development, after defining the assets with which they could be achieved, and after we have determined priorities and

stages in achieving such objectives and, finally, since a strategy must include the "human factor" in this respect as well, with what, with what kind of forces, will such a project be accomplished.

Yarmolyuk. Speaking of priorities, what, in your view, is today the most vital thing on which we should concentrate our attention?

Kostakov. It is the problem of food, the situation in the countryside. Tell me, what kind of problems could we discuss with a person and what could we ask him to do if he has not met his prime need? How can we speak of morality when a huge amount of produced goods are perishing under the very eyes of the people? Generally speaking, what good things can be accomplished in a country with such a backward agricultural production?

Under the conditions of the aggravated social tension we must, above all, saturate the food market, followed by the entire market in consumer goods. The foundation for this is agriculture, the agroindustrial complex, which accounts for 70 percent of retail trade and whose traditionally low efficiency does not allow any progress in solving social and economic problems.

Yarmolyuk. Must we prove this at this point? Are we not repeating something universally acknowledged...

Kostakov. Despite all discussions on this topic, no system of measures has been drawn up. Therefore, we must keep repeating and proving.

I read the USSR Council of Ministers decrees which were promulgated after the March Central Committee Plenum (as we know, dealing with rural problems), and what did I see: The councils of ministers of Union republics are asked to ensure an annual increase in foodstuffs in the 13th 5-year period ranging from 4.7 to 5.4 percent. All they are asked is to ensure. What does this mean? It means to apply pressure. They should have stipulated the importance of providing certain specific conditions to improve the production process so that it could develop on a balanced basis, on a new technological foundation, so that the rural population would have labor incentive; had it been stipulated how to act so that in areas which are depopulated people would come and where there is manpower surplus (what we mostly have is surplus) such people would be ensured some kind of work.... But nothing of this sort is to be found. As in the past, it is "to ensure." Well, they will "ensure." Once again they will issue quotas to every kolkhoz and rayon and, if the figures do not add up, they will raise them.... But perhaps we do not need an increase of 5 percent, perhaps we need a 1 percent, while all the rest could be obtained by taking proper care of the goods?

Quite some time has passed since the first congress of people's deputies where such emphatic statements were made about the significance of the agricultural area. Once again, however, we notice that in the same way that produce was allowed to rot in the past, it is being allowed to rot now to an even greater extent; we used to draft

urban residents to help in the harvest and we still continue to do so. Estimates indicate that every year farmers are paid more than 13 billion rubles for goods which never reach the consumer (this, incidentally, is a powerful booster of inflationary processes). In my view, we are coming very close to a situation in which here as well emergency steps will have to be taken.

It seems to me that much of this is due to a certain attitude which has developed toward this sector. Incidentally, the idea that there are main and secondary, important and unimportant sectors was personally proclaimed by Stalin. He stated at one of the Central Committee plenums that the lag of agriculture behind industrial production was natural but that such a lag should not be excessive. But how to determine the extent? This is already a subjective concept of the person who holds the power at that given moment. An entire generation of economists were raised on this kind of theses which, it is true, were later considered erroneous but, apparently, have nonetheless remained stuck in some minds....

If we speak of making the reform in stages, unquestionably the first stage should be the reorganization of agriculture. This would mark progress which the people would really feel and which, in itself, would have a healing effect on the entire economy, the financial system, and the psychological situation in the country. It is not a question of priorities conceived differently (or of ever new investments). It is a question of concentrating our efforts and attention, so that we could consider our plans through the lens of agricultural efficiency (including the 13th 5-year period), together with structural changes in the economy, scientific and technical progress, and social reorganizations.

Naturally, the question could arise of how realistic are the positive changes in this area. Reality has repeatedly proved that they are possible. Let us recall the now traditional example: the population's private plots, which account for 1.5 percent of the farmland, account (in terms of the overall volume of output), for 59 percent of the potatoes, 31 percent of the vegetables, 54 percent of the fruits and berries, 28 percent of the meat, 27 percent of the milk, etc. Such is the result of the work of people who feel themselves to be the true owners of the land. Hence the conclusion as to what should be done to awaken the inner forces of man. We must view through the lens of autonomous work the law on the land, which is currently being debated by the Supreme Soviet. This presumes entirely different planning methods, in which not mandatory indicators but instruments such as taxation in kind and money would prevail. It is important to recall that the kolkhozes are agricultural cooperatives and that the prosperity of the working people must be related to the extent to which goods reach the consumer. All of this could sharply improve matters in the immediate future even before the structural reorganization of the national economy, which should lead to a radical change in agricultural production technology.

Yarmolyuk. I gather that you consider this matter essential?

Kostakov. Yes, I do. Naturally, the process of formulating the strategy and the concept we are discussing presumes alternate principles, especially in the sense of priorities. I am prepared to substantiate my viewpoint, aware that other viewpoints may exist as well. However, one must begin somewhere. One must agree on and initiate something without exclusively relying on emergency measures. All of this must come from the Congress of People's Deputies. A concept must be approved in this case, and only the congress should have the right to amend it, taking public opinion into consideration and sponsoring referendums on individual essential matters. Unfortunately, during the first congress no such tasks were formulated. Its resolution includes several programs which are to be drafted, in particular those pertaining to improving the working and living conditions of women and emphasizing the need to pass a law on young people. This means that we also need a law on the elderly, and the disabled.... Meanwhile, society faces problems which are the same for all. Naturally, people are different and approaches to the solution of such problems should also differ. However, if the system itself includes an orientation toward man (the strategy must be strictly based on the social trend in the development of the economy), in that case not special laws would be required.

Unified social objectives exist as well. It is they and not indicators that should determine our immediate and longer-range plans. In my view, the main among them are the health of the people, the lifespan (which we mentioned); the labor motivation of the population (a task which was implied in statements at the congress); full employment (the objective is not "unemployment," which is something one occasionally hears, but "full employment of the population").

It is important to develop a mechanism which will subordinate our entire socioeconomic complex, all of its units, to the implementation of such targets and on that scale. I believe that in that sense we could consider that the problem of the market is the most important instrument. We shall be unable to attain the strategic tasks on the basis of centralized planning as it developed in the past. We need a different view which should be based on the mechanism of market relations, in which the question of the "average population" no longer fits, and in which the people will see that they have some sort of choice which they could influence. It is important to let the person feel that he is an active participant in such a mechanism and not an object of charity. This is one of the main tasks.

We must acknowledge that in addition to everything else the psychological problem has become aggravated now, a problem which can be described as the widespread mistrust shown by the people in broad-scale measures undertaken within the framework of economic changes.

The people have lost faith because our plans and programs, which promised to improve life, merely remained like "pictures" which were not supported by a serious mechanism for their implementation. For example, a "5-year quality plan" would be proclaimed and it would be precisely during that 5-year period that the quality of output would drop to an unparalleled level. How many more such examples could be cited? Another feature of the "picture" is instilling or, rather, trying to instill in the people ideas as to the way they should live and what they should aspire to. Everyone has been told what to expect in the next 15 to 20 years or longer: the type of output and what specifically will be produced, what quantity of various products would every working person eat, what clothing he will be wearing, what services he would be needing and, naturally, what type of person he should become (or, rather, what type of working person). Promises are made as though granting gifts, irresponsibly....

In order to restore in the people their faith we need major and considered decision and guarantees on the part of the state that they will be systematically implemented. We must think of the nature of such guarantees. The main factor is in the area of trust in the state. What the country needs is a mandatory nonconflicting continuity of action. The strategy should not depend on anyone's specific taste. If we have agreed on something good, which promises a better life for the people and has been approved by the congress of people's deputies, we must be confident that no one would eliminate it. It is on the basis of such positions that we must consider the strategy of development, the extent to which it is consistent with the idea, shall we say, of the stabilization of society and continuity in leadership.

Nor can we avoid the question of the way our country appears compared to other countries. This is very important in order to know what direction we are following.

Yarmolyuk. In this connection, Vladimir Georgiyevich, I recall that in the past, by the turn of the 1960s, the idea of "catching up and outstripping" within the shortest possible time, was popular.

Kostakov. At one point the objective was even set of catching up with the United States in the production of meat per capita....

Yarmolyuk. Today one of our readers, the head of a large rayon, has deemed necessary to set the following task: "To catch up with Japan by the year 2000!" Probably such slogans will not be raised by us but we shall have to eliminate the lag. How: by catching up or "cutting corners?"

Kostakov. I agree with the idea of "cutting corners." However, one must take a look as to what could be "cut" and where? For example, while developing industrialization, we tried to "cut corners" and ignored the interests of agriculture. Let us not repeat the results of this. I believe that "cutting corners" in organizing the market is dangerous, for this is also related to the mentality of the people. Essentially the people are not prepared to

abandon equalization all of a sudden although many of them are displeased with it. We shall need a rather lengthy period of psychological adaptation. In general, if we speak of global matters, "cutting corners" is hardly worth it. This should be done more in specific technological areas.

We must surmount a substantial lagging. We must indeed catch up. However, this should not be the old pursuit of quantitative indicators or increased pace. There are general laws of development which must be applied above all in terms of the means to be used in achieving a normal, a balanced development of a country and improvements in the living standard of the people. The answer is obvious: This can be achieved through quality features. Whereas the problem of quality is above all a problem of the quality of labor, of the attitude of the worker toward his job and his conscientiousness and feeling of responsibility. We also need a qualitatively different level of economic management. Nor can we ignore guidelines which are common to all countries in terms of the population's way of life such as, for example, increasing the amount of leisure time and making it meaningful. Incidentally, we are not thinking about it and we are not even formulating such a task.

Yarmolyuk. What kind of rest is possible, Vladimir Georgiyevich, when the entire time is spent waiting in line in search of what is most needed....

Kostakov. I expected you to say "could we worry about this?" However, if we do not think about such matters today, whenever we shall be ready to deal with them from the viewpoint of the efficiency of our economy, we shall find ourselves unprepared.

Let us rephrase the question. In my view, the question of household work is acute in our country. Do you agree? It takes a tremendous amount of time. According to my rough estimates the country's population spends in household chores an equivalent of the labor of nearly 80 million average annual workers. If we add up the overall labor—in the national and the domestic economy—and look at the share of the latter, it will prove to be about 40 percent. Three-quarters of all that is done by women. Is this not a problem? It is a tremendous social problem and we must consider its solution precisely now, for this is also an assignment for some sectors in the machine building and food industries, and the structure of our economy. Scientific and technical progress as well should deal with such matters. Nonetheless, our conceptual views on such a problem do not mention even a single word about it, as though it does not exist.

The main problem in our country now is to find funds (in the home economy as well it is a matter of funds). In the final account, however, the question of funds ends with the problem of management. We are as yet to reach in this respect the quality standard of other developed countries, bearing in mind that the rest of the world as

well does not stand still and that today's progressive methods and assessments could turn into those same old stereotypes tomorrow.

Here is a clear example. We are currently relying on the faster development of group "B" sectors, contrary to our older concepts. Generally speaking this is good but only under certain circumstances. In the United States, for example, for quite some time the share of these sectors has not been increasing but has even shown a declining trend. We studied the reason for which all of a sudden such a trend developed although an increasing number of consumer goods are being made available to the people. The reason was the existing ratio of prices. The output of group "A" is becoming increasingly expensive (contemporary means of production with automation); meanwhile, group "B" is providing consumer goods which are becoming increasingly less expensive as they are mass produced. We cannot, under the influence of even goods ideas, fail to see the prospects, the real trends of development, for otherwise this would lead to bad consequences: we shall be increasing the share of sectors in group "B" (making this a self-seeking aim), but also produce in this area expensive goods. Yet it is once again a question of thinking not of a maximally possible general growth in group "B" but of how better to meet the needs of the people and make many goods basic and accessible to all.

Naturally, the possibilities of scientific and technical progress and the explosive social consequences which change the way of life of the people make a great many things unpredictable. Additionally, in our country, there are the difficulties of the transitional period, for already this year we realized how the unpredictability factor can influence matters (the strikes). We must act while mandatorily taking into consideration that the moment we move new problems will arise and new solutions will be needed. No universal solutions are possible.

Yarmolyuk. However, there obviously should be an instrument with the help of which matters could be substantially improved. What, in your view, could such an instrument be, given our present circumstances?

Kostakov. Management and, within management, competence and respect for knowledge. In this area this is the most pressing problem.

We keep claiming that centralized planning and the new role it plays under conditions in which the decision has been made to bury once and for all the system for managing the national economy, is reduced to the formulation of the strategic directions and forecasts, and to set development targets and define the most important rates and proportions and, above all, with the help of price instruments, taxes, and credits, to create the necessary economic conditions which would favor the efficient functioning of the basic level. If this is truly necessary, it must be done by properly trained people. This is an essentially important problem, for otherwise this will be nothing but a wish, as is presently the case.

We have a great deal of confusion still. We have become accustomed to considering resolutions by party authorities as solutions of economic problems, quite frequently specific ones, which should be resolved by the specific ministries (problems related to chemistry, storage and processing of produce). To this day the central authorities, both planning and administrative, in charge of their respective areas and units in the national economy, cannot claim that matters depend precisely on them and that they have the right to make decisions.

The existing situation has been repeatedly and comprehensively discussed. According to that situation everyone is a manager but no one is responsible for assignments for the reason that whenever management is provided on a parallel basis—by the party, the state, and the economic authorities—responsibility becomes diluted. The congress of people's deputies was held but I personally, for example, did not notice any particular changes in the separation of functions. Instead, a danger appeared: The moment the USSR Supreme Soviet truly gets to work, such responsibility may become even more diluted.

It may seem obvious that anyone who makes a decision should be responsible for it. For the time being, we have not developed such a clear concept. From top to bottom, on different management levels, we have established a main privilege to which we pay little attention. Public opinion has been directed to "shareholding," to the fourth administration, etc. Yet the other, the main privilege, that of decision making (without being responsible for them!) has been ignored.

Clearly, I believe that in economics one cannot act on the basis of directives. The party and its agencies may suggest their course of economic development or its practical ways and may prove its advantages and defend their viewpoint and formulate their own suggestions. However, they should not be shaped as resolutions of the Central Committee and the Council of Ministers. In general, in terms of its purpose and nature the party should not deal with all the specific aspects of the economy. It is important for economic thought to be focused within the Council of Ministers, the Gosplan, and the ministries—within the management authorities in which such problems must be considered by specialists, on a highly professional level, with the formulation of corresponding decisions.

Yarmolyuk. You are the representative of science and you also participate in the work of the Gosplan. Based on your own practical experience, obviously you could assess the extent to which science truly influences and could influence competent decision making.

Kostakov. This is a difficult matter which involves a great deal of interrelated factors. I head the economic institute of the Union Gosplan. Similar institutes function under authorities such as the Ministry of Finance, State Committee for Labor, State Committee for Prices, and so on, and the problems we encounter are of the

same nature. One of them is the status of these authorities themselves, something we already mentioned; the very fact that they frequently become "lightning-rods" or "switchmen" naturally affect us as well.

The other problem is the status of science itself. In one of his recent speeches, Academician Shatalin said that its task is to seek the truth and to acquire knowledge; as to practical applications, this is a matter of a different structure. I would not use such a sharp demarcation. Science must be interested in application although, it is true, not as is viewed by the broad circles of the public. We have ideas which take 20 years to make their way; we keep sending reports and notes to the superior authorities....

Yarmolyuk. As a member of the Gosplan, one would think that you could take one such note and see to its practical follow-up.

Kostakov. I can do this when "the time is right," when attention is concentrated precisely on that problem. Things rarely happen otherwise.

Consider the following problem: Under contemporary conditions, under the influence of scientific and technical progress and structural changes in the economy, problems related to the full employment of the population have become pressing. The world is on the threshold of the development of technologies which require few people or no people at all. The entire way of life of the people is affected and changed, and so are concepts of a labor career, its duration, and so on. We cannot remain aside from such processes, for which reason we must structure our employment policy correspondingly. In our country the dynamism of structural changes in employment is increasing sharply. Cost accounting will result in increased labor efficiency. The major task is promptly to relieve people from some labor areas and transfer them to other. For a while this may not suit some people who must be given social protection and promptly retrained and helped to find jobs. One could describe such processes any way one wishes. One could reject unemployment in the belief that it does not "hit" socialism. However, we must not shut our eyes to this.

For a number of years we tried to concentrate on problems of employment and have written notes and articles in the press....

Yarmolyuk. Incidentally, you did this on two occasions in our journal (KOMMUNIST Nos 2 and 14, 1987).

Kostakov. But then there were the events in Fergana. Obviously, referring to youth unemployment, some people may have said "this is a serious problem." This generated an interest in the problem. I am already receiving telephone calls and being asked: "What are your views?" Yet last year we had issued our latest note which discussed what precisely should be done in the immediate future, how to deal with demographic processes, and how should a policy of employment be structured. This note may be found on the desks of

officials in various departments.... Now I have been heard (it is true I do not know the reason for this) and now no one is reluctant to mention unemployment.

I remember a substantive work drafted by scientists sponsored by the USSR Academy of Sciences and the State Committee for Science and Technology. It was entitled "Comprehensive Program for Scientific and Technical Progress" and consisted of several thick collections. It had a section entitled "Population, Labor Resources, and Labor Safety." At the very first stages of the work (there were several), in the mid-1970s, we tried to identify the adverse trends and to forecast many social phenomena, including unemployment. We sought ways of localizing it so that this would not bring about political conflicts or any other severe consequences. Nonetheless, we were late. Who among the administrative personnel made a study of this analytical material (although it could be found lying on many a desk)? The uniform approach, as I observed it, was the following: Such a study is undertaken whenever it becomes necessary to draft any kind of document—well, what can I find and borrow from what is available? Yet one cannot take a bit of a document and make it part of the latest resolution. This should be material for thought, leading to ideas. Finally, if we begin to structure the work of departments in a different way, aiming it at conceptual, at strategic considerations and at looking at things from the viewpoint of the future and of overall patterns, possibly the attitude toward that which is being created within scientific institutes could change. For the time being, there is neither the desire nor taste to dig into those notes and reports. Extremely rarely are those who drafted them being sought. This means that the document was either not studied or was merely glanced at without understanding it. It failed to generate any kind of idea.

Our trouble is that, in practical terms, our "turning to man" is related to traditions (which apply to the cadres as well) according to which anything is viewed above all from the positions of sectorial problems. Consequently, the technocratic approach leads to an approach influenced by circumstances. Most frequently major decisions are being made for circumstantial considerations.

Here is a typical fact borrowed from our recent past: Symptoms of increased mortality and reduced birthrate appeared in the 1960s. However, thought was given on this purely human problem exclusively from the viewpoint of the reinforcement of labor resources. The Ministry of Defense was also concerned about what would take place at the end of the 1980s and how to reinforce the Armed Forces....

Some change has already been noticed. People are beginning to listen more closely to science; I believe that this is due to the influence of public opinion. Serious publications are appearing and opportunities in that area have increased substantially. New people are taking over and many of the heads of deputy commissions and committees are scientists. This creates a favorable situation. An

effort is under way to increase the competence of the apparatus by appointing scientists to leading positions. Under conditions in which some processes have reached their maximal point of development this could be useful, although the existing system, in my view, will try to subordinate them as well to its own rules.

Nonetheless, this will be merely the very beginning. For the time being, I see not any kind of interest in working on the problems but rather an aspiration on the part of the departments to use science in support of their views. In the past this was not considered all that necessary; now it seems to be "fashionable," to make a scientifically supported decision....

Yarmolyuk. Nonetheless, there is a certain feeling of irritation which has developed in society and a rejection; with increasing frequency we hear, even from the rostrum of the Congress and the Supreme Soviet, that science or an individual scientist has "palmed off" something on management.

Kostakov. I believe that this is largely the result of a still insufficiently clear understanding of the nature of the decision-making mechanism. We say that decisions must be made competently. But what does competently mean? It is important to hear out not one group which holds a certain view but several. Mandatorily the differences in approaches must be made clear. I assume that a scientist, even a major scientist, could occasionally err and miss something. However, an objection to his ideas must always exist. This makes the dialogue between science and the management structures substantive and fruitful. Science functions when it is heard in decision making and when the variety of viewpoints is not ignored. However, it is not science which makes the decisions. Why make it responsible for them? In my view, this compromises knowledge and does not increase the responsibility of those who are truly empowered to make such decisions.

I believe that this is also influenced by the way in recent years our tactical objectives had been formulated and implemented. Let us recall the way we proceeded. Initially priority was given to the idea of acceleration despite the fact that the labor incentive in society had reached an extremely low level, the economy was tremendously unbalanced, and that perestroika and acceleration are difficult to combine. Then everyone began talking about the "human factor," although this was not followed by giving priority to providing food supplies or consumer goods. After a while people started talking about quality, hoping to achieve it with the help of state inspection. Then it was forgotten and the people started struggling to increase the shift coefficient, which was supposed to ensure savings on equipment and manpower. The same objective was pursued by the certification of jobs. This was abandoned. What will the future of leasing be?... We seem totally unable to abandon the campaign approach and methods based on slogans and propaganda are still being applied instead of engaging in thorough and calm work. As long as someone says from

a rostrum "this is a good form," it is as though a signal has been given for its immediate "application" everywhere, and not always after due consideration and adequate support. We draw up a poster, we wave it around, and then we begin to seek culprits. This irritates the population and has a very poor educational impact on young scientists, teaching them to equivocate.

Recently I was amazed to find out that a maternity home decided to charge 100 rubles for ordinary childbirth and 500 if surgery was necessary. This maternity home found itself without customers. The women avoided it fearing the surgery. Who would have been to blame if, God forbid, this idea had been "implemented?" Science or the idea of cost accounting? In my view, the culprits are those who said that cost accounting must be applied everywhere.

I cannot accept the speech of a people's deputy who says "we are the working people," clearly separating himself from other people who, one would thus surmise, are loafers who seem to have concentrated in entirely specific areas, in science in particular. If a situation which creates such people existed in the national economy, it would create them everywhere, including in industry and at the construction sites. It is precisely for the sake of putting an end to this situation that we should act together. Why pit the working class against the intelligentsia and the "people" against the "professors?" In such difficult times we must promote a respectful attitude toward people who are engaged in practicing their professions. Otherwise no progress can be achieved.

Let me make the following appeal: Let us be guided by common sense! However, I do not know at whom to address it.

Yarmolyuk. Vladimir Georgiyevich, do you believe in what you are doing?

Kostakov. How can one work without faith? If you are asking whether I am optimistic, that I am. Above all I have faith in common sense. I have faith in our people although today a great deal of different things are being said about them. I cannot agree with claims that we have "depeasantized" the peasant, wasted the intellectual "humus," and raised waste-makers and "pilferers," people without lofty principles. History is familiar with the qualities inherent in our people and their great loyalty, dedication, and goodness and the enthusiasm which they can display when they must rally around a major task. The existing system exploited these qualities without developing them at all. Nonetheless, this did not disappear in the people or, in any case not in the overwhelming majority of them, and there is one method through which we can assess the true nature of a person and his age-old moral concepts: a real turn toward man. I am optimistic in the belief that such a turn is being noticed, and that democratization in the political area exists, although with distortions and difficulties, but still it is truly coming and creating conditions for democratization in economic life. I would like to believe that the

course of events (in my view this already applies to elections to the local authorities) will involve in active social life the generation which was born in the 1950s and 1960s on which I, for example, put great hope. I am optimistic also in terms of our orientation toward universal human values and the interest which other countries are showing in us....

I would like to go back to the question of whether we are talking about something which is well-known by all. I believe that we must speak out when under the pressure of ever new problems those which have already been discussed are buried under without having been resolved. People frequently ignore one another, lose their guidelines, and forget that consistency in plans and decisions is necessary. We must think of how to make the people aware of this and guide their specific actions.

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On the Socialist Constitution

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[Article by Valeriy Chalidze, publicist and publisher (United States)]

[Text] It is an already acknowledged fact that perestroika in Soviet society requires the drafting of a new constitution. It is to be hoped that this will be a more serious and less propaganda-oriented document compared to the present Soviet Constitution. I have faith in the internal potential of development of the Soviet system and have had faith in it even during quite dark periods which are now commonly described as stagnation. A society which has rejected universal human values under the pressure of illusions or illusion makers, must sooner or later return to such values. It is precisely to this faith that I linked my hope for a "more juridical" constitution, for the development of the Soviet system means, above all, the development of a standard of social relations and, consequently, structuring them to a greater extent on the basis of the law.

In this article I shall discuss problems related to the constitutional formulation of the basic principles of socialism along with some concomitant problems. The main purpose of the article is to indicate, using as an example a model draft article on socialism in the constitution, that a juridical formulation of its principles is possible and does not require mandatorily require lacing it with propaganda and ideological concepts as has been the case so far. It would be a grave error to attempt in the new constitution as well to bypass the difficulties related to legal formulation of the principles of socialism, leaving this task to the ideologues. I am writing this article with the Soviet Union in mind but I believe that the common principles of constitutional socialism could be acceptable by any country which would like to choose a socialism of rights rather than a socialism of prohibitions.

On Stability

Should the constitution say as many things as possible or as few things as possible? Should it be as stable as possible, aimed at the present age, or should it stipulate a simple procedure for amending it in order to provide society with the necessary flexibility to react to changing social conditions?

The American Constitution is aimed at stability: not only changing it but even amending it is a very difficult matter. This constitution says little but has existed for a long time. One cannot provide a general answer to the question of how stable should the constitution be. If those who promulgate it realize that social institutions in the country have not been stabilized as yet, the constitution should stipulate simple procedures for amending it or, in any case, for ensuring its flexibility and adaptability to changing circumstances.

In a certain sense, the stability of the constitution is directly proportional to the stability of the social institutions and inversely proportional to the extent to which we plunge into the details. One could expect that a constitution which does not go into details should last longer without amendment compared to one which does not limit itself to stipulating the main principles. One could also assume that even the energy with which social institutions change would not weaken the constitutional principles, providing that they have been proclaimed in an economical and far-sighted manner.

One could ask whether the stability of the constitution is important enough to take such views into consideration. What would be bad about changing the constitution every 5 years? The answer, clearly, is found within human nature itself. A sensible degree of stability is needed by the people simply because many of them plan their activities a year in advance and also because people are conservative in their facility to adapt. If the reader is dissatisfied with such a sociobiological interpretation, let me point out that respect for the law is, obviously, proportional to its stability and that a stable constitution is a foundation for the stability of laws.

Let me note yet another reason for which we should aspire to a constitutional stability. Any society contains "centrifugal" factors which are quite divisive. They are particularly strong in societies which combine citizens of different races, nationalities, and religions. In the past, fear of power and the cruelty of the tyrant was a sufficiently strong integrating force. However, even then did empires crumble. In republics which respect human rights force and cruelty can no longer be the main integer. Other types of factors are necessary.

Federations which were unified long ago by the force of the tyrants could rely on a federal nationalism as a binding force. For example, 1,000 years ago what is French territory today was inhabited by individuals whose awareness of being French was not sufficient to make them accept the idea of a common French statehood. Today, as a rule, this suffices. In other cases the

binding force could consist of other factors, such as resistance to a common enemy or sharing a common religion or even a common history. However, a binding force is always necessary and, desirably, should not be the only factor.

It turns out that a stable governmental structure, which secures the rights and protects citizens and promotes commerce could, in itself, be an integrating principle. Since such a system is based on the principle of a stable constitution, the constitution itself could become the integer. Americans, for example, have an unusually great respect for the constitution. High officials swear their oath of loyalty to the constitution and the official question asked of those who are granted U.S. citizenship has a quasi-religious sound: Do you believe in the Constitution of the United States?

The stability of the Soviet Constitution could secure the stability of the laws, something which is so greatly necessary for a society whose legal standards are still low. In the course of time it could become an integer of a society in which a lack of integrating forces is obvious. Such stability, with proper constitutional guarantees of human rights, could also contribute to the enhancement of the population's legal standards. Finally, it can protect society from the fluctuating moods of the power of the propertied classes, which is so important in strengthening the principles of a democratic social structure.

However, the following question arises: Does this stability not conflict with the necessary flexibility and does it not obstruct the development of society? This is a serious question. Soviet society is indeed not only developing but also restructuring. Possibly, it will go on restructuring for a number of decades, for all too many problems and internal contradictions have accumulated to hope for a fast resolution. I believe that there are two ways of ensuring flexibility, which do not block a stable constitution.

First, the constitution proclaims only the most basic principles, so that details can be found in other acts and laws, the amending procedure for which is simpler. This would make it possible, if necessary, to make amendments in the regulations concerning social institutions without amending the constitution. Second, flexibility is achieved with an incomplete formulation, which is admissible to a point. I realize that this may worry some readers concerned with the fact that in frequent cases the vagueness of legal guarantees would be used as a reason for the violation of rights. However, the incompleteness of constitutional guarantees is frequently inevitable.

I shall explain this with the example of the right to demonstrate. In the United States this right is permitted under the constitution. However, the constitution cannot list all possible types of clashes. Here the police are not interested in why the people demonstrate. That is their business. Public order, however, is the business of the police, as is the protection of foreign missions. Consequently, in the United States some restrictions

apply to the right to demonstrate, not stipulated in the constitution but considered natural. If the local authorities or the police impose excessive restrictions, the citizens will appeal themselves to the courts in defense of their rights. In such disputes the final authority is the U.S. Supreme Court, which passes on the constitutionality of laws and judicial decisions. It is not excluded that in their dispute with the police the citizens would go to the Supreme Court and that the decision of the latter may not satisfy them. This will mean that the guarantee that through a legal procedure the constitution will provide, in a specific situation, an interpretation mandatory to all, as well as the fact that those who have lost will not like this interpretation. However, democracy does not presume that laws and legal decisions should please everyone. Its objective is to ensure the extent to which the people can exercise their rights, compatible with the existence and well-being of society as a whole. The more refined democracy is and the higher the legal standards of the citizens become, the higher becomes this degree of exercise of rights, i.e., the degree of freedom of the people.

Let us now consider a similar example borrowed from Soviet life. The Soviet Constitution does not list restrictions of the right to demonstrate. At first no laws whatsoever were passed on this matter. A ukase was passed in 1988 on such limitations. It goes far beyond limiting the right to demonstrate, compared to what is accepted in developed democracies, for the authorities have been given the right to evaluate the purpose of the demonstrators. However, one can easily see that in practice the right to demonstrate is now being exercised better than immediately after the adoption of the 1977 Constitution, where there was not even a procedure calling for obtaining a permit to demonstrate. As we can see, even a limited procedure of exercise of rights is more valuable than a simple declaration of this fact.

This example proves that the constitution may not be exhaustive and that sensible restrictions of such guarantees are frequently inevitable. It is precisely this that ensures flexibility even with a stable constitution. In the hypothetical American example, the Supreme Court could revise its decision, particularly should social conditions change. The Soviet legislature can change the rules concerning demonstrations without changing the constitution but the citizens may demand this by referring to the constitution.

It is self-evident that excessive flexibility would be dangerous and could virtually annul constitutional guarantees. It is important, therefore, that the constitution itself should stipulate restrictions. For example, it could stipulate that the restriction of constitutional rights is admissible whenever this becomes necessary for specific purposes and only if allowed by law or by a court decision.

In concluding such views on the usefulness and characteristics of a stable constitution, let me point out that in the USSR practical experience has been acquired

without such a constitution. The reader will remember how frequently in the country the constitution has been either replaced or amended. The authorities considered it a beautiful facade or a propaganda proclamation. Neither the authorities nor the people held the view that the constitution is the foundation for structuring the state, in which the law rather than arbitrariness triumphs, and that the state is governed by laws and not by people. The constitution itself, however sensible it may be, will ensure neither rights nor democracy. The will of the people is needed, aimed at exercising the constitutional guarantees. However, a clear and stable constitution, combined with the readiness of the people to defend its postulates, is the real beginning of popular rule.

It seems to me that it would be accurate to draft the new Soviet Constitution on a long-term basis and to protect it from frequent amendments through a special protracted procedure. To this effect it is only the most fundamental principles that should be included in it, leaving to the judgment of the legislator problems of administrative divisions, governmental structure, organization of elections, rates of representation, the institution of state symbols, etc.

Constitutional Objectives

The objectives of constitution drafters share some common features: the proclamation of more or less clearly expressed fundamental principles of a legal social structure and, as a rule, to set the limits of state power (the latter is particularly applicable in the case of republic constitutions).

Unfortunately, all authors of Soviet constitutions have paid greater attention to propagandizing the advantages of the Soviet system rather than to drafting a realistic functioning document on the basis of the principles of which one could successfully structure legal relations within society. It is very important, therefore, to free the new constitution from elements of propaganda and make it a serious document.

A working constitution must also imply the fact that constitutional guarantees should be considered practically adequate in the defense of human rights regardless of whether such guarantees are or are not stipulated in other laws. So far the situation was such that the constitutional norm was taken seriously only if it was repeated in the law. Actually, a legal stipulation as well was frequently left hanging in the air, until an instruction, frequently unpublished, would clarify how to apply the law or else whether to apply it at all. Article 58 of the 1977 Constitution on challenging the actions of officials in court was not applied for a long time, for no law had been passed on how to do it. Now, when such a law has been passed, it limits the range of cases accepted by the courts more strictly than does the constitution, for it mentions officials in the plural whereas the law accepts an appeal only of decisions made by a single official (the new law, which was passed on 2 November 1989 at the

second session of the USSR Supreme Soviet, which will become effective as of 1 July 1990, allows the appeal of collective decisions passed by administrative authorities as well).

Another example of the way the constitution may not work is based on my own practical experience. In 1970 I submitted to a judge in a Moscow rayon a petition on the fact that a student had been expelled from an institute for signing a petition in defense of a law. Naturally, my claim was based on the constitutional rights to education. The judge told me literally the following: "The right to education is a constitutional right. It is not protected by the court."

It is very important for the court to protect precisely the constitutional rights so that a reference to the constitution would be seriously admitted by the court and so that the court could cite the constitution if the law conflicts with it. A legislative hierarchy is inevitable in a society with complex social relations, and it is important for the constitution to be at the top of this hierarchy not only in theory but also in fact.

There are four groups of principles which, in my view, should be included in the Soviet Constitution. They are the following:

The principle of a federation, i.e., the legal grounds on the basis of which the republics are united within the Soviet Union and the ways in which the rights of the Union are restricted;

The principle of democracy, i.e., the legal foundation of the fact that the people make the government and the limits of the power of that government;

The rights of man, i.e., standards of civil and political freedom common to all civilized countries;

The principle of socialism, i.e., the guarantees of socio-economic life and criteria in determining the extent to which these guarantees are secured and limited, specific of a socialist country.

It is important to understand that these are four separate groups of principles, although it is usually considered that a democracy is inseparably related to human rights. A federation or any other type of governmental union can exist without democracy and even more so without socialism. Democracy is possible without a federation and without socialism. The question of whether socialism can exist without democracy is being argued about. Many people believe that socialism has already been built in the USSR and that all that is necessary is to improve it with the help of democratic principles.

I shall not become involved in this dispute. In the final account, everything is a matter of definition. The trouble, precisely, is that there is no clear legal definition of socialism. It is precisely the constitution of a socialist state that should provide such a definition. Let me repeat, it is very important in this case to remember that each of the four groups of principles I mentioned is

autonomous. It seems to me that it would be important to express this in the Soviet Constitution: It is required by sad historical experience. Those who ruled regardless of the will of the people made use of the looseness of the definitions of socialism in order to distort the essence of both democracy and federation. The concepts of socialist democracy and socialist federation were introduced. The lack of democracy, the violation of rights, and excessive centralization were justified with references to socialism which had allegedly become such a high blessing that merely referring to it could justify the lack of any other.

Therefore, the objectives of a Soviet socialist constitution should be, in my view, the proclamation and legal codification of the principles of federation, democracy, human rights, and socialism, in such a way that some of the principles would not be distorted to provide advantages to other.

Socialism. General Remarks

I am not a socialist. I love free competition and the free market.

However, my personal sympathy for democratic capitalism does not prevent me from understanding the inevitability and even necessity of socialist ideas in society. One could say that thanks to the ideas of capitalism the people built contemporary Western civilization. However, it was precisely the ideas of socialism that made this civilization more humane. It is therefore through the competition among ideas, even conflicting ones, that the development of mankind should be pursued. This is an already tested and successful way of development.

I also realize that the Soviet Union would like to be a socialist country and not a country with free competition between capitalist and socialist ideas. This requires a clear understanding of what precisely is socialism. We were taught from childhood that socialism means state monopoly on anything that could possibly be monopolized. Now, however, the people are beginning to realize that instead of socialism Stalin palmed off on the people a dictatorship combined with an economic monopoly.

What is socialism, about which so many volumes have been written both by mercenary people and idealists?

Let us imagine the axis of the socioeconomic condition of society. Let the final point of this axis on the left be theoretical communism, a society with absolute material equality, described as the need for everyone to work equally and receive equally. This single statement is worth volumes. Let us imagine on the right side of this axis the area held by capitalism—a system with a more or less free distribution of efforts and income in society. At that point the broad range of social conditions along this axis, between the communist point and capitalism, could be described as socialism, i.e., a society in which active people have limited yet sensible opportunities to display their activeness, while passive people are protected from the greed or oppression of the active.

It may seem that all that is left is to find along this axis a point which would mark not simply socialism but functioning socialism, a functioning economy. To find the correlation between the aspiration of those who are less active to material equality and the aspiration of active producers to inequality, in order not to suppress the activeness of the breadwinner and not to trigger the strong discontent of the dependents. The experience of mankind indicates that this point should be sought closer to the right side of our axis, for economic success depends on the activeness of the active.

Obviously, this will not be a point but a certain area of correlation between aspiration to material equality and inequality, a correlation in which both social peace and a functioning economy will be made possible.

The location of this area will depend on a number of parameters, for which reason a one-dimensional consideration would be insufficient. We must introduce in our system a second axis which would characterize the role of the state. If the state is the monopolist, we should speak of barracks socialism (a term frequently used to characterize Soviet society before perestroika). Nonetheless, as Soviet experience proved, monopoly does not lead to a functioning economy. Where should we stop along this axis? What degree of participation of the state should be considered sufficient?

Since there are no precedents, the answer to this question could be provided only on the basis of the method of many years of trials and errors. The position of minimizing the role of the state seems attractive. Give the land to the peasant, give the factories and the plant to the working shareholders, and give to the cooperatives the area of services and science. Sooner or later, such a system will become functional. Nonetheless, it will be later rather than sooner. The transitional period will be necessarily painful and not only in terms of social relations but also of investments in the future of the country, in the future of the economy. It is precisely in this case that the role of the state is irreplaceable. I am referring to investments in scientific and technological progress, in improving the ecological situation, and similar national requirements. The participation of the state is obviously inevitable in providing the mechanisms for the redistribution of the national wealth. That is why one should not expect any fast and substantial restriction in the role of the state. All steps in this direction are steps toward a functioning socialism.

However, even those two axes are insufficient in computing the place of socialism in the space of the socioeconomic system. These axes do not describe the level of confidence of initiative-minded people, the confidence that displaying their activeness would make sense. Was this not what Tatyana Zaslavskaya described as taking the human factor into consideration? Let this be our third axis, the axis of the security of active people. No appeals, no bank credits would make it possible to make full use of the activeness of the active unless strict

legislative measures do not lift a suspicion which developed in the course of decades. The people have been deceived all too long and it will not be all that easy to restore their trust in the state. Unquestionably, glasnost and the criticism in the press of those who suppress the cooperatives and the cautious guarantees provided by the laws help. However, this is by no means sufficient.

I think that all legislation must be reviewed from this viewpoint. It must be determined what it is that frightens the people, and what could be maliciously used to frustrate their initiatives. The people show activeness in pursuit of their own objectives and not in order to please the state. Therefore, should we go on with our talk about the primacy of social over private interests? In a well-organized society usually the people pursue their personal interests and thus serve the social interest. This may not be easy to understand by those who have been raised in the romantic spirit of serving the state. The time to understand this, however, has arrived. The idea of the primacy of the social interest was invented precisely in order to smooth, to reduce the variety and wealth of individual interests. Unquestionably, society as a whole lost from such a standardization.

The individual interests of the people must be respected and their right to satisfy their interests through legitimate means should be protected. I mean by this the entire range of personal interests, including hierarchical self-definitions, concern for the structure of the family, choice of leisure time recreation and, above all, the right of ownership, whatever name we give it, whether individual or private.

In order to gain the confidence of active people they must also be given the feeling that they are not social misfits which society would reject at the next shift in the general line, but full citizens, whose greater contribution to the economy is valued not only by granting them the permission to have more money. Such people must have a say in social affairs.

Model Constitutional Article About Socialism

This model article is an effort to provide a juridical definition of socialism. I believe that it should be followed by articles stipulating guarantees of socioeconomic rights.

If we set aside ideological debates and reduce the idea of socialism to specific formulas, the application of which could be tested, socialism is nothing other than a guarantee and insurance of socioeconomic rights resulting from the redistribution of the social wealth. The boundaries of such redistribution must be defined not on the basis of ideological fantasies but of the real economic admissibility, of the need to provide sufficient incentives for economic development.

I spoke of formulas the application of which could be tested. I believe that this is a key phrase in formulating the reasons for which socialism is surrounded by such an

ideological fog. With unclear guarantees and loose promises and the absence of democratic procedures success cannot be seriously controlled. This is the reason for the vague phraseology, the distortion and concealment of statistical data, and even the struggle against formalism in science. In short, all too frequently socialism has been described in dishonest terms. I do not believe that such dishonesty could be continued. The people have become more intelligent and historical experience has not been wasted. It is time to become formalists and to guarantee in the constitution only that which has been tested and is attainable. Therefore:

Socialism is a social system in which the state guarantees to the citizens socioeconomic rights and ensures them to the extent to which this is possible, based on the country's economic potential.

With a view to the better guaranteeing of socioeconomic rights of the citizens, the Union and the republics must take steps to develop the national economy, including assisting the economic activities of the citizens, the cooperatives and individual labor activities.

With a view to ensuring the socioeconomic rights of the citizens, the Union and the republics have the right to tax the income of the citizens and their economic associations on a gradual scale and to collect from the citizens fair insurance premiums. A progressive income tax should be computed in such a way as not to hinder the development of the labor and economic initiatives of the people.

Within the legally stipulated limits, the Union and the republics have the right to regulate the extent of guaranteeing the socioeconomic rights depending on the needs of the citizens and their contribution to the national economy.

The first paragraph formulates the essence of the socialist idea: providing socioeconomic guarantees, and honestly stipulating that mountains of gold and rivers of milk will not exist. Society cannot give more than it has. If the scientists are not sufficiently well off, let them seek the reasons. Let them work better and choose better superiors. If this does not help, let them think of new economic mechanisms. If this too does not help let them realize that they have reached the limit in the distribution of the available wealth, which means that they must be patient and reduce distribution by investing more capital in the development of the economy.

All this seems simple on paper. However, a revolution must take place in the minds of the Soviet people so that they could understand this. The government in recent decades made too many promises and led to the development of excessively strong feelings of dependency in the country.

... leads to the question of the mechanisms for decision making relative to reducing the distribution and increasing the efficiency of investments in the economy. Under capitalism, theoretically such decisions are made by the market, through market control of wages, interest

rates, and prices. I said "theoretically," for the state and the trade unions greatly distort the role of the market. Under socialism, the role of governmental democratic mechanisms should be much greater, for ensuring socioeconomic rights is the obligation of the state. However, even if the market itself does not provide a mechanism for automatic decision making, it should retain its role as an indicator which would issue the state information as to how to regulate redistribution.

The second paragraph indicates the way to improve the guarantee of rights, emphasizing the need for the constant search of new forms of economic management, not stopping with the already found forms. This paragraph would not have been necessary in the model constitutional article had there not been past experience according to which economic autonomy and search for new forms of such autonomy were prohibited by the state.

The third paragraph describes sources of funds for providing such guarantees. Today the main source of such funds is the income of enterprises owned by the state. However, it is precisely this source that I do not mention, for the constitution should include nothing which would obstruct the elimination of state monopoly. This paragraph emphasizes the legitimacy of the redistribution of income in society in accordance with the need to limit such redistribution in such a way as not to suppress the activeness of the active.

The fourth paragraph is self-explanatory. If society prohibits forced labor, economic means of protecting it from loafers should exist (I hope that forced labor will be prohibited in the USSR in accordance with the ILO Convention. The 1977 Constitution stipulates the right to work and the obligation to work. This is obvious nonsense, as is any assertion of the obligation of the citizen to exercise his right). Nonetheless, socialism must react to the increased needs of some members of society, regardless of their contribution to a common economy.

The purpose of a model article is to formulate the general principles of socialism, granting society adequate scope in finding its working model. As the reader can see, I have not included in the juridical definition of socialism the usual ideological stipulations on a planned economy, the public ownership of what is known as means of production, the nature of land utilization, etc. None of this belongs in the constitution, for this applies to the number of principles of economic organization and should be accepted in full or partially or else rejected according to the requirements of the economy.

The degree of formalism of this model article may trigger some criticism and I will be pleased if someone could provide a more precise legal definition of socialism. Let me point out that for the time being there has been no properly functioning model of socialism, at least in those countries which describe themselves as socialist, for which reason one must keep looking again and again. Yet in order for such a search to be successful, a constitution

is needed which will ensure sufficient flexibility even if at the expense of legal strictness.

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SPIRITUAL LIFE OF SOCIETY

'The Untamed Demons' of Our Life; Subjective Notes

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[Text]

I

I have described these notes as "subjective." By this I mean that this article expresses my own personal, strictly personal, views on philosophical problems which, I believe, are quite pressing in our time. They are not in the nature of a finished, a full-scale scientific composition with all of its inherent attributes, such as quotations, names, developed formulas, and complete structure. Furthermore, the attention is focused on essentially a single problem (described as "untamed demons") although, actually, it will be a question of conceptual problems as a whole. Furthermore, this is the opinion of a person who deals professionally above all with legal studies, although constantly coming across philosophy but who does not claim, nor could lay claim to any type of complete and categorical nature of his views.

Could there be a certain reason for this? Official philosophy operated so rigidly and peremptorily in recent decades and its concepts and formulas were so firmly asserted as the only possible postulates that perhaps the time has come in today's revolutionary time of perestroika to awaken and stir this ossified philosophical pile of official and semi-official formulas, to emancipate and move philosophical thinking? Furthermore, is it not a personal attitude and original approaches that could play in this case the role of a kind of disturbers of the calm and an impetus for further creative work?

Something else. Possibly, philosophical works are, in general, bound to contain a "subjective" component, for different philosophical concepts, which embody an original and unique philosophical vision of the world and its development and, particularly, an understanding of human society, man, and the meaning of his life and destiny could, and, in my view, must develop on the basis of a single conceptual foundation of Marxism and its initial philosophical ideas which express in a concentrated manner the intellectual achievements in the development of mankind in the preceding history of civilization. They must develop in such a way as to obtain the possibility of reciprocally enriching coexistence of a number of such concepts within the framework of what

is considered tolerant and, even better, respectful attitudes toward each one of them.

The need for a thorough philosophical interpretation of reality is becoming apparent quite sharply precisely now, during the period of perestroika. In this connection, it seems to me, perestroika itself is considered in a more profound and more significant way or, perhaps, its all-embracing significance.

Actually, it may seem that perestroika itself is our private concern: we allowed monstrous errors and deformations and bloody crimes committed under bright slogans; we hung on the neck of society a monstrous octopus—the administrative-command authoritarian management system. Today, we are correcting all of this with a great deal of effort, with zig-zags and losses. This is our own internal affair. Yet what a tremendous interest has been shown toward perestroika, throughout the world, literally in all corners of the planet. Why?

Naturally, this includes simple curiosity (major changes in such a huge country), amazement (suitable people were found to undertake this hopeless cause), malice (they are turning around, did we not predict it?), cautious expectation (what will all this mean to us), and many other.

Nonetheless, I see the **flicker of Hope** in this planetary attention paid to our perestroika. Does this mark the beginning of a sharp turn in the fate of human society in general, a turn which will take mankind out of the whirl of ever multiplying and growing crises?

I shall dare to claim that yes, such is the case! Mankind has reached a line beyond which, possibly, no options will exist, for it is not in vain that Alarm has settled within human society.

This is because many outstanding scientific discoveries and engineering accomplishments of today are frequently paralleled with major losses, difficulties, upheavals, and crises which we, with certain delicacy, describe as global problems. The main among them is that mankind is increasingly becoming involved in a deep conflict with nature....

Are these not the symptoms of an approaching catastrophe? Did we not hear its first shots in the radiation storm of the Chernobyl accident and in the crew of Challenger, which was burned alive in full view of millions of people? Who knows, perhaps nature is giving us a sign of an approaching global catastrophe with terrible biological destructions of human nature—AIDS—which is the plague of the 20th century, and prematurely old children?

From this viewpoint as well the universal significance of perestroika is that by the whim (or perhaps logic) of history, for the second time after October it is precisely on us, I believe, that has fallen the difficult task of answering the challenge of history in terms of the fate not

only of our country but, possibly, of all human civilization. It befell on us, perhaps, precisely because such an answer must be experienced. And was it not we, the peoples of our country, who experienced the October Revolution and gained an understanding of the secret future of the people?

Here is the essential part of it.

As a whole, such crises and difficulties are not the result of anyone's error, blunder or erroneous and controversial decisions, although, unquestionably, in many cases all of this worsened the difficult situation and led to various tragic consequences. What is essential is that in terms of their initial foundations they are the inevitable consequences of a primarily spontaneous historical development, a development which is of a natural spontaneous nature. Society, which exists and develops on a natural-spontaneous basis seems to have no future other than one of growing crises and arising catastrophes. Nor does man have any other destiny.

II

Let us begin briefly with "philosophy" per se.

I put the word "philosophy" in quotation marks thus, admittedly, paying a certain respect to the negative attitude toward this peak and crown of human knowledge, as it has developed in the minds and concepts of many people.

This very fact in the world of human spiritual life is a real tragedy. It is yet another terrible consequence of Stalinism. One had to schematize primitively presented philosophical concepts to such an extent and elevate them to the rank of some kind of absolutized "features," and suppress any live theoretical word, push aside the philosophical sciences following a truly creative development—systems analysis, axiology, and other—largely turning philosophy into the servant of current programs. All of this had to be "mastered" and even proudly considered as the "peak of philosophical thinking" before the people would become repelled for a long period of time by a philosophy which had become a "mandatory subject" of tests in VUZs and in postgraduate studies, and a profitable professional employment of people who had little in common with philosophy.

Actually, is science closer to man than is philosophy? To understand the very essence of what exists, to encompass with the mind the entire world, to understand "where it is that I come from," "who am I," "where am I," what awaits me and all mankind in the future and, furthermore, to understand and explain the entire world, what could be closer to the spiritual world of every person, what could be more important to our fate? To our fate and to that of our children, our grandchildren, and all mankind.

One can only be amazed at the fact that unlike economics, history, and law, in our press renovated by the period of glasnost, philosophy which, it is true, has

become a target of strict critical assessments and questions such as "who is to be blamed?" has still not become an object of considerations. It has still not turned into patient considerations and thoughtful searches for the truth and harmony, for the secrets of human life, and the meaning of life and all that is called upon to provide a **philosophical foundation** to perestroika. Could this be the reason for which of late televised "Philosophical Talks" have begun to draw universal attention, from which the fresh wind of a living philosophy, the philosophy of Man, has begun to blow?

And now to work. All in proper order....

And so, we face the world, the entire world with all of its elements, including society, and we ourselves, each one of us with his own separate, unique spiritual world.

How to understand this unimaginably complex and comprehensive world with its innumerable ties and interdependencies among objects and processes—the world of objects, phenomena, thought, etc., with all its essentials, as they say? Understandably, the basis of the world around us is material. It has existed forever and, as a whole, it is totally independent of the thoughts and intentions of any one of us. Naturally, the world is developing; it is developing in its entire complexity, with transitions from one condition to another, in a contradictory, i.e., a dialectical manner. Let us consider these elementary clear concepts as a start.

But what then?

Then, precisely, we need a philosophical concept. I have tentatively described it as **differentiated pure** philosophy. Alas, not enough space is left to substantiate all of this in detail. Could we present it as a few axioms which are essentially also quite clear? On the elementary level, in a popular presentation, such axioms are normal and inevitable, the more so since they will be expanded in the entire course of our subsequent considerations.

And so, in order to truly and thoroughly understand the world around us, we should, as our first and initial step (let me emphasize: first, initial!) try to see objects and processes in their extremely simple connections and interaction, initially mentally ignoring their complexity, and try to see objects and phenomena in their **pure** aspect. It is only in that case, one would assume, that we would be able to single out the primary areas of the world around us, of the universe. In this connection, I recall V.I. Lenin's words to the effect that the essence of dialectics is splitting the entity and identifying its conflicting parts. This "split," I believe, is needed precisely in order to see the objects and phenomena in their relatively pure aspect; it is only then that it becomes possible truly to understand all the connections and interactions, everything that is truly conflicting within that which we see as one.

With such an approach to the surrounding world, the entire universe becomes a world united in terms of material foundation but, at the same time, also **differentiated**.

With such an approach we single out **areas**, each one of which acts as a separate, independent, and qualitatively specific and sovereign part of the universe, demanding its "own" specific interpretation (and not an interpretation in which all subsequent areas become part of those preceding them).

Judging by all available data, there are four such separate and sovereign areas in the universe:

The cosmos: the inanimate nature, i.e., the entire (almost entire) universe—its essence, the entire universe;

Life, i.e., a self-tuning and self-reproducing locally enclosed system of circulation of matter and energy;

Reason, i.e., an ideal system manifested in the ability of the living being, of man, to engage in a general ("conceptual") anticipatory reaction to the facts of reality;

Society, i.e., a self-regulating closed biospherical system of highly developed beings, people with reason, whose essential feature is that of including within this system, as a determining force of material objects the means of production and production and other relations which develop on their basis.

Man is the separate, the original link in the development of the universe, combining and integrating within himself the latter areas (reason and society).

The universe and its logic of development are a hard shell and in order to open the gates to its secret a single key would be insufficient—the concept of the differentiation of the universe into relatively pure areas.

The second key would be the concept of the special foundations for the development of each of these areas (other than, naturally, the prime—the cosmos—which has its initial material-spontaneous self-development). In general, the existence of this foundation, this basis, is what predetermines the sovereign autonomy of one area or another and the fact that it cannot be reduced to the one preceding it. Each area—other than, I repeat, the first—is logically and historically separate; proceeding from the logic of the preceding area, in its primary aspect it assumes at a given moment a specific individual foundation. Subsequently, each sovereign area continues, in accordance with its specific foundation its own self-development so that, finally, at a certain stage, it can provide an impetus for a new foundation or even for two foundations and, consequently, for a new area or areas and a new and sometimes quite complex development spiral. The universe has provided two development spirals—from the cosmos (the inanimate nature) to life and, from it, immediately to two interrelated yet parallel developing areas—reason and society.

Therefore, the very essence of life is that the local particle of matter and energy which, in principle, are part of the cosmos in its primary forms, obtains a kind of foundation within itself. It begins to exist and develop separately and, to a certain extent, independently of the cosmos, of inanimate nature (although it remains inseparable from it). That is precisely life, as an autonomous "sovereign" system, with its own foundation, which needs constant self-assertion and its stable functioning, constantly adapting to the environment and interacting with it.

The specific foundation for the existence and self-development of reason is the system of concepts, views, and ideas it triggers which, despite the entire dependence on external factors (society, nature, etc.) becomes a new, a qualitatively original reality which, although determined to a decisive extent by external factors, nonetheless has its own specific forms of existence and development patterns.

Economics is the specific foundation for the existence and self-development of society—material objects, created as a result of the purposeful labor activities of the people: means of production which, with the economic, power-administrative, and other relations which develop on their basis, directly and sharply affect the basic needs and interests of the people and, hence, their mind, for which reason they become a self-satisfying determining force in the existence, functioning, and development of society as a whole.

Here is what I would like to point out in this connection: the substantiation of the concept of the economic base, as provided by Marxism, is the profound penetration of the human mind into the secrets of the universe which, in general, opens the way to understanding its features and laws and, therefore, could be classified among the scientific discoveries of global philosophical significance, which has not been as yet entirely appreciated, in the understanding of the nature of society, the universe, and mankind's destinies.

III

The effect of the fact that society acquired its own foundation (its economic base) proved to be much more significant and almost incredible compared to the acquisition of their own foundations by the other areas.

It is not a question merely of the fact that material objects and phenomena—means of production, the production process and other relations which develop on their basis—began to act as part of a single system with the human community and, so to say, in connection with it. The essence of the problem lies in the following: the artificial environment created by man becomes the "untamed demon," a master which imperatively and peremptorily subordinates the entire society and predetermines the laws and prospects of its development.

Furthermore, with the spontaneous natural development of the foundation for the progress of society—

economics—we detect a trend toward converting it into a self-sufficing force, a system which increasingly works for itself. The most important components of a spontaneously developing economy increasingly encourage unsatisfied needs, and egotistical interests, converting it into an all-consuming Leviathan.

Here is now one of the decisive aspects of our subsequent presentation. In society, particularly after its entry into the stage of civilization (with its characteristic class, state, and national divisions), other "untamed demons" appear in connection with economics and on its basis.

Above all, this applies to the political system, the purpose of which is to ensure the administration of public affairs in accordance with the requirements of the economy but which, along with it, assumes its own powerful independent force.

Another "untamed demon" is ideology, the system of conceptual views, the purpose of which is to express in the social area the dominant and other concepts and ideas related to the political system and to the emotional and mythical aspects of human life and which, in turn, assumes a relatively independent personal life.

Both political power and ideology, objectivized in specific institutions (the state, the political system, the system of conceptual-ideological institutions, etc.) serve the economy. Nonetheless, in accordance with the characteristics of social and class conditions, they turn into closed self-seeking autonomous systems, which largely work for themselves and as such seriously influence the life of society.

We, the people, one would think, have still not fully realized the irreversibly rigid nature of the activities of the foundation of society—economics—and the "untamed demons" which associate themselves with it—political power, ideology, and the nature of their influence on the life of society and of individuals. Such an effect and such influence could, under contemporary conditions, yield significant results in the utilization of the potential of scientific and technical progress, the consumption level, and the abundance of commodities and lead to a certain external harmony of social relations structured on individualistic personal freedoms and, at the same time, paralleled by growing negative consequences, such as the aggravated alienation among people, increased atmosphere of merciless egotism, moral degradation, and loss by the people of faith in the purpose and prospects of life, as well as the facts which we already mentioned: the growth of global problems and crises which affect all mankind and its conflict with nature.

IV

How to understand all of this, the reader may ask, if the attempt at the philosophical substantiation of the universe led to hopelessness, to thoughts of a stupefying future, to an impasse in the development of mankind?

It is indeed true that a pessimistic aspect may be found in these philosophical remarks. From this viewpoint they disagree with the accepted philosophy of optimism which formulates, usually on the basis of arbitrary postulates, the initially progressive nature of the natural-spontaneous development of society which, allegedly by itself, logically, leads to a higher social system.

The strictly scientific approach to reality, which I have tried to follow, does not allow me to depict the development of society and the entire universe in such a rosy-colored tonality. A strictly scientific approach, however, also provides prospects for and indicates a solution to the impasse.

The starting point in understanding such an optimistic future is extremely simple: the strict, the merciless effects of economics and the other related "untamed demons" takes place in the course of the spontaneous development of society.

What does this mean? It means that through changes in the economy and the political system and ideology, we can not only weaken the imperative nature of the effects of all these forces and free society from their iron chains but also change the nature and, above all, the trend of such effect. This opens the way not only to eliminating the worsening crises and the overall negative consequences of the spontaneous development of all mankind but also to giving mankind a hope for a bright and optimistic future. Such is the universal-historical prospect which opens to mankind, called upon actually to implement the great mission of society, which characterizes its significance as a qualitative breakthrough in the development of the entire universe.

It is noteworthy that even within the framework of a society spontaneously developing on a private ownership basis already an obvious trend has been noted, one way or another, of conquering the untamed factors and levers of social development and eliminate extreme manifestations of its spontaneity (state control of market relations, participation of working people in ownership relations, ecological measures, concentration on solving general social problems in science, education, etc.). Under the conditions reached by the developed capitalist societies, including an abundance of commodities, and the cult of consumerism, all of this has created an atmosphere of well-being and even sufficiency but, in any case, has eliminated on the psychological level the threat of difficulties and catastrophes threatening mankind.

What is this? Is it a feeling of self-preservation which has appeared within the overall human community? Is it a spontaneous reaction to survival in the face of future difficulties? Is it the assessments of economists and sociologists heard by the captains of the capitalist countries? I do not know. Probably it is the first, second, and third taken together, added to something else coming from social intuition.

Nonetheless, in my view, not everything is as yet clear in the obvious trend toward easing the extremes and in the

reformation of capitalism. Possibly, these are only emergency measures taken today, aimed at the immediate future, at hiding behind the well-being of the present from the distant and obviously adverse ending in which the wounded and tortured nature will begin mercilessly to seek revenge?

I would very much like to hope that these changes within capitalism and saturating it with socially significant social principles implemented by radical social and ecological movements would be crowned with positive results, in the long range as well. God willing, as they say, we could reach a future without any major social upheavals in which the optimistic time of mankind will shine vividly and encouragingly.

Nonetheless, I still believe that by retaining the uncontrolled foundations of social development and its uncontrolled general negative trends, however we may be softening or improving them, sooner or later inconceivable hardships and catastrophes will be inflicted on the people. The dam of prosperity and sufficiency will, in the final account, burst under the pressure of the hard blows of presently dormant "untamed demons."

V

Socialism opens the true path to a bright and optimistic future for mankind. Yes, it is socialism, which can reshape the very foundations of social development, which will tame the "untamed demons." In this case, it is essential, above all, to note the following.

The concept of "socialism," despite the excessive abuse of this word, is conceived as something which is **bright**, brimming with profound meaning and hope, despite the fact that the word "socialism" in many cases (which too is indicative!) has been attached to antiscientific and sometimes reactionary beliefs and doctrines and even despite the fact that socialism, as a real program implemented in the socialist countries, proved to be deformed, assuming, in practice, distorted, rigid forms, extraneous to its nature and essence and, in many cases, concealed abuses of political power, arbitrariness, and illegality, a circumstance which was used by the supporters of spontaneous development of society, who have persistently tried to identify socialism with said negative facts.

Nonetheless, the word "socialism" not only survived, so to say, and withstood the excessive abuse but, as in the past, has been illumined by great values, identifying itself to the people with the initial, with the primary meaning expressed by this word: the high significance of the social feature, social justice, and happiness for the people.

Socialism is called upon to encompass within itself a system of needs with the help of which its radical transformation can be achieved, its restructuring, and thus becomes from this viewpoint a phenomenon of civilization.

The point is that in society economics, managerial and regulatory mechanisms and institutions are spontaneously established, which ensure its uninterrupted, its normal functioning. This includes commodity production, centralized control, democracy, self-management authorities, and a system of legal control, including the law. In connection with the fact that these mechanisms and institutions take shape in the age of the appearance of private ownership, the division of society into classes and the assertion of a system of class rule, they assume a private-ownership, narrow-class nature which precisely agrees with the spontaneous nature of social development and predetermines it. Nonetheless, they are also **phenomena of civilization**: They accumulate within themselves the elements and features which are of a universal human nature and have the value of highly advanced means which can ensure the purposeful and efficient functioning and advancement of the social system. The following turns out to be possible with the help of the mechanisms and institutions of civilization:

First, to ensure the restructuring of society, drastically to lower the level of the imperative effect of its own foundation and other untamed factors, and change the nature and trend of such action;

Second, which is even more essential, to adopt a sensible socialist program for the development of society, in such a way that the latter prove to be embedded in those same mechanisms and institutions, become part of their flesh, and an organic component of the new, the naturally necessary forward movement.

Furthermore, there is yet another aspect pertaining to the very essence of socialist development. It would be unlikely to conceive of the future of mankind as being bright and happy if this is understood only as a purely intellectual, rationalistic feature, structured on the basis of mechanical varieties of principles. Do you not feel a certain cold wind blowing from such an understanding? If we remember that even abstract programs were considered sensible, such a "rationalism" creates terrifying concepts which, generally speaking, developed into perhaps superficial but widespread concepts concerning the theory of socialism, which developed in many people a poor impression about socialism, repelling in a number of cases the true supporters of progressive social advancement.

Hence the thesis to which I would like to draw the attention of the readers.

The shaping and development of a sensible, a socialist organization of society demand that the changes themselves within the foundation of society and the principles of social life not only depend on reason, on its so to say superior level, but also have their own pivot, a single objective, and a higher purpose.

Such a pivot, objective, and purpose is **Man**—the meaning of life, the happiness of man, and his future, which identifies through action the humanistic content of the philosophy of dialectical materialism. For that

reason the socialist trend in the development of society should be considered not simply as being sensible (or even optimally sensible) but as being systematically and profoundly humanistic. From this viewpoint socialism is also the first social system in the history of mankind within which, from being a "means" in social processes can become the objective and meaning of social development.

VI

Revolution!

The conversion of society to socialism means the first true revolution in the history of mankind, leading to a sharp turn in the history and destinies of mankind and, in a certain sense, of the universe as a whole.

Therefore, considered from the viewpoint of these concepts, the socialist revolution and socialism are not simply the extension of the spontaneous, the natural uncontrolled development which started with inanimate nature and, through life, rushed further, through society and through reason. Yes, even within the framework of social development, they are not the next rung on the ladder, logically following preceding stages, for the natural-spontaneous logic "led" society toward a growing crisis and a futureless end. The profound meaning of socialism consists precisely of halting such a spontaneous development and eliminating the destructive effect on society of seemingly unbendable outside forces. Socialism is legitimate from the viewpoint of the need for the survival of mankind and its possible progressive future.

The October Revolution in Russia and the socialist revolutions in other countries were aimed at eliminating social injustice and the entire horror and shame of the exploiting society, give the power to the working people, and solve other problems which were important to the working people. However, the profound historical "intent" of the revolution, its meaning, were to redo the world. The real prerequisites for reorganizations in the economy, in the area of power and ideology, gained in the course of the revolution, actually meant that for the first time in history a real possibility appeared for a profound restructuring of the entire society.

Unfortunately, the socialist revolution in the way in which it was dictated by the "plan" of history, limited itself to acquiring the initial prerequisites for profound changes and mastering the real instruments for such changes. All of this can be viewed as a dramatic turn in social life and, perhaps, as the most acute historical tragedy.

What a grandiose meaning is invested in the socialist revolution! The initial positions were conquered along with the real levers for its implementation! But all of a sudden (while preserving a number of important revolutionary principles) most severe negative consequences appear; deformations and difficulties make themselves apparent, manifested in the Stalinist regime, and in the

neo-Stalinist, Brezhnevian order. They were manifested in all those things for which we now must pay, the calamitous ecological situation, the crisis in the national economy, the worsening condition on the consumer market, the disruption in the monetary circulation, the neglect of many sectors of spiritual life, the growth of criminality, and so on.

What was the reason for this?

The reason was that after the October Revolution, little by little but increasingly, the "untamed demons" began to function and apply their destructive power.

Political power is the most treacherous among them.

The result of any revolutionary coup is the assumption of political power which, precisely, is called upon to become a powerful instrument of social change.

However, it was not for nothing that on the very eve of the October Revolution, in the book *"The State and Revolution,"* in substantiating the need for political power in building the new system, Lenin dedicated many passages to the fact that this authority must not be strictly an "apparatus" authority, and to limiting the omnipotence of the permanent officialdom and the military, so that after the revolution there would be a "semi-state" and, step by step, such a semi-state would wither away.

Unfortunately, the desperately bad economic and military situation of the country during the post-October period urgently demanded the creation of a powerful system. Instead of popular self-administration and universal arming of the working people, because of the harsh necessity, an extensive economic-managerial and military apparatus developed which, by the end of the civil war, rose as a gigantic colossus.

V.I. Lenin was always concerned by the growth and increased power of the "Soviet bureaucracy," by its "communist boastfulness" and other vices and difficulties. It seems to me that Lenin's courageous revolutionary accomplishment—the introduction of the NEP—was partially aimed at substantially reducing and streamlining the huge administrative apparatus (indeed, the transition to the NEP was accompanied by a substantial reduction in the apparatus). However, the "NEP Spring" did not last long. After Vladimir Ilich's death it was replaced by a Stalinist bitter frost, when Stalin's autocratic power was embodied into an omnipotent administrative-bureaucratic system.

What a treacherous being this "untamed demon"—political power—can be! And how strange it is, precisely under our circumstances, after the revolution, that it brought to life another main, determining untamed factor, manifested in the economy as the very foundation of social life. It was precisely through powerful political rule that an omnipotent centralized bureaucratic

economy was created, with monopoly state ownership—all that which became the prime foundation in the life of our society.

Another social force was allied to political power—the Stalinist ideology. The left-wing communist and radical ideas within the framework of Marxist theory, which were initially of a heroic-romantic nature (particularly under the circumstances of the civil war and the people's opposition to foreign intervention) were transformed, after a powerful political rule was established in the society, after Lenin's death, into the ideology of Stalinism—the ideology of a state, administrative-barracks regime of sociopolitical life, and a military-bureaucratic economy.

Furthermore, the mastery of the real instruments of social change offers the opportunity not only for a sensible reorganization of the world but also for the "free," and sometimes arbitrary and voluntaristic use of such instruments. When abstract, arbitrary objectives and programs assume a dominant significance in ideology, particularly those which express the ideology of Stalinism, while the political power is concentrated in the hands of a group of people who are the bearers of such objectives and programs or, worse, in the hands of a single person, a leader, this inevitably leads to an increase in the negative aspects in the economy. At that point the economy and, with it, the excessively strengthened and aggrandized political power (administrative-bureaucratic, punitive, and managerial system) and a pseudoprogressive ideology once again puts iron fetters on society and leads to major losses, crises, stagnation, and decline.

The final circumstance is, probably, one of the prerequisites for the failure to see—as we can detect in many political articles written of late—the sources of our past difficulties and shortcomings as residing virtually exclusively in the personal qualities of the leaders, the features of their character and their ill-will.

The moment the new society began to master the real levers of reorganization of social life on a socialist basis, immediately after the October Revolution, the centralized bureaucratic economy, the autocratic political dictatorship usurped by Stalin, and the ideology of Stalinism and neo-Stalinism began to work in earnest. The result was that public ownership, the political power of the working people, and Marxist-Leninist outlook "slipped out of the hands" of the bearers of humane socialism. In the final account, all of this intensified the imperative-merciless, all-embracing nature of the effect of the economy and other factors on social life in such a way as to lead to destructive consequences: it triggered stagnation in society and a decline accompanied by numerous negative phenomena.

The sacramental question is, what to do?

The answer to this question is found in the philosophical and political-applied nature of perestroika.

Naturally, above all our generation's difficult mission is to remove all the dumps and accumulations of difficulties and misfortunes triggered by previous development ("naturally,"... but this is not all that simple. It is extremely difficult to accomplish it, considering how far we have gone down the wrong way). We must go back to the initial, to the prime positions, to what was given to us by the October Revolution and what began to be implemented under Lenin, under the conditions of the NEP.

And then what?

Then we must systematically implement a program for sensible-optimal socialist development on a humanistic and democratic basis. The main link, the profound secret for success of such a program is to conquer the "untamed demons," i.e., to establish the type of economic organization and political power and ideology which would exclude their deformed use and functioning. The restructuring taking place in the USSR and the other socialist countries is aimed at not only removing from social life all the consequences of deformation and critical phenomena by improving the economy and developing democracy, emancipation and humanizing of the spiritual area, but also, in the long-term, excluding the very possibility of such use and functioning.

The main point in all this is the triumph of a truly socialist ideology which would express a sensible, a truly socialist program for social progress, which would encompass both economics and the political system. One of the most important aspects of perestroika is the restoration, in accordance with contemporary conditions, of the Leninist theory of democratic centralism with its moral-humanistic essence and, on this basis, the formulation a strategy of social progress.

In what way, what new directions must be followed in our practical activities in taming the "untamed demons," pacifying their cruel and merciless actions and opening wide the road to building a humane democratic socialism?

All indications are that there are two such ways and directions.

First. It is the physical, visible (real) lowering of the level of the imperative diktat in economics, the political system, and ideology. Thus, the conversion from a bureaucratic economy to a self-regulating socialist structured commodity-market economy should, according to our estimates, exclude the total domination of the economy over all other areas of social life. Similar results could be expected by "taming" the political, the state system and strictly subordinating all of its manifestations to the real social requirements and the law and to the standards of civilization and enlightenment. Obviously, as an important factor, ideology as well should weaken its comprehensive influence over the minds of the people.

Second. It is subordinating the "untamed demons" of our life to the bright principles formulated in the theory of democratic socialism, service to Man above all.

At this point I would like to submit for discussion an idea which could be conventionally described as "the idea of stopping." Furthermore, for quite some time I have been tortured by the following consideration: would it not be justified to raise this idea to the level of a kind of banner of socialist change? It is only that our present economic and social difficulties do not allow us to encourage such an approach.

But then, readers, let us consider this together.

Here is the sequence of such considerations.

The understanding of dialectical-historical materialism suggested in these notes defines systematically and strictly the inevitability and justification of the break, a kind of "cutting short" the uncontrolled development of society. In full agreement with the need for radical revolutionary change in the very foundation of social life, which is the consequence, we must consider as objectively necessary and justified a kind of stop and streamlining the uncontrolled development of society and mankind and defining this development in accordance with the superior moral-humanistic ideals and values. This applies above all to economics, the growth and advancement of which must be made consistent not only with moral-humanistic ideals and values but with nature as well.

Therefore, unlike other concepts concerning the present and the future of society, based on the idea of the legitimacy and justification of an unrestrained and increasing development of the economy and consumption, the understanding of dialectical-historical materialism, as substantiated in these notes, is based on an entirely different, opposite premise of taming the "untamed demons"—on the idea of the streamlined, restrained, sensible moral-humanistic way of life and development of mankind.

The implementation of the "idea of a stop" (streamlining, coordinating the development of the economy and the entire society with higher moral-humanistic values and nature) should lead mankind to the implementation of the objectives of socialism which is the true and actual kingdom of freedom—the age-old dream and ideal of development of mankind.

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Negating Negation

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[Article by Viktor Sergeyevich Rozov, writer and playwright]

[Text] I realize that this article of mine may sound somewhat daring if not immodest in a respected theoretical journal, the more so since it bears a strictly philosophical heading. I have never considered myself a theoretician or politician. However, I have always tried to understand what was happening and is happening in our country and society. I have thought about the difficult social and purely ordinary clashes. I have tried to find in them some kind of pattern or system. I have formulated, strictly for my personal use, theories which would explain that which I saw and experienced and what touched and is touching me. Naturally, there has never been any scientific foundation for such theories. They have always been built on exclusively common sense and my own practical experience. You could describe me as a contemporary naive realist. I lay claim to no more than that. I believe, however, that my thoughts and my present mood are similar to those of the masses of people who, unexpectedly to themselves, find themselves currently involved in a tempestuous political life and are trying to answer the most complex questions addressed to the entire world and to each one of us by perestroika. Naturally, this is good, it is excellent but... Democratization brought about an unparalleled political dilettantism and just about everyone thinks that he alone knows what should be done and how.

I would also like to caution the reader about the following: Negating negation, in my view, is not only a philosophical law but an ordinary observation with the help of which I try to explain what is taking place around and within me. Events which are happening around us are such that one must hold one's brain with both hands to keep it steady. We are drowned in a huge amount of information, both unexpected and puzzling. We find in each newspaper and journal something conflicting and frequently mutually exclusive. Under such a situation a person who is untrained and trusting could become totally confused and even panicky. This is a disease quite widespread today in our country. I do not exclude the possibility of being contaminated by it myself. Its reason is the ordinary negating of negation. What do I mean by this?

After the revolution (I am slightly older than the Soviet system) instilled in us, children and, subsequently, adolescents, were certain views on life not on the level of theorems but of axioms. We were asked to master them ready-made, without any analysis. How was this done? I grew up in the family of a low-ranking official. In our home, as in all homes, there was an icon on the wall. Naturally, I was baptized and taken to church, I took communion, etc. Subsequently, all of a sudden I was told that religion is a lie, that it is the opium of the people. One could somehow understand opium, for opium is a pain-dulling medicine. I found it difficult to accept, however, that religion was some kind of spiritual raw vodka from which one could only get sick. Subsequently, in school, I was made a member of the "Godless" circle. I perfectly remember how we, essentially children, were sent to the villages (at that time we lived in Kostroma) to

prove to the peasants that there was no God. Can you imagine a 14-15-year old adolescent as an agitator of this kind? Incidentally, the peasants listened to me without hostility but, in any case, during the night they would lock me up in the barn to prevent this unfortunate child from being killed for such propaganda activities. How painful it was when Easter came! Kulich, painted eggs, and all the rest, my God, considering our poverty, these were impossible dreams! Stoically, however, I ate nothing of all that, although I became an active Godless person only because I was instructed to be one.

But what about now? The millennium of the baptism of Rus is celebrated as a nationwide holiday. Churches are being restored. Archbishops and bishops speak on television and even at the congress of people's deputies. But why talk about the church hierarchy! I personally, as a television preacher, proclaim to the entire country that the kingdom of God is within us, although I could describe myself a believer in very relative terms. Here is your negating negation on the scale of one person's life.

I recall my childhood: How did I really feel at that time? Did I feel that someone was coercing me? Or was this a kind of hallucination caused by the devil? To this day I cannot unravel my own feelings as a child. That is how I spent a lifetime: I was talked into one thing or into its exact opposite. How not to become confused? Despite all this, I intuitively could sense what was real and what was not. I believe it is precisely the innumerable ordinary negating negation that largely shaped our conflicting, our chaotic social awareness.

What about the family? What about the marriage ceremony? The ring, the bride's veil, the entire ritual? All this was rejected! Marriage, it was claimed, was a philistine religious prejudice. Wearing a ring was universally condemned. I recall how my father removed it from his finger, almost crying. It is true that later the ring and the silver chasuble with the miracle icon were pawned in order not to die of hunger. What now? Everything is turned around. It is true that the modern marriage ceremony with the mandatory visit to the grave of the unknown soldier, in my view, has something pagan.

I consider the family as exceptionally important. It is my strong point. Without a family one is a rolling stone among weeds. The home is a place inside which one can take off the entire burdens of the day, one can relax and rest and gather strength for the next day. However much I may have been told about the educational significance of the school and other organizations, nonetheless the foundations in shaping the spiritual world of man begin in the family.

Let me cite yet another example: the attitude toward the intelligentsia. I experienced this personally. I repeat, my father was a petty official in an industrial cooperative. After graduating from secondary school I was denied the right to attend a higher educational institution. Initially I had to acquire labor seniority at a plant or factory and only then, after the classification "worker" could be

entered in the line "social status" in official documents that the doors of all VUZs would open. The most widespread epithet added to the word "intelligentsia" at that time was "rotten." Today only the elderly recall the inspired expressions of those times: "a hat he wears!" or "and glasses on his nose!" and all of this was about the intelligentsia. Today there is a process of negating negation. Respect is being restored for the people engaged in intellectual labor. Slowly and not everywhere, but such respect is coming back. The decline of the authority of the intelligentsia could explain many of our present difficulties, such as the fact that increased metal intensiveness in output is still faster than increased science intensiveness. And are the lack of spirituality and the moral decline of society not related to the rejection of the intelligentsia?

Allow me to expatiate on this matter. I shall not undertake to judge the extent to which my views are scientific. Please accept them simply as a metaphorical comparison. I imagine the state as a live organism, somewhat similar to the human body. It has many organs and each one of them has its specific function—hands, feet, eyes, ears, heart, liver, internal secretion glands. One organ—the brain—is especially connected to all functions and determines conditions of the organism as a whole.

Let us say that my foot hurts. Naturally, this is bad. During the war I spent nearly 1 year in hospital, half of which in a cast all the way to my stomach, having been severely wounded in the leg. But, you know, I did not become despondent. I was a happy soldier, a joker. I recited to my neighbors poetry from memory. There were as many as 40 beds in the ward. Even in the ward of terminal patients (where I spent 1 month) I asked that someone put on my chest a book and I read to the people aloud. I remember once I read "Queen of Spades." How closely the others listened!

The nurse would ask me: "Rozov, how come you're so cheerful?" I would answer: "Well, it is my leg that is hurting. I personally am healthy." When the leg hurts it is bad; when the liver hurts it is very bad; when the heart hurts it is very troublesome and even terrifying. But when the brain is sick the entire organism is sick. Let me apply this to the state. Industry is shaky, the situation with finances is poor, and there are difficulties with agriculture, and all of these are very bad things. But when the brain of the country is sick, so is the entire organism. For quite some time it has seemed to me that it is the brain that was chronically ill in our country, for which reason the entire country is still shaking with fever. The brain of the country is not only the Politburo or the Supreme Soviet. No, by this I mean the intelligentsia in the broadest possible meaning of the term. This applies to engineers, workers-inventors, and academicians and, in general, anyone who does not think and act according to stereotypes. If this tremendous creative potential would be activated, the country as a whole would begin to work well. Alas, no true negating of negation has as yet taken place. Our state lost not only its

peasantry but its intelligentsia. No brain in the country could mend itself after a lengthy illness. But where did the illness come from?

A wise man said that if a revolution would win not in a highly developed country everything in it will have to be started all over again. The first Soviet years I remember vaguely, for I was still a child. However, my memory from childhood has preserved something which, as I now am beginning to understand, was similar to primitive communism—a feeling of universal association of working people. This was a very brief period. The period which followed it I can assess quite clearly, based on my own experience and very specific knowledge learned not out of a textbook. A process of negating negation which had already been experienced by mankind, was initiated. Is it not accurate to compare the years of Stalinism with slavery? Everything possible and more than that was taken out of the individual. Workers were actually chained to their machine tools. Changing a job was not simply a problem. Sometimes it was a tragedy. One went to jail for being 30 minutes late for work. Deprived of their internal passports, the peasants were even more oppressed and enslaved than they had been under serfdom. The recent Brezhnev times clearly remind me of a feudal society. The chief feudal lord sat in the Kremlin and his own servants were in the local areas. We paid them their dues but now this was known as a bribe. Naturally, not all of them accepted bribes but there were many....

This way of negating one system with another took centuries and millennia in the history of mankind; in our country, like a black shadow, it spread over several decades. This is not the first time that we are trying to break out of this vicious circle. Khrushchev tried to replace Stalinism with a primitive structure of the state. However, as we know, the most primitive structure is, as we know, the most solid. And if it is concealed behind purposefully decorated curtains on which are depicted cheerful faces, smiling Stakhanovites, ballerinas with bouquets of flowers, and other beautiful pictures, even very honest people and maybe even those living in the most out-of-the-way areas in Siberia and the far north may be tricked. Those who knew something or could guess something quite clearly imagined what such an unnecessary perspicacity could lead to.

With his typical bluntness, Khrushchev pulled down these curtains and exposed the structure. Everyone was stunned. To me this was perhaps the greatest upheaval in my life. It was as though society literally woke up. We described that time as the "thaw." However, when Brezhnev came to power, once again curtains became fashionable and there was even a time when Stalin's rehabilitation could have become an official fact in our party's history.

Frequently, I mentally compare this already distant "thaw" with today's perestroika. Professionally, I am interested, more than anything else, in the moral and psychological condition of society. I think that at that

time it was easier for Khrushchev to turn the situation around compared to Gorbachev today. Khrushchev inherited a frightened and disciplined society, whereas Gorbachev inherited a corrupted one. The "thaw" gave a warm feeling to the people, as though the dark clouds scattered and the sun broke through. With happiness came relief. Today everything is difficult, uptight, and explosive.

In his time, Marx said that mankind happily parts with its past. We are parting with ours with hatred, irritation, and vengefulness. The question arises: Are we parting with it at all? How can we explain this aggressiveness which has become ubiquitous in our country? Let me not even mention the increased crime rate. Wherever we go we see the aggressive sales clerk in the store, the girl at the post office, aggressive behind her window, the aggressive official. Even men of culture have begun to attack one another like sworn enemies. Decisively, everyone is aggressive. I seek the answer and ask, why? This condition of the social mentality cannot be accidental. It must have a social explanation. It seems to me that all of us are now like the person who is forced to look at the terrible truth in the eyes every day. Unaccustomed to this, the terrible truth angers him, makes him indignant, and triggers his protest. Sometimes the old seems so tranquil and orderly. A great deal of injustice existed in the past but also there was something to be proud of. What about now?

In such circumstances it is very important to find an answer to the following: What should we abandon and for the sake of what else? Today many people are abusing socialism. But what socialism? Socialism was depicted as without problems, some kind of Soviet miracle. Millions of people enthusiastically sang "We were born to make a fairy tale come true" not thinking even for a minute about how stupid this inspiring sentence was. A fairy tale is something which has never existed nor could exist. The hunter cannot slice the belly of the gray wolf and release Little Red Riding Hood's grandmother alive and unharmed. Conservatively estimating, the real "gray wolf" cost us 20 million lives. However, we believed in fairy tales, we believed in them very strongly. Naturally, that 20 million did not include those who considered a miracle the fact that they had survived the Kolyma and other camps. It is a human weakness that one always wishes to believe more in the good than the bad. The people believed in utopian socialism as well. This was brilliantly said by Pushkin: "I prefer the darkness of the lowly truth to an uplifting deception...."

How should people feel who lived for several decades in an atmosphere of "uplifting deception," if they all of a sudden find themselves in the thick impenetrable surrounding of "lowly truths?" Naturally, we suspected that our statistical figures were suffering from excessive optimism. Naturally, we realized that it was not very seemly, to say the least, for a great power to sell crude oil outside the sanitary cordon. Naturally, we felt that our economy was economizing at the expense of the needs and the difficulties of the ordinary working people and that our

socialism was somehow strange although it was described as developed. But then we were building the biggest hydraulic power stations, we smelted cast iron more than anyone else, and we had an absolutely cloudless friendship among the peoples and incorruptible spokesmen for internationalism, such as Rashidov and other heroes of the same cohort....

And now we have the "darkness of the lowly truths." Virtually every month there is a new Union-wide problem with its specific features, a problem which we do not know how to approach. Such negating of negation is probably not conflicting with dialectics. However, it literally tears with its contradictions the ordinary mentality. All of us unquestioningly accepted the concept of "new thinking" as applicable to international affairs. Who can fail to rejoice if the threat of war has been lifted, if we can reduce military expenditures and use such funds for urgent peaceful needs? But the moment we had to reinterpret internal political, economic, and spiritual conflicts which, one way or another, affected the interests, convictions, or ambitions of individuals, there was no traditional unanimity which we believed to be inherent in socialism. All of us saw the fierce battle in which clashed two mentalities and two ways of thinking: conservative and radical, each one of them projecting something onto the other side. Our main trouble today is division. There are those on the left and those on the right. There is no golden middle. This is horrible! A golden middle, a precisely golden one.... The rest could be either made of lead or soap bubbles.

I saw on television a meeting held in Luzhniki, sponsored by the trade unions. I noticed the slogan "down with Soviet millionaires!" and another one which called for freezing prices. It as though today one could manage the economy with slogans. That was precisely what was being done in the past. The results are known. Let me repeat, however, that I am not an economist and I can think only on the basis of common sense. In the United States there are millionaires and billionaires yet the people live better. I believe that someone will immediately voice the mandatory argument: But then in that country people huddle in hovels and some are totally unemployed. We know this and openly admit that both are plentiful in our country. Now let me ask: Do you want to live better while we have in our country millionaires or would you like the former equalization without anything changing in our living standard?

I can anticipate the following question: How do you know that if there are millionaires we will live any better? Let me answer: First, I am speaking metaphorically, meaning by millionaire a person who lives much better than the overwhelming majority. Second, I am not referring to millionaires-bribe takers and thieves or the bosses of the black market or else the clandestine millionaires. We have already lived with them and everyone knows that one could not expect anything from them. Third, we have virtually no practical experience of living with ordinary capitalist millionaires. That is what history decreed. We came to the negating of capitalism

without virtually any personal experience as to what it is in its developed stage. The law of negating negation, to the best of my knowledge, presumes not simply rejecting, deleting the past but also an element of continuity, a development on a new level of what was good and useful in the preceding stage.

When the socialist revolution was made, all we had were some growing big businessmen, such as Morozov, Manontov or that same Yeliseyev with his famous stores. Yes, they were exploiters. It was programmatic, it was unquestionable that socialism had to reject this quality of theirs. However, in order to accomplish that which they had accomplished one had to be quite a talented organizer and noted entrepreneur. But are socialism and enterprise incompatible? In words, everyone agrees: They are compatible. But we had no experience in any knowledgeable, noncriminal enterprise. I believe that in developing his new economic policy, in addition to everything else Lenin wanted to fill this historical gap. Let me add that we did not learn the experience of the psychological perception of enterprise. We did not feel the social usefulness of the free development of this quality. Conversely, an entirely different psychological stereotype appeared and strengthened: "I would rather die than let him live better than I do." The fact that he was more talented and that he could invent something for the general good, something which no one else could do, was unimportant.

"I would rather die...." This was the mentality on which collectivization in the 1930s and equalization during all subsequent years were based. In my view, there could be no more utopian and destructive slogan than "equality!" understood in this sense. There can be no equality of talent in art or in any other area of human activities. There can be no equality in skill, dedication, and conscientiousness. There can be equality only in the eyes of the law. There should be full equality among the chairman of the Supreme Soviet, the prime minister, the turner, the cooperative farmer, and the writer. There should be absolute equality, for everyone is equal in death. When Stalin died and when his terrible deeds became known, the wild thought came to me that one should build a monument to this Death. It is frightening to even mention this: a monument to Death.... But then death alone had been able to stop the madness. Therefore, the law should have the same type of totally unquestionable, supreme, and absolute power.

We have been fighting bribery and other types of crime for decades and they are still present. Why? Because in our country the law did not have absolute power. It greatly depended on the circumstances familiar to all of us. Meanwhile, we learned a long time ago how thoroughly to grind into dust our original talents, or talented organizers and socialist entrepreneurs, without any laws. There have not been mass protests and meetings by thousands of people in their defense. Nor are there now. Why is it that some people have millions while tens of millions of people live below the poverty line? Strange

though it may seem, this question is asked most frequently by comrades who live significantly above the poverty line and who consider themselves popular politicians. Their popularity, however, has the same psychological roots: "I would rather die than let him live better than I do."

To whom do the people turn on the subject of gross illegalities? In the past they turned to the CPSU Central Committee. Today they also turn to the Supreme Soviet. They act properly, although in a normal democratic society this is absolutely absurd. How frequently have we heard that in the bourgeois West the fate of presidents and prime ministers is decided above all by the courts and, frequently, not in favor of even the highest government leaders. This is entirely logical if the state is structured on the basis of the principle of the separation of power. Today we speak a great deal about this principle. However, we do not know from our own historical experience what this is although it is precisely on this that socialist statehood should be structured. Everything today would have been much simpler had we had in the past such a democratic tradition and had it become part of daily life and of the social awareness. Whereas under the NEP we had some, albeit minute, practical experience in the area of enterprise under socialist conditions, we had absolutely no experience in the separation of powers. Common sense should indicate that yes, that is the way it should be. However, in practice we are absolutely unprepared for this.

Let us honestly admit that in our ordinary concept power is still a single thing. In the past we had the apparat. Today we have the Supreme Soviet. In the imagination of many power is related to a certain position, a mandate, some type of formal-prestige attributes. Not everyone considers that in order to achieve a truly democratic separation among the three powers we need profound knowledge, ability, and even a certain development of character, separate for each of the three cases. That is why I am afraid of the struggle for power which is currently being waged.

At the Writers' Union, during the first nomination of candidates for deputies, someone mentioned my name. I leaped and said: "Never! No way! To begin with, my age. Second, most important, I am incapable of being a political activist." I am not confident that all candidates acted sensibly when they were being nominated to the supreme legislative authority. The art of being a politician, the art of managing the state, a state as complex as ours, is not given to everyone, even to a very good, honest, and decent person. It took nearly 2 centuries for the bourgeois state to develop the structures of its parliamentary democracy and methods for training and promoting political leaders. I agree that such methods do not fit socialism and we rejected them. However, our rejection should be dialectical, retaining positive experience. But how can we do this if we personally have not experienced or felt that which we are rejecting. This is a strange negating of negation, is that not so? It is speculative, abstract, and unnatural....

There are theoreticians and journalists who believe that the October Revolution was an error and that the bolsheviks were in too much of a hurry. I would not like for my views to be quoted in support of such a conclusion. What happened happened. It is stupid endlessly to sigh: "Ah, if this had only not happened...." In rereading documents from the prerevolutionary months, weeks, and days, I feel that this most confused theme of the drama of the autumn of 1917, passing through hundreds of significant and insignificant events and circumstances and clashes of conflicting interests and convictions, step by step led to its natural end: the revolution. I realize how unconvincing this may sound to some. In this case I do not intend to try to convince anyone of anything. I am not concerned with the past. I am concerned with the present and the future.

Wise men have claimed that no socioeconomic system can die before having exhausted all of its possibilities. In Russia capitalism died one could say in childhood. Was this a violation of the laws of history? I do not know. Forces which defeated even quite developed capitalist countries tried to throw our country back, to turn it their own way. And once again we come across the rather strange negating of negation.

I may be wrong but I wonder whether such strange occurrences account for many of our current insanely confused problems. The intensity of criticism of the past irks many people. It irks me too. This is not because I want to defend Stalin or our "achievements" such as the great construction projects of communism on the Volga, which are dooming the life of this great river. No. Forgive me but what gives me no rest is the law of negating negation which, according to all the laws of dialectics should, eventually, bring about a new quality. Unless I am wrong, this makes sense. Negating the old can already be measured in the tons of newspaper and journal publications and television and radio years. Meanwhile, we still do not have any new quality of socialism.

The raging of criticism in the press and the heated battles at meetings and irreconcilable polemics at Supreme Soviet sessions which occasionally remind us of the atmosphere at meetings, and the clash among viewpoints, corrected and still not corrected errors, and most sharp national contradictions.... What is this, is it an explosion of the social element? Is it the eve of general chaos? Today millions of people ache with these questions in mind. I dare to submit my own hypothesis, once again based exclusively on common sense and my special liking of said dialectical law.

It seems to me that the past 2-3 years remind us, in a compressed way, of that part of history which our country skipped by the will of fate. It was a path which mankind in the developed countries took 150 to 200 years and which we undertook to cover in a few years, a marathon at the pace of a record-setting sprinter. Within such a short time we must reject what is socially alien to our system and master our own. We must experience and

be exposed to the true political, economic, and spiritual achievements of the preceding system, without which any further social progress is impossible as well as unnatural.

I recall that 5 years ago the following formula was popular: Socialism is developing on its own foundation. But is it developing on a natural foundation is the question. If we somehow (let the answer be given by historians and philosophers) violated a historical law (and if we did, was this a law?), the one which stipulates that a system does not die without exhausting its possibilities, today, in my view, we have come across another one: No single new system appears before conditions for its birth have matured within the preceding one. This is an amazing unique situation with which our social science, to the best of my knowledge, has not seriously dealt with. In order to clarify it, I feel that it takes more than simple common sense. However, common sense indicates that before our society could assume a new quality it should become a **natural** society, not a fictitious one, not entangled in a net of lies, including theoretical ones.

Is it natural for the richest country on earth to live in shameful poverty? Is it natural that a system which was proclaimed as being the most valuable for man was precisely unable to provide full rights and even basic protection? Is it natural that in a theoretically most democratic system, in the eighth decade of its existence, in front of the entire country the people's deputies are sometimes helplessly learning the elements of democratic procedures? What is taking place today, in our view, is a stormy and frequently uncontrolled process of negating the old lies and totalitarian and other prejudices in order to cleanse socialism from utopian accretions alien to it, of vestiges of long gone times. Today we are only returning to our natural condition. I believe that it is only when we have returned that the law of negating negation will have a say and society will reach a new qualitative level.

The drama of perestroika is only developing. It is offering many options of which we cannot even see the end. Had it been up to me, I would have imagined it as follows: Our society, after incredible and mystical (inasmuch as they are strange to me) changes is finally entering its development in a normal historical channel, with the face of a **natural** yet **renovated** socialism. I am not a politician or historian, for which reason I cannot logically, convincingly, and intelligibly add a theme to this successful end. In order to write a play on such a scale of action and such heated passions and confused circumstances, we must know the inordinate and informal logic of domestic history. Today such a play can be written only by a science fiction playwright. I am not one of them. However, I dream to live long enough to see the day when the time of general negating of the past, of sociopsychological and national tempests, following the spiral of negating negation, will rise our suffering society to a new quality. At that point plays about the present could be written by ordinary realist playwrights.

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PAGES FROM HISTORY

Why Socialism?

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[Article by Albert Einstein]

[Text] Following is an article by Albert Einstein, the outstanding scientist and humanist of our time. It would be superfluous to introduce him to the readers. His name is familiar to everyone since childhood. However, by no means does everyone know that in the final years of his life, in his thoughts on the future of human civilization and the opportunities for progress, freedom, and humanism, Einstein turned to the idea of socialism.

The article "Why Socialism?" was written at the peak of the Cold War, McCarthyism, and the "witch hunt" for the first issue of the Marxist journal *MONTHLY REVIEW*, which began publication in 1949. This is a first publication of this article in the Russian language.

Is it worthwhile for a man who is not a specialist in economics or the social area to express his views on a question such as "socialism?" I believe that it is, for a number of reasons.

Let us begin by considering this question from the viewpoint of scientific knowledge. It may seem that there are no substantial methodological differences between astronomy and economics: In both areas scientists are trying to discover laws which are universally acceptable, concerning certain groups of phenomena, in order to be able to make the interconnection among such phenomena as understandable as possible. In reality, however, methodological differences do exist. The discovery of common laws in the area of economics is hindered by the fact that frequently economic phenomena under observation are influenced by a number of factors which are very difficult to assess separately. Furthermore, the experience acquired from the beginning of the so-called civilized period in human history, as we know, was and is being subjected to serious influences and restrictions not of a strictly economic nature. For example, the majority of great powers in history owe their existence to conquests. The conquering nations asserted themselves both juridically and economically as a privileged class in the conquered country. They seized the monopoly rights to land ownership, and appointed priests from their own circles. The priests, who controlled education, turned the class division of society into a permanent institution. They created a system of values which to this day has subconsciously guided the people in their social behavior. However, historical tradition is, so to say, a thing of the past; nowhere have we surmounted truly that which T. Veblen¹ describes as the "predatory phase" in the development of mankind. Some economic facts

which we have noticed could be classified as part of this phase. Even the laws which we could derive from them are inapplicable in any other phase. Since the true purpose of socialism is precisely that of surmounting the "predatory phase" in the development of mankind and to move forward, in its current condition the science of economics can shed very little light on the socialist society of the future.

Secondly, the objective of socialism is socioethical. Science cannot set objectives and is even less capable of instilling them in the people. Science can at best provide the means of achieving some objectives. In themselves, however, such objectives are attained by individuals with high ethical ideals. If such objectives are not still-born but are viable and strong, they are supported and developed by many people who, half subconsciously, define the slow evolution of society.

By virtue of these reasons we should be cautious and not overestimate science and scientific methods, when it is a question of human problems. Nor should we think that experts alone have the right to express their opinion on problems of the organization of society.

Of late there have been innumerable claims that society is experiencing a crisis and that its stability has been seriously undermined. This situation is characterized by the fact that individuals experience a feeling of indifference or even hostility toward groups, big or small, to which they belong. In order to prove my claim, allow me to quote from personal experience. Recently, in discussing the threat of war which, in my view, would present a mortal danger to the very existence of mankind, arguing with an intelligent and worthy person, I pointed out that it is only a supranational organization that could prevent this danger. My interlocutor quite calmly and coldly answered: "Why do you fear so much the disappearance of the human race?"

I am confident that only 1 century ago no one would have made such a statement so lightheartedly. This was a statement by a person who had vainly tried to find a balance within himself and had virtually lost any hope of success. It was the manifestation of a painful loneliness and isolation from which so many people are suffering today. What is the reason for it and is there a solution?

Asking such questions is easy but answering them with any degree of confidence is hard. I shall do my best, for I well understand that our feelings and aspirations are frequently conflicting and not sensible and that one cannot express them in clear and simple formulas.

Man is both an individual and a social being. As an individual he tries to defend his own existence and the existence of his family and to satisfy his personal wishes and develop his inherent capabilities. As a social being he tries to earn the recognition and love of the people, to share in their joys, to console them in their sorrows, and to improve their living conditions. It is only the existence of these different and frequently conflicting aspirations that determine the special nature of man and it is

their specific combination that determines the degree to which the individual can achieve an inner balance and make a contribution to the well-being of society. It is entirely possible that the relative strength of these two aspirations is essentially determined by heredity. However, the personality takes its final shape in the environment in which man finds himself in the course of his development, the social structure of the society in which he grows up, the traditions of that society, and the way it assesses the various types of behavior. The abstract concept of "society" means to the individual human being the sum of his direct and indirect relations with his contemporaries and with all previous generations. The individual can think, feel, aspire, and work independently. However, he depends to such a great extent on society in terms of his physical, intellectual, and emotional existence that it is impossible to think about it or understand it outside the framework of society. It is "society" that gives man food, clothing, housing, labor tools, a language, and the shape and main content of his thoughts. His life is possible thanks to the labor and achievements of many millions of people, past and present, of all those who hide behind the little word "society."

It is obvious, therefore, that the dependence of the individual on society is a fact of nature which cannot be abolished any more than it can be among the bees and the ants. However, the entire process of life of an ant or a bee is governed to the most minute detail by hereditary instincts, whereas the social model and interrelationship among people could vary and are subject to change. Memory, the ability for new combinations, and the gift of verbal communication have made possible such relations among people which are not dictated by biological necessity. This is manifested in traditions, social institutions and organizations, in literature, in the achievements of science and technology, and in works of art. It explains the way man can, in a certain sense, influence his own life through his own behavior and the fact that in this process conscious thinking and desires play a certain role.

At birth, thanks to heredity, man obtains a biological constitution which we must consider as fixed and unchangeable, including the natural aspirations which are characteristic of human beings. Furthermore, in the course of his life man acquires a cultural background which is accepted from society through contacts and many other types of influence. It is precisely this cultural background that should change in the course of time and which determines to a very large extent the relationship between the individual and society. Modern anthropology teaches us, based on comparative research among so-called primitive cultures, that the social behavior of human beings could greatly differ depending on the prevalent cultural models and types of organization which dominate in a given society. It is precisely on this that those who are trying to improve the destinies of man based their hopes: People are not doomed by virtue of

their biological background to destroy each other or to be left at the mercy of a cruel and inevitable fate.

If we ask ourselves how we should change the structure of society and its culture in order to make human life most favorable, we must always remember that there are certain circumstances which we cannot change. As we pointed out, the biological nature of man cannot be changed for practical purposes. Furthermore, technological and demographic processes in the past several centuries have created conditions which are equally permanent. In the zones of settled and compact habitat the production process for goods needed for survival mandatorily presumes the division of labor and a highly centralized production apparatus. The time when an individual or a relatively small group of individuals could ensure their total self-support, which seems so idyllic as we look at the past, has disappeared forever. It would be only a slight exaggeration to say that from the viewpoint of production and consumption mankind already forms a global community.

Now I can define briefly the nature of the contemporary crisis: It is the attitude of the individual towards society. More than ever before the individual realizes his dependence on society. However, he does not consider this dependency as a positive phenomenon, as an organic link, as a force which protects him, but rather as a threat to his natural rights or even to his economic existence. Furthermore, his position in society is such that his egotistical aspirations are constantly increasing, while his social aspirations, which are weaker, are increasingly breaking down. All people, regardless of their position in society, suffer from this process. Subconsciously being the prisoners of their own egotism, they feel themselves helpless, alone, deprived of the ability naively to enjoy life without thinking. A person could find a meaning in life—which is so short and full of dangers—only by dedicating himself to society.

The economic anarchy in capitalist society as it exists today is, in my opinion, the real source of the evil. We see a huge mass of producers who are tirelessly trying to deprive one another of the results of their collective efforts, not by force but in accordance with legitimately established rules. It is important, on this level, that the means of production, i.e., all production capacities needed for the manufacturing of consumer goods and all new capital investments to be legitimately and for the most part privately owned.

For the sake of simplicity I shall further qualify as "workers" all those who are not owners of means of production, although this is not entirely consistent with the customary use of this term. The owner of the means of production can acquire manpower. Using the means of production, the worker produces new goods which become the property of the capitalist. What is important here is precisely the correlation between the real value of what the worker produces and his salary. As long as the labor contract is "free," that which is paid to the worker is based not on the real value of the commodities he has

produced but on his minimal needs, and on the capitalist demand for manpower and its availability. It is important to realize that even the theory of worker wages is not based on the value of that which the worker has produced.

We see a trend on the part of private capital toward increased concentration. This is partially due to competition among capitalists and partly to the development of technology and the growing division of labor which stimulate the shaping of ever larger production units at the expense of the smaller ones. The result of this development is an oligarchy of private capital, the tremendous power of which cannot be efficiently controlled even in a democratic society. This is because the members of the legislative authorities are elected by political parties which are essentially financed and subject to the influence of private entrepreneurs who aspire, for practical purposes, to separate the electorate from the legislator. As a result, the representatives of the people inefficiently defend the interests of the nonprivileged population groups. Furthermore, under the existing circumstances, the private entrepreneurs invariably, directly or indirectly, control the main sources of information (the press, radio, and education). Therefore, it is incredibly difficult for the ordinary citizen and, in most cases, simply impossible to reach objective conclusions and make intelligent use of his political rights.

The situation which dominates in the economy, based on capitalist private ownership, is therefore characterized by two main principles: First, the means of production (capital) are private property, and their owners can dispose of them as they wish. Second, the labor contract is free. Naturally, in this sense there is no pure capitalist society. Let us note, in particular, that thanks to a lengthy and sharp political struggle, the workers succeeded in securing for some worker categories an "improved" form of free labor contract. As a whole, however, today's economy is not very different from "pure" capitalism.

Goods are manufactured for the sake of profit and not usefulness. However, there is no guarantee that anyone who is willing and able to work would be able to find a job; there exists nearly always an army of unemployed. The worker is always afraid of losing his job. Since unemployed and low-paid workers are not a profitable market, the production of consumer goods is limited, as a result of which serious difficulties appear. Technical progress frequently leads to increased unemployment rather than to making work easier. The orientation toward profit, combined with competition among capitalists is the reason for instability in capital accumulation and utilization. This results in increasingly serious depressions. Unrestricted competition leads to even greater waste of labor and thus distorts the social awareness of the individual as I mentioned before.

I consider this distortion of the personality the greatest evil of capitalism. Our entire educational system suffers from this evil. An excessive feeling of competition is

developed in the students who are trained to put success high on the list of training for their future careers.

I am convinced that there is only one way of putting an end to this evil, i.e., the creation of a socialist economy with its corresponding education system, oriented toward social objectives. In such an economy society itself owns the means of production and handles them on a planned basis. A planned economy adapts the production process to the needs of society. It distributes work among the able-bodied and guarantees means of survival to every man, woman, and child. Instead of glorifying power and success, as is the case in our present society, in addition to the development of the inner needs of the individual, education would be aimed at developing within him a feeling of responsibility for others.

Nonetheless, it is necessary to remember that a planned economy is not in itself socialism. A planned economy as such could be accompanied by the total enslavement of the individual. The reaching of socialism will require the solution of some exceptionally difficult sociopolitical problems, such as how, taking into consideration far-reaching centralization of political and economic power, to prevent the conversion of the bureaucracy into a force with total power? How to protect the rights of the individual yet, at the same time, to guarantee a democratic counterbalance to the power of the bureaucracy? The objectives and problems of socialism are not simple and clarity in their understanding is of the greatest significance in our transitional century. Since under present conditions the free and unhindered discussion of such problems is virtually prohibited, I believe that the creation of this journal² will be of great service to society.

Footnotes

1. Thorstein Veblen was a noted American economist and sociologist, one of the authors of the concept of institutionalism.

2. MONTHLY REVIEW.

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THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD AND SOCIALISM

Reforms in the Socialist Countries; Difficulties, Opportunities, Prospects

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[Text] The social changes in the socialist countries are the most important process of the end of the 20th century to the countries themselves, world socialism, and the global community as a whole. Because of the

reasons which trigger them and their nature and consequences, such changes assume such "tectonic" dimensions that they could be compared to the changes which led to the establishment of the existing systems and which influenced the entire course of historical development of mankind.

The need for change stems from the comprehensive profound crisis experienced by the existing system in those countries. A prerevolutionary situation, in the Marxist sense, has appeared: The existing system of production relations has become an obstacle to the development of production forces, leading to a lag in social development (and, sometimes, a regress) compared to parts of the world in which, in recent decades, development has taken place at a faster pace. A situation has developed in which the system is unable any longer to ensure its successful reproduction, for the "upper levels" can no longer manage as in the past, while the "lower levels" are unwilling and unable to live and work as of old.

The need for change does not mean, however, an inevitability of progressive social reforms, as is sometimes simplistically assumed. The profound crises, as historical experience indicates, are the opportunity offered to the various social forces. The crisis of capitalism at the start of the 1930s was resolved by the establishment of different political and social systems: fascist, democratic, state-capitalist (the Roosevelt system in the United States), and the popular fronts. The present crisis in the socialist countries, which is triggering a profound social ferment, brings to life trends and shapes forces which can bring about various solutions, such as preserving the existing systems with their possible modification ("improving developed socialism," i.e., a conservative or bureaucratic reform), various types of open or concealed bureaucratic counterrevolution (the "firm hand" system), as well as a rejection of the socialist trend of development. Therefore, the radical socialist reform, the renovation of socialism and its modernizing are merely one of the possible ways of solving the crisis. The leading political forces in many socialist countries have taken this path: The political will for such change has been expressed, concepts have been formulated, reform strategies have been drafted, the initial steps have been taken, and a process for their implementation has been initiated. However, the results of this process depend on the depth of the problems to be solved, the obstacles which must be surmounted, the dynamism of reformist impetus, and the power and scope of social forces which support or oppose change.

Actually, initiating change or any other social process is the result of the influence of numerous objective and subjective factors. On the one hand, the objective circumstances create real prerequisites for reform and imperatives for their implementation; on the other hand, however, they are also objective obstacles and major barriers on the way to change. Under such objective conditions which require radical changes and hinder their implementation, the true course of the reform

decisively depends on the activities of the people: on the positions and participation of organized political forces and, above all, the positions and activities of the various social groups. The profound reforms and the renovation of socialism are, consequently, an objective need but, at the same time, also one of its possible futures. In that sense the difficulties are of a double nature: First, they are related to the fact that the transition to reform takes place with a major historical delay; second, they are due to the fact that the functioning systems in the socialist countries did not develop the type of subjective and objective factors the effect of which, in itself, would ensure the modernizing, the economic rationalization and democratization of social life but, conversely, triggered mechanisms and forces of conservative inertia and reproduction of the status. It was precisely this that created the crisis and hindered its resolution. That is why it is necessary to make the "Copernicus turn," i.e., to achieve profound shifts and thorough changes in the system.

Is this possible and who should do it and how?

Difficulties and Obstacles on the Path of Reforms

The formulation and implementation of the strategy of reform, particularly in the course of its implementation, are accompanied in all socialist countries by numerous difficulties. Over the past 30 years the development of those countries was characterized by a peculiar contradiction between the increasingly obvious need for change and the opposition of the system to reforms. Various factors and inertial forces were more clearly manifested than the requirements, needs, and forces of change. The base of such an opposition is, on the one hand, the interweaving of interrelated obstacles and barriers. Its second aspect is that of social forces interested in preserving the existing system. Let us consider both aspects.

What are the difficulties and obstacles?

1. The ideological-theoretical foundation, the ideological manifestation of the system of so-called real socialism, like the Maoist model used in China during the period of the "Great Leap" and the "Cultural Revolution," was the statist-bureaucratic revision, the arbitrary interpretation and dogmatizing of Marxism and Leninism. A more or less integral system of theoretical views and ideological concepts was created, which identified the existing system in all of its specific manifestations with the very nature of socialism, presenting it as its highest achievement. It is thus that a barrier was erected in front of the scientists, blocking the critical reinterpretation of the existing system and, even more so, efforts to dispute or question its value. In such an ideological and spiritual atmosphere many party cadres, like the simple people, frequently viewed any demand to abandon such dogmas, not to mention changes in the system, as a withdrawal from socialism. Therefore, these classical or modified Stalinist and Maoist concepts and dogmas constituted **ideological barriers** which hindered both the revised and reinterpreted foundations of the system as well as the

shaping of a new system and the extensive participation of some cadres and the population in the implementation of the initiated changes.

2. In addition to ideological barriers on the path to change, characteristic **psychological barriers** exist as well. The Stalinist system and, subsequently, the system of real socialism, on the one hand, and the Maoist ideology and practices of the "Cultural Revolution," on the other, molded a corresponding type of personality. The nature of the psychology of socialist collectivism turned out deformed: Collectivistic values and discipline were transformed into subordination and command from above; ideological convictions became a limited intellectual autonomy and a "suppressed" social activity. Under the conditions of repression, a fear spread among the broad population strata (with the exception, from time to time, of Poland and Hungary) "of somehow being thrown out of the common ranks;" the optimism of the "makers of the new world" turned into a barracks-style sedating artificial cheerfulness. Today the reform process keeps stumbling on these "legacies" of Stalinism and Maoism.

In accordance with their assigned place and role in a society divided into managers and executors, most managers assumed the bureaucratic habits of command; among most of the population—including managers of labor collectives—the features developed of people who implement other people's thoughts, plans, and directives, formally and superficially, and try to obtain as few assignments as possible. Under such conditions initiative, a creative approach, and autonomy, the precise qualities which are needed under the contemporary conditions of perestroika and reform, were suppressed. Particularly profound changes must be made by the heads of enterprises who must display efficiency, enterprise, competence, confidence in their own possibilities, observe the ethics of business relations with their partners, and organize, cultivate, and develop relations of cooperation and enterprise within their own collectives. Such new people are few; the majority are stricken by a strong mental inertia, habits, and behavior which developed under the former system. All of this hinders the implementation of the stipulated changes. In China and in some other Asian socialist countries, in addition to ideological barriers, the low educational level not only of the working class and the other population strata but also of most party, state, and economic cadres, also plays a role.

3. All of these countries have their characteristic **scientific barriers** to the formulation and implementation of reforms. Considering the situation in which the social sciences found themselves (the existing situation was justified and popularized for the sake of the "party-mindedness of science"), they did not have the opportunity critically to analyze the condition of society, not to mention that of formulating and suggesting alternate solutions. Therefore, after political decisions were made on implementing reforms, science was unable to formulate an overall concept of change. Together with practice

(through experimentation) it was forced to seek them through the inefficient "trial and error method." In the past few years, although it has taken a step forward, to this day it not only lacks entire and functional concepts of changes but also preliminary theoretical answers to basic questions on which the reform concept rests. This is one of the reasons for such concepts turned out to be undeveloped and inconsistent. Another reason is found in the correlation of forces within the political leadership, which leads to compromise and, therefore, to inconsistent decisions which, in turn, are obstacles on the path of change.

4. The inconsistency of the previous reformist thoughts, concepts, and measures is reflected in a number of important problems, the most important among which are the following:

First, the acceleration of economic development and the organization of an economic balance (between production and consumption, among individual areas and sectors of the national economy, between imports and exports, etc.)—the two important objectives of economic policy, enclosed in the concepts of the reform and which, in accordance with economic theory and current practices, are reciprocally conflicting, which determines other manifestations of inconsistency;

Second, some objectives in the first phase of the reform (interventionist steps for "healing the economy") conflict with the long-term objectives of the reform: with structural and structuralistic strategic changes;

Third, demands of increasing consumption and technological restructuring of the economy can be met with difficulty simultaneously; yet without the former it is impossible to develop efficient motivational factors, whereas without the latter modernization becomes inconceivable;

Fourth, the concept of democratic centralism in economic management, which remains within the overall framework of the planned reforms, contains a number of conflicting elements of centralization and decentralization, which can be successfully combined with each other with some difficulty;

Fifth, the economic reform within the individual socialist countries is insufficiently supported by reforms in their reciprocal economic relations and, to an even lesser extent, by their involvement with the world market;

Sixth, the economic reform is not paralleled by corresponding political reform, as a result of which the institutions of the political system are an obstacle to economic reforms.

All these and other manifestations of inconsistencies and contradictions in reform steps are major obstacles on the way to their implementation.

5. The following is necessary in order to implement a policy of reforms: change the structure and modernize

the economy; develop the scientific and technical revolution; make a reform in education and modernization of science and in material incentive. All of this requires substantial material funds which are difficult to procure in a stagnant and uneconomical national economy, distinguished by an increasingly weak accumulation capability. In this sense one can speak of **material obstructions** on the path of change. Funds for expanded reproduction, wages, sociocultural needs, and armaments and the implementation of international obligations must be extracted from the national income, the growth rates of which have slowed down.

These groups of "expenditure items" show a tendency to grow. Nonetheless, not all of them can be increased. This model was based on a slower increase in wages for the sake of accelerated economic development and strengthening of military power. Today this model has become unproductive: The low (stagnating and sometimes even declining) living standard becomes an obstacle to development. It is obvious that the enhancement of the living standard and the modernizing of the economy can be achieved only by reducing armaments. Therefore, the obstacles to reform assume **international parameters** as well. Therefore, the success of the policy of disarmament and, in general, of easing international tension, is a major prerequisite and structural component of the reform.

6. Systems theories show a trend toward self-reproduction of systems and the elimination of all "alien elements" introduced in them. The so far unsuccessful efforts at reform prove that the existing socialist systems have built within themselves a number of systems barriers which oppose change and reject it. In this sense gradual and partial changes which are being made in the existing system, not to mention in any one of its parts (subsystem) encounter major obstacles. All of this requires radical and comprehensive structural changes within the system. However, it is difficult to undertake them, bearing in mind the reasons we listed and the correlation of forces between the opponents and proponents of change.

Reform Proponents and Opponents

The implementation of reforms at all stages, from an idea, through the formulation of a concept, and to the decision of their implementation, goes through an ideological, political, and social struggle. Therefore, the course and outcome of this struggle depend, on the one hand, on the possibility of surmounting objective difficulties and the enumerated obstacles and, on the other, the **correlation of forces** of the proponents and opponents of changes and their ability to win over a significant portion of the population which is displaying an undefined attitude toward reforms, and the ability to formulate and implement a proper—realistic, active, and mobilizing—strategy in the struggle for reforms.

Thus, the discrediting of the old concepts (models) of development, and the harnessing of political will for

change and formulation of the concepts of change are the necessary prerequisites. Nonetheless, they are merely the prerequisites of changes. Their implementation is the most important and most difficult step in the entire reform process. Its results substantially depend on the scope and power of the forces which support or oppose reforms. Reforms affect the real interests of the people and thus largely define their positions and behavior. Available experience of initiated or unfinished attempts at reform indicate that a considerable percentage of administrative structures, which have strong positions and influence, oppose the reform. On the other hand, reforms begin as a consequence of pressure "from below" as well as a "revolution from above," for which reason it is necessary for a certain support for the reform exist that on the upper level of the administrative structures.

In order to ensure the success of the initiated changes, as practical experience indicates, a favorable development of circumstances is necessary. It is important, above all, for the political leadership to include a nucleus of leaders who are entirely resolved to endure on the path of reforms. Leaders are needed, who enjoy both popularity and authority, combining daring and resolve, perspicacity and tactical cunning, and the ability to rally creatively thinking fellow workers and to synthesize their ideas and thoughts within a realistic concept and an efficient platform, people with the ability to test scientific conclusions through practical experience and to apply practical experience in the programs and actions of the people. Furthermore, the participation and support of intellectual and all other creative forces are necessary throughout all the stages of such processes: the reinterpretation and formulation of concepts and their implementation. In the final account, however, success in reorganizations is determined above all by the extent to which they can be accepted and supported by the broadest possible masses within each labor collective and at each separate job and throughout the country, and their implementation is undertaken.

The amazing hesitations and difficulties in the course of such social and political battles are explained by the fact that no single large social group or political and social organization can be entirely and fully classified as either a supporter or opponent of the reform. The previous assumptions that the working class was a unanimous supporter of reforms in the socialist countries is not confirmed either by the results of scientific studies or their practical implementation. The communist parties as a single entity as well are not the bearers of the renovation of socialism; nor are the trade-union and youth organizations or specialized and artistic associations.

On the other hand, it is inaccurate to claim that the entire administrative apparatus and the party and the organizations we mentioned are opponents of the reform. The results of studies have indicated that the watershed on the matter of the attitude of the reform runs not through them but through social groups and

sociopolitical organizations. As a rule, in terms of the attitude toward reforms, three not entirely clearly outlined or permanent groups develop: supporters and opponents of change and heterogeneous groups distinguished by a duality of views.

Supporters of change are members of virtually all basic social groups and organizations, including the party, state, and economic apparatus on all levels of its hierarchical structure. In the national economy, two groups are interested in economic reform: first, the members of the leading enterprises staffs (of economic associations), whose rights become considerably broadened with the implementation of the reforms; second, the simple workers and engineers who, under the new circumstances introduced with the reforms, will be able to work more and earn more. However, the results of the studies have indicated that only part of said group supports the reform. This applies to the young, the more energetic, skilled, and active people, who have faith in themselves and their capability but were previously denied the opportunity to prove themselves. Under the new circumstances they would like to do so to a maximal extent, to earn more and live better. A significant portion of the intelligentsia, above all its most creative detachments, are either active fighters for reforms or support them. In the party and state apparatus the bearers or supporters of change are the most dynamic and creative cadres on different levels who, having realized the full seriousness and difficulty of the developing situation, and its profound roots and inevitability of structural changes, have unanimously spoken out in favor of stopping the existing negative trends and their pernicious consequences, solving problems and determining possibilities of the further development of the country and their own personal advancement in the labor area. It is difficult to determine their actual numbers.

Opponents of the reform are various groups belonging to different social strata. Their nucleus is part of the administrative and bureaucratic apparatus in all areas and on all levels, whose interests (privileges, power, authority, and influence) are affected by the reforms, undermining their position as alienated and uncontrolled centers of power. Frequently they consist of **clan groups** (related through family, tribal, age, and similar ties) which control the situation in their ministries or local associations, via institutional and noninstitutional channels. Opponents of the reform also include the various parasitical strata who, with the help of bribes, speculations, "the underground economy," etc., earned substantial amounts of money illegally. This group can include also ideologically convinced dogmatists, primarily belonging to the older generations, who entirely and fully consider themselves part of the system of real socialism and are frequently associated with its prime Stalinist variant of the "strong hand." Furthermore, Maoists and other groups of the "new left" and "populist socialism" oppose economic reforms, rejecting them in the name of social justice and egalitarianism, considering them a return to capitalism. The opponents of socialist reforms carried

out by the party and the government also include opposition groups which are hostile not only to the existing system but also to socialism as a whole either because they have no faith in the sincerity of the government's reformist activities or because they want to discredit and defeat socialism.

The largest group is that of **social strata and groups whose position fluctuates, on the one hand, between the desire for reform and expected positive results which such reforms should bring about and, on the other, the uncertainty or fear of negative results.** The majority of working people are displeased with the existing system: with their position and role within it, with labor and living conditions, low standards, poor quality of goods and services, limited rights and freedoms, frequent manifestations of bureaucratic arbitrariness, etc. For that reason, they are interested in the changes which should make society richer, more modern and democratic, and support acts and steps leading to such changes. On the other hand, until recently the social protection of the majority of the working people (with the exception of those living in some Asian countries) was ensured (employment, wages, pensions, social security); most of them liked the system of equalization in wages, which gave preference to workers engaged in physical labor. In this case, virtually all those employed felt quite comfortable in carrying out their official obligations (low labor intensiveness, minimal responsibility for poor results, and weak labor discipline). The economic reform, which introduces economic relations and criteria, makes economic management conditions stricter, leads to social differentiation, and creates possibilities of unemployment; the use of economic (instead of the old subsidized) prices of food and communal services raise living costs. Many people find this unsuitable for, as T. Zaslavskaya writes, they will be forced to "pay" for a partial increase in rights with considerably more difficult obligations, increased labor intensiveness, and greater economic responsibility for labor results.

It is believed that the most difficult period will be the transitional years of "economic stabilization," which will worsen the living standards of many workers and other individuals employed in the socialist sector. For that reason, they either fear or reject reformist measures (the referendum in Poland), particularly when they fail to see the readiness of all social strata to "tighten up their belts." A significant percentage of the working people, having learned from the experience of the previous failed reforms, assume a **"position of observer"**, waiting to see how things will develop further, who will gain the upper hand, so that, in the final account, they can join the winner. However, such a position is aimed against change, for the implementation of reforms requires the mass and constant participation of the working people.

All social groups include older people, who are more passive and sluggish, and less skilled, who are unwilling to meet the challenges and requirements of contemporary economic management (higher skills, retraining, job

changes, wages based on labor, temporary unemployment) and who not only fear but also oppose change. They are the mass social support of the real opponents of the reform in the ranks of the bureaucracy.

The Future of Reforms

Although tangible results have been achieved in the implementation of changes in some aspects of social life, so far there has been no change in the conversion from the old to the new system in any one socialist country or area. This is particularly important in the field of economics, where tremendous problems exist and where change is the most important (due to its impact on living conditions and the mood of the people).

In general, global results of the changes accomplished in these countries—on all levels and in all areas—are assessed differently. There are those who believe that only 2 to 3 years ago only the most optimistic forecasts could have predicted such changes; others claim that, as a whole, such changes have fallen behind the proclaimed objectives and the needs and hopes triggered by the promises. The truth, obviously, lies somewhere in between: The process of reinterpretation and the critical reassessment of strategic guidelines were more thorough and profound than expected. However, changes in real living conditions, other than in China, have been quite modest and are causing some concern.

What are the further **prospects for reforms** in the socialist countries?

In the international arena we find a broad range of views, opinions, and evaluations on this subject. On one hand is the opinion of political personalities, journalists, and scientists (primarily bourgeois and conservative) who reject the possibility of any reform in the socialist world. Based on previous experience in implementing reforms, and taking into consideration the main obstacles in their way, they conclude that socialism is unable to reform itself, for any systematic reform (economic and political), they claim, would be a negation of socialism as such, and a turn toward capitalism (or a return to it). Without reforms, however, the socialist countries would be experiencing an increasingly worsening crisis, remain technologically and economically behind the developed world, withering away from within and losing their external attractiveness. On this basis, they believe that "socialism does not have a future." Similar feelings of lack of faith, doubt, disappointment, and sense of futility have spread partially among the socialist forces in general, including in the socialist countries.

The supporters of optimistic assessments are gathered at the other end. Such assessments are based exclusively on political declarations, ignoring the full burden and difficulties of reform changes. Proceeding from party and government resolutions on radical reform, socialist modernization, comprehensive democratization, revolutionary perestroika, true renovation of socialism, and so on, they conclude that the battle for reforms has been

won and victory has been achieved and that all that remains is the simple task of implementing the resolutions.

In reality, the battle for reforms is **much more complex and difficult, and its outcome is still unclear to a significant extent.** The process of the implementation of the reforms will be the result of the activities of many objective (imperatives, difficulties, and obstacles) and subjective factors. Both the difficulty of the problems and historical experience indicate the need for caution in making forecasts. The antireform forces remain influential and the undetermined position of the majority of the working people triggers concern about the future of the reform. Despite encouraging initial results, furthermore, the international conditions which change slowly, remain quite adverse and work against the reforms. On the other hand, the state of crisis, which is the product of the old system, the inability to find a solution to it within the existing system and the inability of antireform forces to offer an effective alternative create the threat of unpredictable negative consequences should the reforms fail to take off. This is the basis for the imperative of change and it is thanks to awareness of this fact that the previous ideological and political battles for reform were won, a reform orientation was approved, and decisions to implement the reform were made. It is on the basis of such imperatives that the conviction is strengthening to the effect that the initiated process is lengthy, stable and largely irreversible.

Such assessments, however, demand a certain refinement and stipulations: **The reforms were initiated and will continue but, first of all, they will not have an identically radical nature in all areas and countries; second, they will take place by stages.** Judging by all we know, they will be more profound in the economy, where without reforms nothing can be accomplished, as well as in some areas of culture and information, where success can be achieved without major material outlays and where quite active forces aimed at change are functioning. In the political system such processes will take place with greater difficulty, more slowly and without any particularly profound changes in the existing system. Time will show whether it is possible, and for how long, to follow the path of such an uneven reformation of society and the system which constitute an integral entity. Finally, **the reform process will experience fluctuations.** It will have its periods of upsurge, stagnation, and decline, although one could expect a preservation of a **general ascending trend.**

Therefore, the future of the reforms remains unknown. As we said, a number of obstacles exist on their way. Substantial forces of inertia, dogmatism, and conservatism are opposed to change. Reforms are opposed also by many significant social forces—the bureaucratic above all. However, they have no realistic and fruitful alternatives and the previous results have compromised both them and the system they represent. Changes are indeed necessary for such countries and a way other than radical reform and true democratization does not exist. Success

in the implementation of reforms in some countries is an incentive and a support for the reformist forces in other. All of this ensures good prospects for the success of initiated processes. However, this success will not come by itself. **The implementation of the policy of reform,** even when it is officially accepted, will require a lengthy, a difficult, and stubborn struggle in all areas of life. All the characteristic features of sociopolitical battles will be inherent in such a struggle.

The history of the countries which took the path of socialist change has already proved that conservative (and, therefore, reactionary, bureaucratic) forces do not voluntarily abandon the historical stage but stubbornly defend their interests (status and privileges). Therefore, in the socialist countries this process is possible only through the **organized struggle** of the forces which are the bearers of revolutionary change and radical renovation. Like the forces which favor reform, they could hope for success in the implementation of their proclaimed policy only by developing even more fully a strategy of change—a realistic and optimistic one—and put it in motion and rally around it that entire human potential which is interested in surmounting stagnation and crisis, in further successful development and in the democratic renovation and the humanistic revival of socialism.

What is the current correlation of forces among groups holding different positions in connection with the reforms?

It is difficult to answer this question for said groups are not permanent or clearly demarcated. Frequently, those who do not support the politically dominant course, speak out in its favor for opportunistic considerations.

In the political leadership of the leading reform countries the predominant forces are those oriented toward change and the key functions are not held by open opponents of reforms. All antireform forces have, nonetheless, not been eliminated. Adapting to the new situation, they either operate in the background or demonstratively approve the party line but try, through their efforts, to slow down, to erode and block changes, in the expectation that "their time" will return. In some cases, related to organized crime, they promote social discontent and ethnic (nationalistic) troubles with a view to creating an unstable situation and thus "proving" the need for authoritarian "strong hand" regimes.

In the socialist countries which have favored partial and palliative changes, the upper hand has been gained by moderate reformist forces. However, ideological-political differentiations are as yet to develop in those countries on the question of the nature and pace of reforms. In some countries where communist parties are ruling, the official political course is aimed against reforms either because the crisis has not reached the proper depth or the because of the dominance of conservative bureaucratic forces.

In countries which favor radical change, after indicating a political will for such change (following the victory

over the obvious conservative, dogmatic, and bureaucratic groups), a differentiation is taking place within the homogeneous bloc of reformist forces. The dividing line is that of questions related to the extent (merely economic or comprehensive social reform), depth (palliative or radical reform), and pace of change. A small segment of party leaders, supported by the most noted members of the intelligentsia, are in favor of comprehensive, profound, and urgent change. They are opposed by the moderate reformist wing of supporters of partial, palliative, and slow change ("improving the existing system" through its partial modification), who are mainly supported by the apparatus which holds dominating positions in the system (the so-called apparatus or bureaucratic reform). A reformist nucleus develops between these groups, which defines the strategy of long-term profound changes but which takes into consideration the real possibilities and the true correlation among political and social forces and tries to formulate and implement a policy of gradual reforms. The line separating these two trends in the reformist bloc is neither clear nor fixed, and the main reform is subject to the pressure of either wing, for which reason the very course of the reform is largely subject to fluctuations.

Consequently, the meaning and significance of reforms are perceived differently within the individual reform trends. The supporters of the "apparatus reform" consider the changes a forced correction or temporary retreat; to them reforms are the "lesser evil" which would allow them, following a certain correction of the course, to preserve the essential components of the existing system and their dominant place within it. The truly reformist forces realize the need for radical changes in the existing system and for the renovation and modernization of socialism. These forces have a more or less clear vision of the objectives they would like to attain. For the time being, however, they do not have a theoretically substantiated, purposeful, and tested strategy for the implementation of reforms. Their objectives include an economically efficient economy, oriented toward the market; a socially fair, democratic, and humane society, open to the world and extensively communicating with it, ready to accept and further develop the civilizing achievements of mankind.

Within the framework of this insufficiently united and organized bloc of truly reformist forces, differences on the question of the pace (and not the meaning and nature) of change are becoming increasingly clear (and increasingly dangerous in terms of the future of the reforms). The radical reformist wing supports a maximal pace of fast, profound, and comprehensive change, increasingly feeling that such change cannot be made without a break with the party apparatus and the struggle against it. Such a policy, in itself attractive to the broad public, does not provide convincing answers to the question of the cost and the means of implementing such a line, triggering, furthermore, the danger of the opening of a profound split and of sharp ideological and social conflicts. Therefore, the greatest opportunities are found

in the policy of gradual implementation of quality changes, the pace of which is determined by the real possibilities and ratios of forces. The supporters of this orientation try, in addition to everything else, to rally and consolidate all reformist forces, while avoiding broad and sharp social conflicts.

Achieving a broad social consensus on the nature and pace of the reforms and the "price" which must be paid for them is a prerequisite for their successful implementation. Therefore, it is important for each of those groups to have the broadest possible social support. This is particularly important for the supporters of radical economic, political, and comprehensive social reforms: The status quo (over a more or less lengthy period) can be established also without the support of the masses; halfway changes can be accomplished also with the help of the instruments of power applied from above with the partial agreement of the social "base;" the radical reform needs not only the broadest possible support of all social strata but also the direct and steady participation in it of the working people. Therefore, the scope and future of the reforms largely depend on the type of ideological and political forces which will be given the corresponding support of the largest possible group, of those who today are essentially undecided and hold a vague position concerning the reform or, in other words, the majority of the working class and the other cadres of working people, who support the positive aspects of reform but fear their negative consequences.

The depth of the crisis and its numerous negative consequences raise the question of responsibility for the situation. Helplessness or inability on the part of the party-state leadership to find a reliable and productive solution to the crisis puts in doubt the competence of that leadership and in some cases mistrust in the leadership spreads to the ruling party as a whole. Conflicts and divisions within ruling parties—wherever such divisions exist—worsen the helplessness in terms of solving the crisis. The discrediting of the previous models of socialism, stricken by the crisis, particularly in countries in which no true socialist revolution took place and where the deformation and crises were manifested particularly clearly, threatens to make the dissatisfaction of the masses with the existing system grow into a discontent with socialism as such. This favors the antisocialist forces in their efforts to oppose socialism, and to reject it. In some socialist countries they exert different levels of power and influence and act on the basis of different platforms and different slogans. Their real opportunity lies not only in their power—although it too should not be underestimated—but in the weaknesses and errors of the socialist forces and their inability to find an efficient democratic solution to the crisis. It is precisely these circumstances that increase the responsibility of the forces of socialism for its renovation and for the democratic resolution of the crisis.

All of these circumstances indicate that the socialist countries, in the course of their development, find themselves at an important historical crossroads. A new, a

crucial stage in their history has arrived. They will either find the necessary strength to cope with the difficult problems of the crisis, deformations, and lagging of socialism and to formulate a strategy of change which could resolve the complex problems and answer the challenges of the future or else they will be doomed to backwardness and pushed to the margin of social processes.

The reforms in a number of socialist countries are beginning their true life, and the area of reformist practices is becoming the real battlefield between the real forces which favor change and the objective difficulties, systematic obstacles, and opponents of the reform. This struggle requires strategic far-sightedness and tactical wisdom as well as principled endurance. It is necessary to win over on their side, to mobilize and activate, on the basis of an attractive, convincing, and realistic strategic platform, all creative forces and all toiling strata, for the struggle for reform can be won only through the active and interested participation in it of all of these strata. Hence the need for the development of democracy, through which the various interests are manifested and integrated and which will offer extensive opportunities for self-initiative, self-organization, and self-management of the working people and their associations.

The battles for reform being fought today could be of decisive significance to the future of the socialist countries and the entire reform process. The revolutionary forces, which failed to use the opportunity for the renovation of socialism, would find it difficult subsequently to catch up. Those who succeed in achieving initial successes should not stop there. It is necessary to create a viable system which would include a mechanism of self-healing, self-reproduction, and development of an increasingly efficient and politically ever more democratic society which can surmount the accumulated problems, resolve contradictions, and successfully meet the challenges of the future. The successes of those who will follow this path will be an incentive for the other socialist countries and a contribution to the cause of renovation of socialism as a global process.

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Structural Changes in the Socialist Economy

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[Text] The profound changes in the national economic structure have become today an imperative of the new economic policy. The need for them is felt, to one extent or another, not only in all CEMA member countries but in other socialist-oriented countries as well. Although

economic structures and levels of economic management of all these countries may substantially differ from each other, we find many similar features and approaches in the structural policy they have been pursuing so far.

This is largely related to the overall initial theoretical postulates or, more specifically, the historically developed dominant means of interpreting the Marxist theory of reproduction. They were manifested above all in the simplistic understanding of the dynamics of the correlation between the first and second subdivisions of public reproduction which, in the strict Stalinist interpretation, was once again reduced to a one-dimensional formulation of the law of the priority increase in the production of means of production (or the faster growth of group "A") and the law of socialist industrialization. It is precisely these concepts which, gradually filling all textbooks of socialist political economy, by the end of the 1940s had become the "strong points" of the key political and economic documents of the communist parties and, subsequently, of the governments in the new people's democracies—Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria, Romania, Yugoslavia, China, Korea, and Vietnam. Subsequently, the influence of such one-dimensional formulations influenced the development of the GDR and Cuba as well as that of many developing countries.

Naturally, it is by no means a question of theoretical but also of specific historical roots related, above all, to the fact that the course toward accelerated building of heavy industry in the people's democratic countries of Eastern and Central Europe was largely determined by the military-political interests of Stalinism. We know that these countries took the path of socialist development on the basis of the free choice of the majority of the population, as confirmed by the postwar democratic elections. This makes even sadder the fact that a Stalinist model of socialism, which its characteristic features of cruelty and repression and its distortions of the theory of the class struggle and the dictatorship of the proletariat, "updated" for self-serving purposes, were unceremoniously imposed upon them, a tradition infected by Byzantine-tsarist vestiges, gradually alienating itself from the European traditions of Marxism. Matters went so far that at the familiar trials at the start of the 1950s, along with the heads of the communist parties in the European countries, a number of leading economic officials were sentenced to death or to life imprisonment or else to long jail terms, on the basis of the usual "reason:" "sabotage" of the priority development of the of heavy industry. This was an "object lesson" taught to the economic cadres for many long years into the future.

We remember how contradictory was the "first historical stage" of the socialist industrialization in the USSR. The merciless concentration of accumulation resources in heavy industry at the expense of the impoverishment of agriculture and neglect of the basic requirements of population supplies, going so far as to cause mass hunger, was interwoven with the objective historical requirements of industrialization and modernization of

a backward economy, the necessary need of a secure defense and the labor enthusiasm of the working class, the training of domestic skilled cadres, etc. The unquestionable Leninist concept to the effect that the final victory of socialism can be achieved only on the basis of higher social labor productivity compared to capitalism was used to substantiate economic policy.

Equally conflicting was the "second historical stage" of socialist industrialization of the end of the 1940s and, particularly, during the 1950s, manifested in the accelerated development of industry in the people's democracies of Eastern and Central Europe. In addition to arbitrariness and dogmatism, nurtured by the interests of the authorities and the military-political priorities of Stalinism, in this case a great role was played by the objective needs for an intensive industrial upsurge of the majority of these countries, accompanied by the opening of the big Soviet market for industrial goods. In particular, in Czechoslovakia, this provided the necessary conditions for profitable trade with the USSR (export of machines, import of raw materials), fast expansion of sales, ensuring employment and upgrading the general living standard, and industrializing the backward parts of the country, agrarian Slovakia in particular. A large number of complex industrial, power and other projects were completed; hundreds of thousands of highly skilled workers and engineers were trained, etc. To varying extents these positive aspects of postwar development influenced economic growth in Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria, Romania and, later, the GDR and Cuba, and the countries with socialist orientation. This, however, did not justify the negative and, in some respects, even tragic consequences of accelerated industrialization.

Let us also remember the sad fact that many professors, academicians and other scientists dedicated their efforts to the defense of such deformations and that our economic publications were oversaturated with glorifications of successes, relying on the "key objective economic of the primary development of means of production." Many such authors are publishing today totally opposite views, not deeming it necessary even to mention the fact that they had revised their old views and the reasons for such revisions. Yet this is important, for it is a question not of "self-scourging" but of shaping the ethical and professional prerequisites for the systematic elimination of apologetic and circumstantial trends in our science.

As a young Marxist, I too supported the law of the priority development of the first subdivision in social reproduction arguing, for example, with Professor B. Mints. Later, thanks to the debates of the end of the 1950s, I, like many other economists, converted to a long

theoretical and practical opposition to the one-sided preference given to the development of heavy industry. Nonetheless, I find it difficult to claim that today we are encountering proper understanding of the nature of this question among people in leading positions as well.

The objective reality is that profound deformations are inherent in the existing structure of the national economy of all CEMA-member countries and of a number of developing countries with a socialist orientation. Essentially, they are the excessive development of heavy industry to the detriment of processing industry and the service sector. This problem has already manifested itself quite sharply in Czechoslovakia, the GDR, Hungary, the USSR, Bulgaria and Romania. The "prologue" to such a development of events can be seen also in many socialist-oriented countries. To say the least, all prerequisites to this effect are found in the ideology of an ambitious industrialization, which ignores the real needs of the domestic market, population demand, the interests of the development of agriculture and the service industry.

The Czechoslovak economy provides, in my view, a typical example of the structural problems which have accumulated and which are topical in the other socialist countries as well. This is confirmed by a number of key macroeconomic ratios.

Table 1. Share of the Entire Industry in Production Resources and the Gross Domestic Product in the 1980's (in percent)

	Czechoslovakia	DCC ¹
Employment	37.6	25.2
Energy Consumption	59.0	36.8
Investments	35.0	23.7
Imports	86.8	39.8
Gross Domestic Product	37.0	27.6

Footnote: DCC—Developed Capitalist Countries: average values of indicators for Austria, Belgium, Denmark, The Netherlands, France, the FRG and Japan.

A comparison between the share of heavy industry in the national economic indicators of Czechoslovakia and the developed capitalist countries (DCC) provides an even clearer example. Thus, the share of all heavy industry sectors (including heavy machine building) in the gross domestic product (GDP) of Czechoslovakia in the 1980s averaged 20.2 percent, compared to 12.1 percent in the DCC; in gross investments (excluding agriculture): 24.0 percent for Czechoslovakia and 10.1 percent for the DCC; overall employment: 17.5 percent for Czechoslovakia and 8.9 percent for the DCC.

The distribution of investment resources and employment in the most important sectors of the national economy is important in terms of characterizing the

economic structure. A comparison with the DCC presents the following picture for the key ratios:

Table 2. Structure of Employment and Investments by Sector¹ in 1985 (in percent)

	Share of Employment			Share in Gross Investments		
	I	II	III	I	II	III
Czechoslovakia	12.5	47.0	40.5	15.3	44.5	40.2
DCC	6.0	32.1	61.9	4.8	25.5	59.7

Footnote: I—Primary Sector, i.e., agriculture, forestry, extracting industry; II—Secondary Sector, i.e., industry and construction; III—Tertiary Sector, i.e., the service industry.

Here social labor productivity is 50-60 percent of the level of the developed capitalist countries; capital intensiveness exceeds this level by more than 100 percent.

The macrostructural deformations, an idea of which can be gained from the tables, is largely explained by the high material and capital intensiveness of the Czechoslovak economy. International comparisons, for example, confirm that approximately one-half of the disparity in material intensiveness of the gross internal product in Czechoslovakia, compared to the developed capitalist countries, is related to the low share of the service sector.

The overall standard of capital investments in Czechoslovakia is somewhat higher than in the DCC. The main distinction, however, is found in their structure. As much as two-thirds of investments were channeled into the primary and secondary economic sectors in Czechoslovakia compared to about one-third in the DCC. Twenty-five percent of all capital investments in Czechoslovakia are in heavy industry, compared to 10 percent in the DCC.

Some kind of "vicious circle" is being constantly reproduced. It is impossible to reduce the material and energy intensiveness in the processing industry through its modernizing due to the lack of investments which are channeled primarily into the fuel and energy complex and into heavy industry. Raw materials, metals and energy resources are in constant short supply because of the increased demand for such commodities by the machine building industry. The consequence is that ever new investments must be made both within the country and abroad (particularly in connection with participation in the building of the respective projects on Soviet territory).

In the final account, all of this turns into a chronic shortage of investment resources for sectors producing consumer goods. In a number of them accumulation rates are declining.

Inevitably related to structural deformations on the macroeconomic level are disproportions in the development of a number of sectors and major industrial sub-sectors. International comparisons lead to the conclusion that there is an unjustifiably high scale of heavy machine building, metallurgy, coal extraction, heavy chemistry, and the textile and shoe industries.¹ The other sectors

are car manufacturing, the production of household equipment, precise instrument manufacturing, industrial and household electronic goods, the timber processing industry and printing which, conversely, either are roughly consistent in terms of share in the structure of the public production of similar sectors in the developed capitalist countries or else are below their level.

Related to said structural disproportions are the technical lagging in the material base of industrial production and services, and a substantial shortage of progressive (information above all) technologies, as well as an overall slowdown in production and technological innovations. The risk of losing competitiveness on world markets increases.

The reasons for the structural deformations in the Czechoslovak economy are complex. Popular opinion notwithstanding, they cannot be reduced only to errors in drawing up the material balances or shortcomings in innovation policy. It is a question of the profoundly inertial nature of the entire economic structure, which has largely exhausted its reserves and which is leading to significant national economic losses.

It is no secret to anyone that the energy and metal intensiveness in our industrial production and the related disproportions in the extracting and metallurgical industries are excessively high. Efforts are being made to solve this problem through the so-called "balance method," i.e., by reducing the use of fuel and ferrous metals in the consuming sectors. It is believed that, in the final account, this can lead to a lowering of the volumes of output in metallurgy and fuel extraction.

It seems to me that here we are confusing cause with effect and the production and consumption structures of ferrous metals and fuel in the various economic sectors.

The emphasis here is exclusively on direct "technical-balance" relations between them and, essentially, no attention is being paid to the most complex inverse relations which take into consideration essential sectorial differences in terms of the necessary advanced funds and the time needed for their turnover, which directly depend on the level of capital intensiveness.

We know that the higher the latter, the slower capital turnover becomes. Capital intensiveness in Czechoslovak heavy industry sectors is approximately 3 to 4 times higher than in light industry. Naturally, under these circumstances the priority development of heavy industry requires substantial amounts of capital investments. In turn, investments are secured by a further increase in output which, once again, leads to increased capital, metal and power intensiveness in economic growth. Such is the spiral of the self-seeking development of heavy industry in which production takes place for its own sake. This has created a very acute situation in capital construction, characterized by a deep imbalance between supply and demand, extended deadlines for construction work and increased number of unfinished projects. A considerable increase in estimated expenditures further increases the stress in the investment area and slows down the turnover of funds in the entire national economy.

All of these processes adversely affect the efficiency of the economy, worsening its main structural disproportion between industrial and nonindustrial consumption. Their share in the generated social product is 68 and 32 percent and, respectively, in the consumed product, 70 and 30 percent. This is substantially different from optimal ratios which, according to estimates, call for an approximate equality of their levels.

Such a historically developed disproportion is worsened as a result of ignoring the need for the accelerated development of the service industry, related to the obsolete concepts according to which services do not create value and, within the framework of the secondary redistribution, are merely exchanged for income created in the material production area.

This clearly indicates that the Czechoslovak national economy faces today the need for a major structural maneuver, the task of which is substantially to reduce the share of heavy industry and thus eliminate the most significant deformations in the development of the production sphere as a whole. It would be expedient for the released resources to be channeled into science-intensive sectors of medium and light machine building, light industry and the service industry, where the best possible opportunities exist for upgrading the efficiency of our country's participation in the international division of labor and the further growth of the standard and quality of life.

The importance in the development of science intensive sectors, as in the service industry has been repeatedly emphasized in the past as well. As a rule, it was believed that the expansion of advanced sectors and areas of the economy should be in addition to those already existing. Naturally, with this approach the old and very inertial structure of the national economy remained untouched while economic development as a whole followed the extensive method.

The logic of the present structural maneuver should be essentially different, for it is a question of a major reallocation of resources by rigorously restricting the fixed assets, energy consumption and the number of workers in heavy industry and other sectors producing nonscience-intensive goods. This marks a new stage in the strict selectively structural policy with a consideration of closing down all unnecessary and underefficient production facilities and the extensive retraining of their personnel. The released investment, import, energy and other resources should be channeled above all to sectors which can improve domestic demand and our position on the foreign market. Under Czechoslovak conditions, it is a question above all of the development of sectors in the medium and light machine building, in which the possibility exists of quickly regaining international competitiveness. We must once again realistically consider prospects for exports of textiles and printing presses, machines for the shoe industry, equipment for precision chemistry, progressive production facilities for the food industry, equipment for environmental protection and for the service and health care areas, means of information, automobiles and household appliances.

The priority areas must include precision chemistry, the pharmaceutical industry, the production of textiles, shoes, high-grade glass, porcelain, furniture, food items, tourist services, housing facilities, telephones, natural gas facilities, strengthening the material base of health care, the school system and the trade system, the network of public catering, etc. It is also important to undertake the radical modernizing of the other facilities in ferrous metallurgy and heavy machine building and other heavy industry sectors.

The significance of this structural maneuver lies above all in the social reorientation of the economy and in ensuring the actual interconnection between production development and increased consumption by the population. Progressive changes in the structure should be manifested in the increased share of the processing and light industry and the entire realm of services, accompanied not simply by changing the variety of produced consumer goods but by a radical improvement in the quality and technical standards of output and, consequently, a substantial increase in the share of goods sold for freely convertible currency. In turn, this presumes radical improvements in the structure and mechanisms of foreign trade among CEMA members, the development of production cooperation and other mutually profitable foreign economic relations between Czechoslovak enterprises and their foreign partners.

The implementation of profound structural changes provides great opportunities for the socialist countries. This unquestionable conclusion, however, demands an explanation. The point is that the overall economic potential in most socialist countries can in principle ensure a much higher level of development of the population's personal consumption which, in addition to an increase in per capita consumption, is manifested in the overall

condition of the internal market, extensive offer of commodities and services, its balance with solvent demand, etc.

In Czechoslovakia, for example, the per capita gross domestic product, computed on the basis of the parity of the real purchasing power of the national currency, is about \$9,000. In terms of the volume of output this is approximately consistent with the level of Spain and comes closer to the levels reached by Austria and Italy. Nonetheless, the availability of goods and services for the Czechoslovak population is much worse. Therefore, the scale and levels of the production potential and individual consumption show striking disparities. In my view, the basis for such a sharp contradiction is found in the inefficient structure of the economy and the under-effective economic mechanism.

The conclusion, however, is that structural problems cannot be solved separately from the overall macroeconomic interrelationships within the country and that progressive structural changes cannot be achieved only on the basis of some kind of separate structural policy.

It is entirely clear that structure of public production and its changes cannot be assessed only in terms of categories of specific labor and consumer values, i.e., as a share, let us say, of the leather, textile, metallurgical, chemical and other industries. Nor can we assess the structural changes exclusively on the basis of changes in the share of the individual sectors, which are taking place as a result of their technical retooling. Despite its entire importance, such a traditional approach is insufficient. The economic structure today should be considered also through the lens of abstract labor, value categories, correlation between outlays and results, i.e., in the final account, from the viewpoint of social production efficiency. This approach presumes, to begin with, a comprehensive nature of the structure of the national economy as an economic category. It focuses attention on its interconnection with scientific and technical progress and the intensification of the international division of labor. This enables us to link structural changes to economic interests and the value categories which reflect them—wages, prices, production costs, enterprise profits, competitiveness, etc. This is very important, for the economic structure, which is developing on the basis of the respective system of production relations, is shaped precisely through the coordination of interests among the economic subjects.

Under the existing circumstances of socialist production, in my view, the reciprocally complementing combination of expanded areas of action of an efficient market mechanism with state enterprises, oriented toward the implementation of the strategic concepts governing structural changes, assumes priority in shaping and improving contemporary economic structures. One-sided reliance either exclusively on the market or on state policy is equally inefficient and unsuccessful.

Underestimating the restructuring of the economic mechanism and the inevitability of renovating the entire system of market relations always lead to the fact that structural programs, which are progressive in terms of their objectives, clash with economic interests and motivations. This increases the "outlay" approaches, as a result of which state budget funds are linked to increasingly expensive long-term capital investments. It was precisely thus that in virtually all socialist countries extensive structural target programs for the electronization of the national economy found themselves in an impasse; the food programs did not yield expected results and the initial concepts on the great importance of innovative-structural changes, based on a comprehensive program for scientific and technical cooperation within CEMA, were devalued. I also doubt that the program for retooling machine building in the USSR will be carried out in its entirety; in my view, it is too broad to be efficient. Machine building employs triple the number of workers compared to Japanese machine building which is saturating the virtually entire world with its advanced output. Similar examples could be quoted for a number of structural-innovation programs in Czechoslovakia.

Equally suffering from illusions, however, are also people who believe that structural problems of the socialist countries can be successfully resolved only through the fast and comprehensive use of the methods inherent in a market economy, i.e., with the help of a market which would function without any state involvement whatsoever.

To rely exclusively on the effect of the market while waiting for the time when all unnecessary coal mines will be closed down along with plants for ferrous metallurgy, heavy chemistry and so on, while millions of workers would lose their jobs, so that the market could open "at its own risk and peril" new jobs, is, in my view, both inefficient and inhumane.²

Whereas today in all developed capitalist countries long-term forecasts have been drawn up for future structural changes on the basis of which funds are being appropriated for the retraining of workers and training new highly skilled specialists, and corresponding changes are being financed in scientific research and experimental design, and so on, the socialist countries must, to an even greater extent, engage in a serious forecasting of a strategy of changes in the structure of the national economy, accompanied by a respective economic policy. It is important for the structural policy of the state not to conflict with the mechanism of the market and its objective criteria and the initiative-minded and efficient behavior of enterprises, systematically eliminating autarchic and protectionist trends, opening the economy to international markets, upgrading its competitiveness, and blocking and neutralizing the negative social consequences of structural changes.

The implementation of the main objective of structural changes—the intellectualizing of national labor—is possible only in the presence of a number of prerequisites and, above all, by understanding the proper role of the economic center in such processes. Within the framework of the specific industrial policy of the state, i.e., in the search for and support of promising forms of production and, correspondingly, in the conversion and limitation of those without a future, enterprises and the banking and financial sector will always be decisive. The entire global experience clearly indicates that the best industrial policy is the one which is maximally oriented toward enterprises and control over the rules governing the functions of the “external environment” in which the enterprise operates. In the real economic world promising or unpromising sectors are, in the final account, sums of efficient or losing enterprises. Naturally, the efficient enterprises must have the support of the economic center while the losing enterprises must be closed down, however under strict state control in order to prevent possible negative consequences.

In other words, we must see to it that the enterprises themselves make decisions which would lead to progressive structural changes in the economy, desirable for the social viewpoint. Their specific activities in this case must be based, first of all, on the logic of the market and, secondly, on the combination of selective approaches which are part of the arsenal of the financial policy of the state (granting loans and subsidies, lowering taxes, easing currency restrictions, granting export licenses, etc.).

In defining the objectives of industrial policy, arguments of a technical nature have traditionally prevailed. By this token, the priority of political decisions turned into a list of demands applicable to the technical aspect of *perestroika* in public production. Furthermore, in the search for “structural-progressive” sectors, the real conditions of the international division of labor were frequently ignored. Consequently, the economic assessment of future results essentially dropped out of the process of formulating a selective industrial policy. The one-sided orientation toward the technological aspect of structural changes in scientific research and experimental design, for example, turned into a belated duplication of the experience of the developed capitalist countries, as a rule on an inferior quality level and with greater investments.

Therefore, in order to develop a modern understanding of the nature of industrial (structural) policy, the ability to use the tremendous global stock of already existing developments and other results of scientific research becomes the starting point. In this connection, it is not the centralized management of science and scientific and technical progress but the gradual development of the mechanisms of a healthy integration within the world economy that become decisive.

Granting the enterprises a decisive role in the implementation of a selective industrial policy is entirely consistent with the course of essential systemic changes in the socialist economy. We must bear in mind that the

economic center achieves the highest results of its structural policy not when decisions affecting the direct production area are made but through indirect regulatory instruments (taxes, credit, prices, foreign exchange rates, streamlining the market structure, etc.). Understandably, even under the conditions of the contemporary deformed system of value indicators, the enterprises make specific decisions and seek an economic optimum precisely on the basis of such parameters. That is why the tasks of the center include the constant improvement and regulation of the latter as factors which establish a kind of “external environment,” i.e., overall objective conditions governing enterprise activities or, in other words, “rules of the game” independent of them. Naturally, particularly important in this case are the actions of the state, aimed at upgrading the level of openness of the economy and the liberalizing of foreign trade.

The systemic approach to structural changes as the main principle of governmental industrial policy, however, in no way indicates any neglect of problems of development of the production process itself. State support of diversification processes in production within individual sectors and subsectors necessarily presumes precise knowledge of the respective global trends, the prospects on foreign markets and reduced national economic outlays for the manufacturing of a given commodity. Without such knowledge no specific actions whatsoever can be taken by ministries and banks, aimed at stimulating enterprises. Nonetheless, governmental structural policy must clearly take into consideration ecological consequences and, naturally, the social interests of the working people who should not in the least be forced to assume the burden of the structural changes, the consequence of which could be, for example, increased foreign indebtedness and higher inflation within the country. An inseparable part of this policy, therefore, is ensuring the overall economic balance and compensating the stricter demands of the working people with increased consumption and an overall improvement in the living standard and quality. Large-scale and comprehensive social interconnections are obvious here. Profound progressive structural changes are not achieved merely through economic reform. They also demand decisive steps in the realm of democratization of social life as a necessary prerequisite for the new creative initiative of the broad masses. Since it is a question not of popular slogans but of the practical need for a profound restructuring of the socialist economy in society, structural changes, the purpose of which is to improve the intellectual content and value of labor, are realistic only under the condition of a new social climate.

The contemplated programmatic concept of structural changes provides a major opportunity for the development of the Czechoslovak economy. However, this does not mean that we are facing a simple project with success guaranteed in advanced. Many aspects of the program remain quite pressing and quite conflicting. This includes the need to shift manpower, the integration of the Czechoslovak with the global economy, upgrading

the international competitiveness of domestic industry, etc. The solution of these and other problems is related not only to new hopes but also new risks. Nonetheless, the adoption of the absolutely necessary measures can be postponed no longer.

The economic reform in Czechoslovakia will not be a simple expanded realm of action of the market mechanism or a universal conversion to a market economy. Here the market is not self-seeking but a means of implementing a specific program of converting our national economy to the track of economically competitive tracks with a balanced structure which will take into consideration the advantages of the international division of labor, and which will ensure a general economic balance and a qualitative improvement in the living standard and environmental protection. The main thing today is to understand the urgency of the reform and to draft its program as an economical and reliable socio-economic entity of all interconnections within the Czechoslovak national economy.

The programmatic approach to the implementation of such assignments cannot stop merely with the search for efficient economic decisions. It is inevitably related to determining the historical position of each socialist countries in Eastern and Central Europe and its new opportunities at the present exceptionally dynamic and very complex stage of development, rich in dramatic changes. Their main motive forces are contemporary science, technology and organization, based on the new dynamics of the global economy, in close interconnection with the increased adaptability and flexibility of national economies as whole as well as enterprises in individual countries.

Another indication of this historical stage is found in the new political realities in the USSR and other socialist countries which, unquestionably, offer extensive opportunities for peaceful coexistence. Nonetheless, we are witnessing difficulties in Soviet social and economic perestroika, which would have been difficult to anticipate. It is becoming obvious that this is a very complex historical process which has no analogy and which must not be simplified.

To begin with, this is not an arbitrary adventure on the part of a narrow political stratum in the center of the decision-making mechanism but historically determined and necessary changes. Even within the short period of time of perestroika in the USSR the profound shortcomings in the functioning and efficiency of the economy, use of contemporary science and technology, population supplies, the social status of workers and peasants, relations among nations, the management of society, etc., have been clearly highlighted. Concealed for many years under a formally successful superficial development of events, they had a corrupting effect on socialism as well as on the overall foundations of civilized development (aggravation of international tension, taking civilization to a most dangerous brink of nuclear confrontation, decline in the international attractiveness of

socialism, shifts in the political development to the right in various countries and areas, etc.).

Second, the depth of changes requires corresponding strategic well-planned actions and decisions. A hasty improvisation triggers an avalanche of new long-term accumulating problems which risk to "explode," i.e., a loss of social control over the perestroika process under the conditions of unexpected economic, national and social upheavals.

Third, it is becoming clear that in order for this process not to lead to a dangerous destabilization within the individual countries and in the world in general, we must take into consideration a certain continuity of historical development, above all the fact that socialism is an unquestionable global reality. Holding a firm position in universal human history and culture, today it is providing new impetus to further historical progress. Perestroika has provided new opportunities for socialism and for civilization as a whole. To pit one against the other means to lose the key to understanding modern history.

Perestroika arose as a new historical initiative of socialism and it is only in this sense that it has any hope of success. It neither is nor could be a return to classical capitalism, and even less so to the condition of society prior to the appearance of the socialist system in the various countries. In the interest of historical progress we must advance toward the future through perestroika. It is only on its basis, for a long, perhaps even very long period of time that the new long-term possibilities will develop for the socialist variant in the development of civilization, which will be the most attractive from the humanistic viewpoint.

Footnotes

1. For example, the share of Czechoslovak machine building in the final product in industry is some 40 percent. This is consistent with the levels of the United States, Japan and other countries. However, in terms of manpower (16 percent) it is twice as high.

2. According to my calculations, by the year 2000 about one third or even one half of all metallurgical output in the USSR and Czechoslovakia could prove to be "unnecessary." In the case of the USSR this would mean 50-80 million tons of steel; in the case of Czechoslovakia, 10-15 million tons.

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Establishment of Socialism in Eastern Europe: Contemporary View

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[Review by L. Shevtsova, candidate of historical sciences, leading scientific associate, head of sector, USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Economics of the

World Socialist System, of the book "*Stroitel'stvo Osnov Sotsializma v Stranakh Tsentral'noy i Yugo-Vostochnoy Yevropy*" [Laying the Foundations of Socialism in the Countries of Central and Southeastern Europe]. (Historical essays). Nauka, Moscow, 1989, 440 pp]

[Text] One of the most important trends in the renovation of socialism is the reinterpretation of already obsolete and rejected approaches to its formation and historical development. This is the beginning of a complex and occasionally painful process of identifying the dialectics in the development of socialism and the profound reasons for its breakdowns and deformations which, to this day, are so difficult to surmount. However, whereas the history of Soviet society is being actively and heatedly discussed in our country, in articles and scientific works, problems of the conversion to socialism by our neighbors have still not become topics of intensified and impartial analysis. Many people, including some scientists, are well aware of the fact that a number of interpretations, covering that period, which became popular decades ago, are no longer adequate, for they do not reflect the real course of events. However, for the time being few people dare to undertake their revision. This is understandable, for a great deal of painful and dramatic events accumulated during those years. Meanwhile, the preservation of obsolete concepts regarding the establishment of socialism in Central and Southeastern Europe adversely affects the development of social theory and history in the fraternal countries. Furthermore, scientific dogmas and simplifications also influence politics, international and intergovernmental relations in particular. The fear of the social scientists to provide a new interpretation of the state of affairs in Eastern European countries can only play into the hands of extremist elements, who are trying to use the complex historical clashes in promoting anti-Soviet and antisocialist feelings. In our time, the need for a scientific theory and political practice and for a renovation of reciprocal connections among governments within the framework of the global socialist system make it necessary to abandon more decisively the simplified evaluations of the past and to make a more profound study of the entire complexity of the conversion of individual countries to socialism and the influence which the USSR had on this process.

Actually, the most important to the destinies of the Eastern European countries was the period of the 1940s and 1950s. It was then that their social system took shape and trends which still prevail to this day in some areas, were established. Not all of them are of the same variety. As noted by the Polish leadership, the reasons for the series of crises which shook up their country for the past 30 years, and which have still not been surmounted, should be sought precisely in those years and events. However, this period is of importance to the global socialist system as a whole as well. The point is that at that time the possibility arose for some countries to opt for an alternate way of progress by the socialist society, not based on the administrative management method

but on a system of pluralism and broad democratic alliances and coalitions. Had this process been implemented, it is not excluded that in the USSR as well the processes of democratization and of establishment of a civil society would have developed faster. Why, by virtue of what internal and external reasons did the Stalinist model of socialism prevail? The solution of many of the present problems depends on the answer to this question.

The countries which took the path of reform clearly demonstrate all of this. In particular, in developing the new social mechanisms in Hungary and Poland, they frequently turned to the experience of the people's democratic stage and the idea of restoring the once interrupted continuity. Not only ideas and concepts but the names of many leaders of the communist movement, who were undeservedly ignored and stricken out of the memory of the people merely because they tried to find their own, their national way in building socialism, are being revived. The study of the theoretical legacy of the social democratic movement, in which the traditions of humanistic thinking were particularly active, is being undertaken. It turns out that some essential ideas, which are important to the current renovation processes, were expressed and developed already then, although their realization proved to be impossible. They include, above all, the ideas of pluralism, coalition forms of government, combination of plan with market, coordination of private with public interests, a law governed state, etc. At the same time, looking at it from the present viewpoint, it becomes clear that a number of theoretical elaborations and practical decisions which were made during that time (and until quite recently), which were considered to be an overall socialist law, in fact corresponded only to a specific historical stage and, frequently, such concepts were totally erroneous. Conversely, that which was considered as temporary and transient, turns out inherent in a civilized society. Naturally, the unbiased historical analysis demands a consideration of the then level of development of society and its interests and possibility of satisfying them. It would be a gross simplification to consider the historical processes exclusively from the positions of the present. No objective evaluation of the past is possible if we separate it from its real social and economic context.

Now the time has also come to abandon the Soviet-centrist view on the history of the global socialist system. I am referring to efforts to consider it exclusively from the viewpoint of our governmental interests and the inability to see the specifics of the national-state interests of other countries and an approach based on Soviet experience as providing a universal pattern for the building of socialism. Today the CPSU clearly directs us toward the study of the overall experience of all socialist countries. This is a most important prerequisite aimed at facilitating the further advancement of the new social system as a whole.

In the light of this, the attention of the readers should be drawn to a book on laying the foundations of socialism

in the European countries, written by a collective at the USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Slavic and Balkan Studies. Essentially, this is a first attempt in Soviet social science to depict, on the basis of new positions, the overall situation and development of the European socialist countries in the 1940s-1960s, which was the most complex period in the functioning of real socialism.

One of the merits of the book is the systems approach chosen by a scientist, i.e., the study of the socio-economic, political, and spiritual life in that area in its interconnection and the aspiration not only to analyze the events of those years but also to depict the way individual social elements interacted and the way individual and specific features influenced the whole. The authors also study the international background which had an active and disparate influence on internal processes. Today, with a broader, albeit not complete, information on that period, we are beginning to realize that in a number of cases it was precisely the international situation and external factors that became crucial in the individual countries, neutralizing the role of some of their internal circumstances.

We believe that this book has benefited from the fact that its authors have rejected the traditional approach to the study of individual countries, which involved the isolated study of national experience, usually ending with its mechanical addition of individual elements and artificial leveling off, and removing anything which did not fit in the predetermined scheme. That was why, on the one hand, the overall nature of the processes occurring in the socialist world were presented in a deformed manner and, on the other, their specific nature could not be adequately understood. The authors of this work try to compare the development of different phenomena and to draw parallels without fearing to highlight the contradictory nature of the links between the general and the national. Nor have they followed another trodden path of filling in an abstract model prepared in accordance with the old canons and examples from the life of individual countries in which they could select only examples which did not contradict the already customary concepts and which frequently traced their origins to the concepts governing the study of countries in the 1940s.

The aspiration to bring up the dialectics of the conversion of the Eastern European countries to socialism is perhaps one of the main qualities of the monograph. The scientists also discuss the unquestionable achievements of the fraternal countries (which do exist and cannot be denied, although such attempts are occasionally being made) and errors, omissions, and deformations. We must acknowledge that they have not been able totally to avoid some of the old interpretations which are by now obsolete. Occasionally we see a wish to smooth sharp angles, which is reflected in a certain idealizing of the events which took place. As a result the most profound sources of deformation, which began to appear here and there in the first half of the 1950s, and the subsequent

crises, remain unclarified. The authors speak of them briefly, without providing a thorough analysis. Yet this is a complex and important problem as confirmed perhaps by the heated arguments about the events of 1956, currently taking place in Hungary.

What was the reason for the initial wave of crises which rolled over the world socialist system in the mid-1950s? Was it the errors made by some leaders, distortions of the political course, inconsistency between the tasks and possibilities of their implementation, and deformation of the party role or of the political system as a whole or else imperfections and errors in the then model of socialism? As it were, the question remains unanswered. The answers suggested in the collective work no longer satisfy us; this makes it even more difficult to agree with the role which is assigned to the forces of international reaction, involved with the appearance and establishment of negative trends in individual countries. Clearly, the reasons for such trends are much deeper and they are related both to the nature of the implemented concepts for the building of socialism as well as the extent of maturity of the society and its leading political forces.

Unquestionably, G. Murashko and A. Noskova, the authors of the introduction, are right by speaking of the canonizing of Soviet experience in the socialist world. Today it would be important also to answer the following question: Why is it that out of the entire wealth of practical experience in the building of socialism in the USSR did, in the final account, the Eastern European countries turn not to the NEP but to the theory and politics of the 1930s, the period of the cult of personality? Until 1948 the possibility of choosing another way to socialism existed, which took to a greater extent into consideration national traditions, needs, and characteristics. Furthermore, such a path was already leading to tangible results.

Significant in this context is the question formulated in the book of the turn made in 1948, when the Eastern European countries essentially abandoned any alternate choices of socialist development and duplicated the Soviet pattern. This also meant the abandonment of the line of the Seventh Comintern Congress and the experience of people's democracy as a whole. As the authors point out, particularly important in this epic internal struggle which preceded the "changing landmarks," was the conference of the representatives of the nine communist parties in Shklyarskaya Porenba in September 1947, which followed a scenario written by A. Zhdanov and G. Malenkov. But could one claim that the pressure applied by the then leadership of the VKP(b), which considered the Stalinist model of socialism the only possible one, or the presence in a number of countries of the Soviet Army that became the foundation for or even the only factor which led to the premature rejection of the people's democratic stage in the life of Eastern Europe? Such an explanation is encountered not only in Western science but also in the works of some Marxist researchers. Therefore, we consider timely the conclusion found in the book to the effect that the leaderships

of several socialist countries included very influential supporters of borrowing from the Soviet Union quite definite ways and means of management. Some, apparently, sincerely believed them to be the laws of socialism; others treated them more as a means of securing their own personal power.

As a whole, the authors have created the need for a closer study of events which occurred within the communist and labor movements as a result of the turn of events in 1948. Under the conditions in which this monograph was written, everything possible was done to clarify the real underlying and motive forces and reasons for the events which occurred at that time. Opening the archives, including those of the Informburo, would enable us to reach a new level of summations. This would allow us to answer many questions of the postwar history of the USSR and the other socialist countries and fill still existing gaps. The book also considers the Yugoslav variant of social development, in which the emphasis was on the primary collectives. Enterprises were granted greater independence and autonomy than in the past and there was a clear tendency to take into consideration the pluralism of interests. As the first to proclaim the idea of self-management, Yugoslavia made a major breakthrough in the then understanding of socialism. At that time the Yugoslav system led to unquestionably positive changes in the country's social and economic life. Subsequently, however, as Yugoslav researchers themselves have pointed out, it began to develop hitches.

In their work the Soviet scientists provide an objective assessment of the Yugoslav experience. Why is it that difficulties and even crises appeared in the development of self-management? Why was there a very tangible gap between idea and practical implementation? Was this the result of subjective errors or of faults within the system itself? Could it be that the impossibility of self-management was the reason? An objective analysis leads to the conclusion that the prime reason for the difficulties was not self-management but insufficient self-management. From today's positions it becomes clear that the Yugoslav reformers were unable in their time, for a number of reasons, to exceed the limits of the then model of socialism. They tried to combine things which could not be combined: to include elements of self-management in a monocentric power system and to develop the self-regulation by society without eliminating restraining organizational and ideological barriers. As a result, the administrative forces which had initially been pushed somewhat into the background gained the upper hand, thus deforming the newly created features. This led to the creation of a peculiar mutant—a bureaucratic system of self-governing authorities.

This makes today's Yugoslav experience twice as instructive. It indicates that efforts at internal system reforms of administrative socialism and the introduction of new elements into the fabric of its structure without

changing the fundamental principles of its work could be efficient but only at the early stages of its existence and only for a while.

An equally noteworthy fact is that the authors have retained their original views despite a developed critical revision of the past. This particularly applies to their attitude toward the centralized management system. They make an effort not only to highlight the negative consequences of its existence but also to understand the reasons for its origins and to prove a certain predetermination. Such an approach (obviously) has the right to life. The centralist method of management in our country was not inevitable. However, the fact that it nonetheless prevailed cannot be explained exclusively with the personal aspirations of individual leaders. It was also related to the understanding of socialist objectives and means of achieving them which prevailed at that time, as well as the traditions of a given society and the degree of its maturity.

The study of the experience of a number of countries—although not all—leads to the conclusion that at a certain historical stage and under specific national conditions the centralized power system proves to be the most likely. It is particularly difficult to avoid its establishment if the evolutionary nature of development is disturbed and its objectively necessary stages are omitted.

One of the major problems of the theory of socialism is the intensified understanding of its overall laws. In this area the authors of the study have taken a step forward. Until recently, one of the basic, if not the most important laws was considered to be industrialization, accelerated and with a faster growth of heavy industry. Nonetheless, in their conversion to socialism, the GDR and Czechoslovakia were facing entirely different tasks. Of late some Soviet scientists have come to the conclusion that in the case of countries with an underdeveloped economy as well industrialization is by no means a mandatory prerequisite for the building of socialism. However, here and there in this work the significance of accelerated industrialization is absolutized. No explanation is given, however, as to the reason for which in no single country did it lead to a fast and efficient conversion to new economic management conditions. In our view, the authors have been unable convincingly to describe the mechanism of interconnection between industrialization and the formation of an administrative system.

Nonetheless, we should consider positive the fact that the authors have extensively interpreted the range of prerequisites and laws governing the transition to socialism. Thus, they have made a substantially profound study of the role of the spiritual area in this process. They have been able to avoid the "basic" determinism which is characteristic of a number of Soviet scientists who believe that the socioeconomic level reached by a country is decisive in terms of the establishment of socialism. This work considers the spiritual area not as a side product of history and not as

a phenomenon which performs a strictly reflective function but as the most important factor of progress which largely determines its economic and political practices. Incidentally, this is confirmed by the contemporary processes occurring in a number of countries and their progress on the path of reform.

The spiritual area is considered by the scientists not as a kind of flat area but as a most complex system consisting of a variety of components which include spiritual values, their methods of development, and their mastery by individuals and groups.

We believe that the study not only of historical but also of contemporary phenomena seen through the lens of interaction among social subsistence—socioeconomic, political, and spiritual—is of great long-term significance. It is precisely here, at the "crossroads" that a number of contradictions emerge without the resolution of which no systematic renovation of society is possible.

For all too long our scientists treated the concept of the development of socialism in Eastern European countries as a monotonous and simultaneous movement. The monograph successfully disperses this myth, indicating the great differences in their starting conditions, traditions, and national characteristics. Already then that was the reason for a certain asymmetry in the building of socialism, despite the efforts which were made artificially to impose common criteria for all. Therefore, already then a pluralistic picture of the socialist system, which today has become even more obvious, was beginning to develop.

The chapters in the book which describe the evolution in the approach of the ruling parties to the problem of taking interests into consideration are of unquestionable interest. Gradually and eventually, by surmounting sectarian views and excesses, although not everywhere, ways were found for putting into common orbit private and group interests through various levels of cooperation, strengthening the petit commodity sector, and the activities of noncommunist parties. Today we see the extent to which this pluralism was limited and excessively formalized. Nonetheless, it played its role and did not allow the withering away of democratic traditions and partially eliminated the painful sensation of the conversion to new forms of life for entire groups of working people. Today, for example, in Hungary and Poland some forms of pluralism, such as a multiparty system, are being reborn. The nature of relations between the SED and allied parties is changing. This makes it necessary to consider the extent to which these forms of social organizations which until recently were considered by us as temporary could be effective today as well.

As we indicated, one cannot agree with all the conclusions of these studies. In some areas one wishes to accuse the authors of insufficient daring. This applies, for example, to the problem of a multiparty system. Is it worth repeating what was said about the subject decades

ago? The contemporary experience of the European countries allows us to deepen our concepts of the role of this institution under socialism. Apparently many of this book's weaknesses are related to the fact it was written in the period of transition from stagnation to perestroika, for which reason it reflects the struggle between old and new ideas and concepts. Another influencing fact is that for the time being many of the conceptual problems of the theory of socialism have not been resolved, which cannot fail to affect the nature of the work on this problem. Let us further add the still limited access to archives. However, we must give proper credit to the aspiration of the authors to rise to a new level of interpretation the history of the fraternal countries and of our society.

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Chronicle

905B0011P Moscow *KOMMUNIST* in Russian No 17, Nov 89 (signed to press 15 Nov 89) pp 128

[Text] A readers' conference, sponsored by the CPSU Gorkom and the editors of *KOMMUNIST* took place in the city of Sosnovyy Bor, Leningrad Oblast. Its participants analyzed the articles in the journal and expressed a number of critical remarks and constructive suggestions. The sharpest debates broke out on the subject of materials pertaining to problems of internal party life.

Members of the editorial staff also met with collectives of the Leningrad nuclear power plant, the Scientific Research Technological Institute, the branch of the State Optical Institute imeni S.I. Vavilov and the aktiv of the city's People's Control Committee. They discussed mainly preparations for the 28th CPSU Congress, the drafting of a party political platform, the economic strategy and tactic of perestroika, and the journal's plans for the immediate future.

Representatives of *KOMMUNIST* participated in a debate which took place at an open party meeting of the philology department of Moscow State University imeni M.V. Lomonosov. The agenda covered a discussion on problems of perestroika in the life of Soviet society, and the role of the CPSU and its organizations in the revolutionary processes occurring in the country.

A roundtable meeting was held in Pyongyang by editors of *KYLLOCHZHA*, the journal of the Korean Labor Party Central Committee, and *KOMMUNIST*, the organ of the CPSU Central Committee, on problems of party leadership of the building of socialism.

The meeting was attended by social scientists and journalists who discussed a wide range of problems related to the place of the Korean Labor Party in the development of the processes of creating a new social system in the Korean People's Democratic Republic and the role of the CPSU under conditions of perestroika in all levels of social life in the USSR.

The collective discussion dealt above all with the problems facing the party authorities of the two countries in implementing the party's course in the political, socio-economic, and spiritual areas and in improving the ways and means of work.

In the course of the dialogue both the similarity of positions of the sides on the problems under discussion as well as differences stemming from specifics and national characteristics under which the parties work were highlighted.

The joint opinion was expressed of the need to structure the work on the basis of the principles of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism and to continue, on a bilateral and multilateral basis, the discussion of the topical and arguable theoretical and practical problems of reciprocal interests.

The editors of *KOMMUNIST* were visited by the editor in chief of *TAP TI KONG SHAN*, the political and theoretical journal of the Vietnamese Communist Party Central Committee, Ha Hwan Chiyong. Views were exchanged in the course of the talk on problems of work of party journalists under the conditions of the revolutionary changes taking place in the USSR and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam and on the development and intensification of cooperation between the journals.

The editors were visited by Yang Kazhong, press attache of the Chinese People's Republic in the Soviet Union, who delivered an answer by You Ling, editor in chief of the CPSU Central Committee journal *QIUSHI* to the

editors of *KOMMUNIST* on establishing cooperation between the two party publications.

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